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I. INTRODUCTION
Like other environmental resources subject to public use, vari-
ous interest groups struggle over joint management of scarce fisher-
ies resources. Further, differing goals for resource management,
such as financial goals versus conservation goals, frequently pit re-
gional groups against one another. In some cases, regional interests
* Associate Attorney, Preis & Roy, PLC. I would like to thank Kenneth Mur-
chison, Louisiana State University Paul M. Herbert Law Center James E. & Betty
Phillips Professor of Law, for his assistance with and invaluable insights into the
preparation of this Article.
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may conflict with overall national interests. As goes the water and
the air, so go the fish.
Congress passed the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) in 1976 to address
overfishing in the Nation's waterways.' Eight Regional Fishery Man-
agement Councils were given authority to manage fisheries in dis-
tinct geographic regions, with the instruction to "exercise sound
judgment in the stewardship of fishery resources" through a coop-
erative of state and fishing industry representatives and environ-
mental and consumer groups.! One such council is the Gulf of Mex-
ico Fishery Management Council (GMFMC - the Council), which
operates as a "quasi-federal entity" whose rules must be approved by
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the lead federal
agency over fisheries and marine life within the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).' The Council includes
representatives from Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, and
Florida. Its primary function is to establish a Fishery Management
Plan (FMP) that prevents overfishing in its regulatory geographic
region, while maintaining the optimal yield of several varieties of
marine life.'
Following enactment of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the NOAA
began a research and development program concerning "marine,
estuarine, and anadromous species"' aquaculture, or fish farming.'
1. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801 et seq. (2007) amended by, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat.
3559 (1996) (the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996) (2007). OnJan. 12, 2007, Presi-
dent Bush signed the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007), setting a
firm deadline to end overfishing in America by 2011 and use "market-based incen-
tives" to double the number of limited access privilege programs, which assign spe-
cific annual harvest quotas to eligible fishermen and regional fishery associations.
WHrTE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, FACT SHEET: MAGNUSON-STEVENS
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT REAUTHORIZATION ACT (Jan. 12, 2007),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007.
2. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(5)(2007). "The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council shall consist of the States of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and
Florida and shall have authority over the fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico seaward of
such States." Id. at § 1852(a)(1)(E).
3. The characterization of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council as a
"quasi-federal entity" comes from Wayne Swingle, former Executive Director of the
Council. Email from Wayne Swingle (March 24, 2008) (on file with author).
4. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1851(a)(2) & 1852(h)(2007).
5. An "anadromous species" is a species of fish which spawns in fresh or estua-
rine waters of the United States and which migrate to ocean waters. 16 U.S.C.A. §
1802(1)(2007).
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Aquaculture is defined as "the propagation and rearing of aquatic
species in controlled or selected environments."' Prior to 1996, this
program mainly consisted of research and development used by
commercial fisheries to develop technologies for farmed salmon,
shellfish, and shrimp culture operations throughout the United
States and the world, including operations in Norway, the United
Kingdom, and Chile.! However, the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act
amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act delegated regulatory re-
sponsibility for aquaculture development in the Exclusive Economic
Zone of the United States to the National Marine Fisheries Service.'
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) occupies an area between
twelve miles and 200 miles offshore, including areas contiguous to
United States commonwealths, territories, and possessions." Al-
though the NMFS has the authority to regulate aquaculture devel-
opment in the Exclusive Economic Zone, no current regulatory
scheme provides a clear mechanism to allow commercial aquacul-
ture in federal waters." The NMFS currently requires an "exempted
6. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, [NOAA's] Aquaculture
Policy (February 1998), at 1, available at http://aquaculture.noaa.gov/pdf/17-
noaaAqpolicy.pdf. The federal definition of aquaculture comes from the 1980
Memorandum of Understanding between the US Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, and Interior. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 3. Such authority comes from the Act's broad definition of "fishing,"
which covers the harvesting of fish. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(16)(2007).
10. The EEZ is to be distinguished from "state waters," which were defined in
the Submerged Lands Act as an area three nautical miles seaward from the baseline
(the boundary line dividing the land from the ocean). 43 U.S.C.A. § 1312 (2006).
See also, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, AN OCEAN
BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 70-72, [HEREINAFTER OCEAN BLUEPRINT] available
at http://oceancommission.gov/documents/full color-rpt/O3aprimer.pdf. Each
coastal nation is allowed to establish an exclusive economic zone for the purpose of
exploring, managing, conserving, and exploiting living and nonliving resources in
ocean waters or in the seabed or subsoil. 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (1994). President Reagan declared the US EEZ in 1983.
OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra, at 72. See also, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(11) (defining EEZ for
purposes of the Magnuson-Stevens Act).
11. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, The National Offshore
Aquaculture Act of 2007, http://aquaculture.noaa.gov.us/2007.html (last visited
Mar. 29, 2010). See also, Alison Rieser, Defining the Federal Role in Offshore Aquacul-
ture: Should it Feature Delegation to the States?, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 209, 220-23
(1997) (describing the lack of a cohesive mechanism to permit commercial aquacul-
ture amongst the various federal and state agencies involved in aquaculture man-
agement); Erin R. Englebrecht, Comment, Can Aquaculture Continue to Circumvent
the Regulatory Net of the Manguson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act?,
2010]1 3
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
fishing permit" to conduct aquaculture in federal waters; further-
more, an exempted fishing permit only allows for the harvest of spe-
cies managed under a fishery management plan for "limited testing,
public display, data collection, exploratory, health and safety, envi-
ronmental cleanup, and/or hazard removal purposes.""
Commentators are engaged in an ongoing debate regarding
whether and on what scale the United States should begin large
scale commercial offshore aquaculture." In part because no over-
arching federal regulatory scheme controls commercial aquaculture,
any offshore aquaculture that develops is subject to a myriad of fed-
eral environmental laws. Furthermore, many coastal states have
statutes regulating aquaculture in their own waters (near-shore
aquaculture). Criticism of this multi-pronged regulatory approach"
has led to two concurrent developments with divergent interests: 1)
a proposed amendment to the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council's Fishery Management Plan to "provide for the regulation
of offshore marine aquaculture," and 2) the creation of a yet-to-be
enacted national regulatory program, dubbed the National Offshore
Aquaculture Act, "for the establishment and implementation of a
regulatory system for offshore aquaculture" in the United States
Exclusive Economic Zone.'" The differing regulatory approaches pit
region against region, and regional interests against national inter-
ests. Without a well-defined regulatory framework, the Gulf of Mex-
ico's Fishery Management Plan amendment to begin offshore aqua-
51 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1201-04 (2002) (addressing the inadequacies of the current
federal and state regulatory scheme).
12. 50 C.F.R. § 600.745(b)(1) (1996).
13. For example, Jeffrey Sachs, Director of The Earth Institute at Columbia Uni-
versity, argues strenuously for environmentally sound cultivation of herbivorous
aquatic species, as opposed to harvesting such species, to relieve pressure on
oceans. See generally, JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A
CROWDED PLANET (Penguin, 2008).
14. See generally, Rieser, supra note 11; Englebrecht, supra note 11. Furthermore,
according to the NOAA, "[c]urrent U.S. law does not provide clear mechanisms to
allow commercial aquaculture operations in federal waters. . . . That regulatory
uncertainty is widely acknowledged as the major barrier to the development of
aquaculture in federal waters." http://aquaculture.noaa.gov/us/2007.html.
15. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council & NOAA National Marine
Fisheries Service, Public Hearing Draft: Generic Amendment to The Gulf of Mexico
Fishery Management Council's Red Drum, Reef Fish, and Stone Crab Fishery Man-
agement Plans and the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic Fishery Management
Council's Joint Spiny Lobster and Coastal Migratory Pelagics Fishery Management
Plan to Provide for the Regulation of Offshore Aquaculture (Dec. 07, 2007) avail-
able at www.gulfcouncil.org/Beta/GMFCWeb/Aquaculture/Aqua-amend% 20DP
EIS%20120707%20with%20indey.pdf).
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culture permitting has entered into effect by operation of law due to
NOAA's failure to approve, partially approve, or disapprove the
GMFMC's actions. 6
This Comment will examine the issues that frame the aquacul-
ture debate. These issues include economic reasons to engage or
not engage in federally sponsored large-scale commercial aquacul-
ture, possible environmental damage caused by aquaculture facili-
ties, and the lack of a comprehensive scheme to regulate commer-
cial aquaculture. The Comment will then review the two currently
debated plans to implement commercial offshore aquaculture - the
amendment to the Gulf Council's Fishery Management Plan and the
federal regulatory program proposed by Congress. A review of
these issues leads the author to two conclusions. First, for both
economic and environmental reasons, the United States should not
engage in large-scale offshore commercial aquaculture, insofar as
such plans are currently being debated. However, this conclusion is
moot; undoubtedly, the United States is headed towards large-scale
offshore commercial aquaculture. The second conclusion is that
given that we are headed in such a direction, the comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme proposed by Congress provides a better
vehicle through which to manage both commercial objectives and
environmental concerns.
II. AQUACULTURE'S BACKGROUND
Peering through the taut weave of polymer netting, a diver could easily
believe the sea holds a limitless supply of fish. Inside the submerged
cage, tens of thousands of sleek carnivores rub fins as they navigate their
salt-water territory.1 7
Aquaculture is considerably more prevalent in other areas in
the world than in the United States. In 2004, countries in Asia and
the Pacific region accounted for over ninety percent of the world's
aquaculture product supply, with China leading production at over
sixty-five percent. North America contributed only slightly over
one percent to the world's supply of aquaculture production."
Amongst that one percent, channel catfish continues to be the most
16. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a)(3) (requiring the Secretary to approve, partially ap-
prove, or disapprove an amendment to a region's Fishery Management Plan).
17. David Helvarg, Farming's New Wave, POPULAR MECHANICS, Aug. 2005, at 46.
18. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, THE STATE OF
WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2006, 16 (FAO 2007). The FAO estimations
include both food fish and aquatic plants.
19. Id.
2010] 5
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
popular food fish product in the United States, and Atlantic and
Pacific salmon in Canada." Although the United States is only elev-
enth in volume of aquaculture producers, it is the third largest con-
sumer of seafood in the world." In 2006, the United States im-
ported $13.4 billion in edible fishery products, fifty-seven percent of
which was from Asia alone.22 In contrast, the United States only ex-
ported $4.2 billion in edible fishery products, leaving the economy
with a $9.2 billion trade deficit. The federal government estimates
the by 2025, there will be a 2-4 million ton domestic seafood gap in
the United States, based on demand growth projections.2 ' The rapid
expansion of aquaculture worldwide has been coined "The Blue
Revolution," mirroring "The Green Revolution" of the 1950s that
led to higher grain yields in agriculture.
While the federal government has been involved in the produc-
tion of fish culture research and development since the late 1800s,
the focus has been on "restoring and enhancing domestic freshwater
and anadromous species in inland waters."2 6 By the late 1970s, how-
ever, the increasing trade deficit for fishery products led to the Na-
tional Aquaculture Policy Act of 1980, designed to "promote the
economic development of the industry to augment the commercial
and recreational fisheries in the United States." In 2001, the Joint
Subcommittee on Aquaculture released an updated National Aqua-
culture Development Plan which emphasized reducing the trade
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 16.
22. National Marine Fisheries Service, Fisheries of the United States 2006, 48 (July
2007), available at http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/stl/fus/fus06/.
23. Id.
24. NOAA Aquaculture Program, Quick Stats (March 12, 2007), available at
www.aquaculture.noaa.gov.
25. Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Promise of the Blue Revolution, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, (July
2007). See also, Susan Stonich, Resisting the Blue Revolution: Contending Coalitions
Surrounding Industrial Shrimp Farming, HUMAN ORGANIZATION (Spring 2000).
As the Green Revolution was acclaimed as the means to end world hunger,
the Blue Revolution often is hailed as a way to increase incomes and the
available supply of affordable food among the poor in the third world. As
the Green Revolution was necessary to the establishment of the global
agro-food system, the Blue Revolution is an essential part of integrating
many important aquatic species and coastal ecosystems into that same
global system.
Id.
26. See Englebrecht, supra note 11, at 1191.
27. Id.
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deficit in farmed fish products by commercial expansion into the
Exclusive Economic Zone."
A. Current United States Finfish Aquaculture Production
Marine aquaculture is "analogous to terrestrial farming and in-
volves some form of intervention in the rearing process to enhance
production, such as regular stocking, feeding, and protection from
predators."' Five finfish (as opposed to shellfish) farms currently
operate in the United States; none exist in federal waters or operate
in the Gulf of Mexico." In Hawaiian waters, Hukilau Foods grows
Pacific threadfin (moi - polydactylus sexfilis) and Kona Blue Water
Farms grows amberjack (kampachi)." Sanapperfarm, Inc. grows
cobia (lemonfish - rachycentron canadum) and mutton snapper (lut-
janus analis) off of the coast of Puerto Rico." The University of New
Hampshire operates an Open Ocean Aquaculture demonstration
project that raises halibut, haddock, flounder, and cod in New
Hampshire waters." Finally, Isle of Shoals Mussels operates a com-
mercial longline mussel operation begun by New Hampshire com-
mercial fishermen.
Hukilau Foods operates four open ocean cages located two
miles offshore and 40 feet under the surface, under a lease from the
Hawaiian government." The submerged cages produce about
900,000 pounds of fish per year, with plans to increase production
to around 1.5 million pounds.3 ' Formerly Cates International, Inc.,
the company became the first open ocean farm in the United States
in 2000, established after a successful Open Ocean Aquaculture
Demonstration Program run by the University of Hawaii." In 2003,
Hukilau posted $1.4 million in moi sales."
Kona Blue was founded in 2001 and uses an inclusive "hatch-to-
harvest" approach to aquaculture, wherein eggs hatch in controlled
28. Id. at 1192 (citing JOINT SUBCOMMIrrEE ON AQUACULTURE, 2000 AcTvrnES
(2000)).
29. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 6.




34. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 11.
35. Hukilau Foods, www.hukilaufoods.com/about-us (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 11.
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technological fishery conditions and fish are grown in open ocean
pens half a mile off of the Hawaii coast." Kona Blue's process dif-
fers from Hukilau's process, in that Hukilau relies on capturing wild
fingerlings to stock its cages, whereas Kona Blue actually hatches its
own eggs."o Kona Blue currently operates eight submersible cages at
a total company investment of $33 million." According to the com-
pany, Kona Blue furthers "the ancient Hawaiian tradition of aqua-
culture by leveraging innovative, state-of-the-art hatchery and open
ocean grow-out technology."" The University of New Hampshire
Open Ocean Aquaculture project began in 1997; while it does not
sell fish commercially, its technology is in active use at Kona Blue
Farms. The project also developed a process for culturing blue
mussels; this process has already been picked up by the Isle of
Shoals group, which produces 180,000 pounds of mussels annually."
Snapperfarm, Inc. operates submerged cages thirty-five feet be-
low the ocean surface off the coast of Culebra, Puerto Rico." Snap-
perfarm's goal is to take advantage of "one of mankind's last great
frontiers and untapped resources."" By 2003 the company pro-
duced 50,000 pounds of fish, and it is now considering cultivation of
the Caribbean spiny lobster (panilirus argus - known to many folks
as crawfish)." Each of the cages at Snapperfarm is attached to a
25,000 pound concrete block resting ninety-three feet below the
seabed surface; the only thing that separates 15,000 fish from cir-
cling sharks is the eighty-five foot wall of Spectra netting," "[resem-
bling] a sunken spacecraft."" The project operates three fish cages.
39. Kona Blue, http://www.kona-blue.com/sustainability.php (last visited Mar.
29, 2010).
40. Id. compare with Hukilau Foods, http://www.hukilaufoods.com/about.us (last
visited Mar. 29, 2010).
41. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 12.
42. Kona Blue, http://www.kona-blue.com/sustainability.php (last visited Mar.
29, 2010).
43. Atlantic Marine Aquaculture Center, http://ooa.unh.edu/about/about
what.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
44. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 12.
45. Id.
46. Snapperfarm, http://www.snapperfarm.com/2006/aboutopenoceanaquacul-
ture.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
47. See Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 12.
48. Helvarg, supra note 1, at 47.
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Although there are only five such projects currently opera-
tional, other companies have submitted lease applications to the
state to operate more farms off the coast of Hawaii.' Furthermore,
the Hubbs-Sea World Research Institute has leased an oil platform
in federal waters off the coast of California to conduct a study of the
feasibility of using offshore oil platforms for the development of
marine aquaculture; this research is certainly significant for the
Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council and various oil pro-
ducing states along the United States coastline. Louisiana commen-
tators have remarked that the presence of several deep water struc-
tures (mainly oil and gas platforms) off the state's coast support an
argument that Louisiana will be disproportionately affected by the
implemented GMFMC plan."
B. Necessity of Open Ocean Aquaculture
In 1997, attorneys for the Environmental Defense Fund re-
marked "as the [aquaculture] industry continues to grow, it will
likely expand into the open ocean."' They also argued that condi-
tions in the late 1990s - the high cost of engineering and building
facilities able to withstand ocean storm conditions, the high cost of
operating facilities far from shore, and the absence of a cohesive
framework, would limit aquaculture's expansion into the ocean.'
The most prevalent stated reason for the need to expand aqua-
culture is the inability to supply the world's population with an ade-
quate supply of marine food products given the stagnant rate of
growth in capture fisheries and estimates of increased population."
In 1998, aquaculture experts predicted that total production will
have reached between 35 million and 40 million tons of finfish, crus-
taceans, and mollusks by 2010.51 "More than half a decade ahead of
50. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 13.
51. Id.
52. For example, see Paula Devlin, U.S. agency approves plan for Gulf fish farming,
The Times Picayune, September 3, 2009, available at http://www.nola.com/
business/index.ssf/2009/09/usagency-approves-plan-for-gu.html.
53. D. Douglas Hopkins, Rebecca J. Goldburg, & Andrea Marston, An Environ-
mental Critique of Government Regulations for Open Ocean Aquaculture, 2 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 235, 236 (1996-1997).
54. Id.
55. See generally, FAO Report, supra note 18; Draft Amendment, supra note 15;
NOAA Aquaculture Policy, supra note 6.
56. THE WORLD BANK, CHANGING THE FACE OF THE WATERS: THE PROMISE AND
CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE AQUACULTURE 1 (2007).
9
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
[those] projections," aquaculture production reached 45 million
tons." By 2004, aquaculture accounted for over forty percent of the
global fish food supply; to compare, capture fisheries have averaged
a growth rate of less than two percent.5  Other common reasons
given for the expansion of aquaculture into federal waters are:
avoidance of state law regulation, avoidance of conflicts with other
human uses of the sea surface, the ability to minimize regulatory
compliance burdens because effluents are more readily disbursed,"
and the ability to farm fish while maintaining the aesthetic look of a
coastal area.'
More recently, advocates of open ocean aquaculture have cited
a common theme to encourage commercial development of marine
foods in federal waters: prevention of a race to the bottom for
scarce environmental resources."' The prevention of a race to the
bottom can encourage the United States to be (or not to be) in-
volved in the production of aquaculture at all, vis-'-vis other nations.
For example, China dominates the world's production of aquacul-
ture. Furthermore, the prevailing view is that "China's economic
planners view pollution as an inevitable or necessary byproduct of
economic development. . . . hence, they are more interested in
maintaining China's comparative advantage as the world's number
one low-cost producer."" China's lower production costs, due to the
lack of environmental regulatory compliance overhead, are thought
to put domestic fisheries at a competitive disadvantage.
The perceived competitive disadvantage does not necessarily
diminish if the United States decides to wade into the aquaculture
market full force. Aquaculture firms will still undoubtedly be sub-
ject to a myriad of environmental laws: the Clean Water Act (most
likely by National Pollution Discharge Elimination System point
source permitting); the Endangered Species Act (if the installation,
57. Id.
58. Id. at 15.
59. Hopkins, supra note 47.
60. Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fishing Ranching, and the Public Trust Doc-
trine: Ride 'Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENvT'L L.J. 3, 24 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Thomas R. Head, III, Fishy Business - Regulating Aquaculture Opera-
tions in the United States, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 21 (2004).
62. Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of En-
forcement, and Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT'L
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 267, 303 (2007). See generally, Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed, Bring in
the Green Cat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006; Pan Yue, Growth vs. Ecological Calamity in
China, 23 NEW PERSP. QUARTERLY 54 (2006); Richard McGregor, Pollution Fears Over
China's Growth, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007.
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creation, or maintenance of an aquaculture net, pen, or cage threat-
ens an endangered species or its critical habitat); and the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, to mention just three. For instance, the
Congressional Research Service noted that even if the National Off-
shore Aquaculture Act passes, "[a]ny U.S. open ocean aquaculture
enterprise will also face issues of how to compete in a global mar-
ketplace with nations whose aquaculture production costs are likely
much lower."" Therefore the allure - for United States firms to in-
vest in aquaculture operations and for ordinary consumers to pur-
chase cheaper imported aquaculture products still exists. However,
one could envision the ability of the United States aquaculture mar-
ket to position itself strategically, for consumers who use their pur-
chasing power in environmentally friendly ways, as the "clean" aqua-
culture industry.' According to Dan Swecker, founder of one of the
first United States near-shore salmon farms, it may be too late to
even mount a viable commercial industry because "[t]he industry
went somewhere else already.""
Furthermore, assuming that the United States could eliminate,
or at least mitigate to a profitable extent, competitive disadvantages,
the finfish currently produced in an aquaculture environment, if
expanded, would do little to ease the trade deficit. For example,
Snapperfarm and Hukilau in Puerto Rico and Hawaii, respectively,
each produce high-end sushi appropriate fish for sale in restaurants
(amberjack and yellowtail (moi)). However, major seafood imports
into the United States include shrimp, salmon, crabs, tilapia, tuna,
and shellfish foods that are common seafood types available at gro-
cery stores and mainstream restaurants." Among those top six sea-
63. Eugene H. Buck & Rachel Borgatti, Congressional Research Service Report
for Congress, Open Ocean Aquaculture, Dec. 13, 2004, available at assets.
opencrs.com/rpts/RL32694 20041213.pdf.
64. See generally, Matthew Kirdahy, Responsibility Pays, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2007)
available at http://www.forbes.com/leadership/2007/11/12/corporate-philanthro-
py-projects-lead-citizen-cx mk_1112donors.html; Cait Murphy, The Next Big Thing,
FORTUNE SMALL BUSINESS, June 4, 2003. For some companies that have the ability
to produce U.S. aquaculture products for export, this marketing advantage may
even prove fruitful in other countries. See, e.g., Vicki Silverman, United States Ex-
hibitors Report Big Rise in Green Business (Apr. 26, 2004) (statement of the United
States Department of State), available at http://america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2004/April/20040426145651HVnamerevliso.html.
65. Querna, supra note 44, at 62.
66. FOOD & WATER WATCH, FISHY FARMS 8 (2007), available at
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/fish/publications/reports/fishy-farms (collect-
ing and summarizing data from Fisheries of the United States 2006, Office of Science
and Technology, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmos-
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food imports, the United States exports 71 percent of its domestic
production. Therefore, if United States aquaculture firms continue
a pattern of cultivating "designer" fish, high scale production of
these fish will do little to ease the import of frequently purchased
consumer grade fish and shellfish.' Possibly more economically
detrimental is the idea that commercial aquaculture in federal wa-
ters could lower the price for wild fish caught by domestic fishermen.
While a lower market-based price for non-farmed fish caught by
domestic fishermen may decrease the numbers of fish caught over-
all, it would certainly drive some domestic fishermen out of busi-
ness.
Preventing a race to the bottom reinforces the benefit of a fed-
eralized aquaculture environment, as opposed to the current model,
one that relies on regional fishery management councils. If all eight
regional fishery management councils were subject to the same stan-
dards, one council could not attract more aquaculture business to
the detriment of that localized area's watershed quality and the
commercial interests of another region. The prevention of a race to
the bottom vis-a-vis another geographic region has been the precur-
sor of many of the federal government's overarching environmental
laws, such as federal programs for the elimination of air and water
pollution."
III. AQUACULTURE'S ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
Aquaculture simultaneously poses the risks of transformation of entire
70
wild ecosystems and the promise of managed aquatic ecosystems.
Undoubtedly, aquaculture's expansion into the open ocean will
lead to environmental problems. However, the need to expand aqua-
culture to the open ocean is causally connected to current near-
shore environmental problems. In some areas, fish cannot be
farmed near the coastline (in state-controlled waters) because of wa-
ter quality problems caused by nonpoint and point source pollution
pheric Administration (July 2007), Imports and Exports of Fishery Product Annual
Summary, 2006, Fisheries Statistics Division, National Marine Fisheries Service,
NOAA (2007)).
67. Id.
68. However, this would not be necessarily true of catfish, trout, and salmon, all
current United States aquaculture products - this would depend on whether those
particular heavily imported and exported finfish were to be produced on a broader
scale.
69. For example, the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. (2006).
70. WORLD BANK, supra note 50, at 15.
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including fertilizers, bacteria, pesticides, chemicals, acid deposition,
sediment, and other possibly toxic pollutants." Moreover, current
near-shore aquaculture operations can damage water quality to the
detriment of future operations. This may become an issue in Ha-
waii, as several more firms have applied for permits in areas near
aquaculture operations owned by Hukilau and Kona Blue."
The fact that aquaculture takes place in water, as opposed to
agriculture, which takes place on land, represents both a challenge
and benefit to aquaculture operations. Water operates as a natural
filter, mitigating the effects of chemicals or pollutants. Additionally,
one could argue that the vast quantity of moving ocean current
means that the oceans are much more suitable to aquaculture than
near-shore water bodies. However, because aquaculture takes place
in moving water, a higher probability of "inadvertent transmission
and spread of wastes, diseases, and genetic material, including in-
troduced species and strains" exists." Furthermore, "[a]quaculture
poses a range of threats to aquatic biodiversity, and control over
breeding and reproduction of farmed species is substantially more
difficult than in the case of most livestock."'
Ecosystem degradation can occur because of solid waste pro-
duction in the form of excess feed and fecal matter, which falls out-
side of a contained area and can be transferred to other wild fish.
For example, cage salmon aquaculture operations in Scotland dur-
ing the late 1990s generated 50,000 tons of untreated and contami-
nated waste, equivalent to the sewage waste of the population of up
to three-quarters of Scotland's population." A senior scientist with
the conservation group Environmental Defense argues that growth
in the offshore aquaculture industry close to the NOAA's goal of $5
billion per year would create as much nitrogen waste as that equiva-
lent to "the untreated sewage of 17 million people."
Additionally, fish farmers use antibiotics to control disease, pes-
ticides to control parasites, and hormones to induce spawning and
yield a larger catch. In 1995, a herpes virus outbreak near several
71. See Babcock, supra note 54, at 23.
72. See Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 13.
73. WORLD BANK, supra note 50, at 15.
74. Id.
75. Craig Emerson, Aquaculture Impacts on the Environment (1999), available at
www.csa.com/discoveryguides/aquacult/overview.php.
76. Anne Mosness, An update to our report in April 2005: Ocean Aquaculture,
June 2006, available at www.pccnaturalmarkets.com/SC/0606/SCO606-aqua-
culture.html.
77. Head, supra note 55, at 21.
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tuna farms sideswiped the Australian aquaculture community, leav-
ing behind a "sea of dead fish" - eventually killing 75 percent of the
pilchards (a fish related to the herring) in the region.7 ' Although
there has been no conclusive proof of the source of the virus out-
break, members of Western Australia's Department of Fisheries be-
lieve that importing pilchards from "wherever the deal was cheap"
led to the infestation." Three years later, another attack wiped out
most of the remaining pilchards." Salmon anemia, although not
harmful to humans, is currently killing off so many farmed salmon
in Chile that the salmon farming industry, the third largest industry
in the country, has laid off more than 1,000 workers.' The virus has
been linked to widespread use of chemicals and antibiotics in fish
pens." According to one local Chilean fisherman, "the salmon com-
panies 'are robbing [them of their] wealth' . . . [The companies]
bring illnesses and then leave [the fishermen] with the problems.""
Closer to home, more and more species are being discovered
off the coast of North America that carry a particular strain of hem-
orrhagic virus, as an expanding sardine population migrates north
from Mexican waters in search of food." According to one fish
health observer, "opening more offshore farms in the United States
will only open more opportunities for unregulated trade to spread
disease." Some ecologists question the proposition that penned
fish are giving viruses to wild fish; some say that it is just as likely
that wild fish may give viruses to penned fish." One such marine
ecologist, Donald Kent, served on the Marine Fisheries Advisory
Committee by appointment in 2002; the Committee serves as an
advisory board to the National Marine Fisheries Service on policies
such as the proposed offshore farming legislation."7 Moreover, Kent
is currently president of the Hubbs Sea-World Research Institute, a
California group that has applied for a research grant and permit
78. Rex Dalton, Fishing for Trouble, 431 NATURE 502, 503 (Sept. 30, 2004).
79. Id. at 503-04.
80. Id. at 503.
81. Alexei Barrionuevo, Salmon Virus Indicts Chile's Fishing Methods, N.Y. TIMES,
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from the state to conduct offshore aquaculture on an unused oil
platform located in the Pacific Ocean.'
Fish may escape - possibly leaving "biological pollution" by al-
tering native species composition and introducing foreign matter,
such as antibiotics, into the native population." For example, in
1999, federal officials in Maine estimated that only 500 Atlantic
salmon with a native genetic makeup were left in the wild." Aqua-
culturists that can genetically manipulate salmon through selective
breeding with traits that are necessary to aquaculture at the expense
of other characteristics can unintentionally breed traits that leave
salmon less likely to survive in the wild upon escape and spawning.'
In Everglades National Park, a release of blue tilapia in Florida has
led to the loss of food, native habitat, and spawning areas for native
species."
Maintaining an aquaculture operation can itself lead to further
depletion of the native fish population. Fish meal and fish oils from
natural stocks are the main ingredients in artificial feed for carnivo-
rous fish (such as salmon)." Between 1999 and 2003, the aquacul-
ture industry's use of fishmeal and fish oil increased three-fold to
three million tons and 800,000 tons, respectively." In the late 1990s,
it took three to five pounds of wild fish to produce only a pound of
salmon; between 1985 and 1995, it took 36 million tons of wild fish
to produce only 7.2 million tons of shrimp."5 Currently, every two to
six pounds of fish caught in the wild yield only one pound of cage
raised fish.' Removing fish to create fish meal can lead to less food
available for commercially valuable predatory fish and other animals
dependent on marine life, such as seabirds, sea lions, and seals. Re-
searchers at Snapperfarm have reported that using fishmeal "can be
3.7 times more efficient" than natural transformation. The group
is currently investigating the utilization of grain based feeds as op-
posed to fishmeal from the native population, given the "widely rec-
ognized" need to eliminate the use of fishmeal in aquaculture
88. Id.
89. Head, supra note 58, at 21.
90. Emerson, supra note 72, at 4.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Food & Water Watch, supra note 64, at 4.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3.
97. Daniel Benetti, et al, Can Offshore Aquaculture of Carnivorous Fish be Sustain-
able?, WORLD AQUACULTURE, March 2006, 46.
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feeds." In addition to making less wild marine food available to
other creatures, fishmeal, which can fall to the bottom of pens,
cages, or nets, combines with similarly-released fish excrement to
"suck oxygen out of the water, creating polluted 'dead zones.'""
Current research regarding aquaculture operations at Snapper-
farm has tentatively found that there were no "significant differ-
ences" in any water quality parameters measured in the areas sur-
rounding underwater cages.'" The company's president noted that
currents carry over 500 million gallons of water through its pens
each day, washing away sewage and excess food."' While Snapper-
farm has benefitted from strong currents and limited aquaculture
operations in its area, fish food and fecal matter still produce an
"immense" amount of harmful nitrogen.'" Furthermore, while
some studies have shown negligible environmental impacts from
current aquaculture activities, "these projects were conducted on
small-scale operations mostly at low densities of fish, so their appli-
cation to large-scale and/or concentrated marine fish farming is
limited."03
IV. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS UNDER ExISTING LAW
TO STOP AQUACULTURE PROJECTS
A. Existing Federal Laws Impacting Aquaculture
As previously mentioned, one of the impetuses for the recom-
mendation of and congressional support for the National Offshore
Aquaculture Act has been critique of the disjointed federal regula-
tion affecting aquaculture."' The primary federal statute governing
aquaculture activities is the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which regulates
98. Id.
99. See Querna, supra note 49, at 62. Biologist Theirry Chopin has argued that a
way to mitigate this problem would be to grow symbiotic species near one another.
Id. For example, growing mussels, salmon, and seaweed in close proximity pro-
duces a natural solution to excess waste - because mussels and seaweed naturally
clean up salmon waste. Id.
100. Benetti, supra note 97, at 44.
101. Querna, supra note 49, at 62.
102. See Helvarg, supra note 17, at 2.
103. MARINE AQUACULTURE TASK FORCE, SUSTAINABLE MARINE AQUACULTURE:
FULFILLING THE PROMISE; MANAGING RIsS, 2 (Jan. 2007), available at http://
www.pewtrusts.org. See also, Food & Water Watch, supra note 64, at 6.
104. See supra, note 11. See also, MARINE AQUACULTURE TASK FORCE, supra note
103, at 24-26; Babcock, supra note 60, at 25-26.
105. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1883 (West 2007).
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harvesting and possession of marine fish in federal waters. The
Magnuson-Stevens Act governs the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Manage-
ment Council's actions to maintain a sustainable yield in the Gulf of
Mexico. However, under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, an exempted
fishing permit from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-
stration (and NMFS) is required to engage in research-oriented
aquaculture. An exempted fishing permit only covers research
aquaculture operations; no permitting scheme exists for commercial
aquaculture.
Several other federal statutes impact aquaculture activities. The
Clean Water Act (CWA)'" prohibits the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters from a point source without a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.'o7 The Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)"8 regulates the
labeling and use of pesticides; EPA recently amended FIFRA regula-
tions to exempt aquaculture pesticides that can affect water qual-
ity.' The 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA)no controls the siting
of structures that affect navigable waters (such as net pens or cages)
as overseen by the Army Corps of Engineers. The Endangered Spe-
cies Act (ESA)' protects federally listed endangered species and
their and other species' critical habitats (including marine species).
While all of these laws affect aquaculture, "none was really crafted
with the regulation of marine aquaculture in mind.""'
B. State Aquaculture Laws
Several states have regulations concerning fish farming in state-
controlled near-shore waters. For example, the Louisiana Aquacul-
ture Development Act"' provides a statewide regulatory framework
"for the orderly development and maintenance of a modern aqua-
cultural segment of Louisiana's agriculture industry and for the
promotion of aquaculture and aquacultural products.""' The Act
106. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2006).
107. Id. at § 1342.
108. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 13 6 -136y (West 2007).
109. 70 Fed.Reg. §§ 5093, 5098 (West 2005). The regulation applies to "produc-
ers of farm raised finfish (e.g., catfish, trout, goldfish, tropical fish, minnows)
and/or hatching fish of any kind."
110. 33 U.S.C.A. § 403 (West 2007).
111. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531 et seq. (West 2007).
112. Report of the Marine Aquaculture Task Force, supra note 103, at 24.
113. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:559.1 et seq. (West 2007).
114. Id. § 559.2(C).
17
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
created the Louisiana Aquaculture Coordinating Council, a group of
commercial, governmental, and environmental representatives."
The Louisiana Aquaculture Coordinating Council recommends
which marine species would be best suited for aquaculture produc-
tion in state-controlled waters and advises the Commissioner for the
Department of Agriculture and Forestry about possible permitting
requirements."' The Commissioner has the power to issue permits
and licenses for near-shore aquaculture operations and to institute
actions for fines and penalties for permitting violations."' The per-
mitting scheme provides for yearly licenses for finfish and crawfish
producers; however, specific bass species are excluded."' After Hur-
ricane Katrina, the United States Department of Agriculture
awarded $4.5 million to aquaculture producers affected by the
storm through the Aquaculture Bulk Grant Program."'
C. Previous Legal Challenges to Aquaculture Operations
Given the myriad of federal and state programs related to indi-
vidual components of water quality that can impact fishing opera-
tions (i.e., polluted waterways, agricultural runoff, pesticide use,
etc.), interested parties have turned to the courts when the regula-
tory structure fails. Thus far, the most successful challenges to state,
regulated aquaculture activities have been through the use of the
Clean Water Act. In United States Public Interest Research Group v.
Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, the district court'" and the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.' found that environmental hazards caused by
a local salmon farm justified both an injunction from operating until
the company got a valid NPDES permit and a ban on the use of non-
native salmon species. Atlantic Salmon of Maine (ASM) obtained an
aquaculture lease from the state and an Army Corps of Engineers
permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act, but not a Clean Water
115. Id. § 559.4.
116. Id. § 559.6.
117. Id. § 559.6 B(4) & (7).
118. Ca.Rev.Stat.Aqu. 3:559.8, .14.
119. Louisiana Department of Agriculture & Forestry: Aquaculture Producers to Get
$4.5 Million in Disaster Funds, 2007 http://www.ldaf.state.1a.us/portal/News/
PressReleaseCurrent/tabid/92/Itemld/1156/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 27,
2010).
120. United States Public Interest Research Group v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine,
257 F.Supp.2d 407, 435-36 (D.C. Me 2003).
121. 339 F.3d 23, 35 (1st Cir. 2003).
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Act NPDES permit.'" The company operated five salmon farms, all
utilizing net pens moored to the sea floor.'" Salmon were harvested
for the local market after eighteen to twenty-four months."'
The district court found several environmental problems with
the company's operation: discharge into the marine environment of
a copper-laced chemical used to treat the nets; discharge of pharma-
ceutical pigments present in the salmon feed; the presence of bacte-
rial kidney disease and virbio; discharge of the chemicals used to
treat salmon bacterial infection and sea lice; release of salmon feces
and fish waste at least thirty days per year; and escapee fish that al-
tered the genetic disposition of native fish in the area.'"
Years after the company began operations, and on account of
an "intent to sue" letter sent to Maine's EPA's Region One office,
the EPA informed the company it would be required to obtain an
NPDES permit because the farms constituted Concentrated Aquatic
Animal Production Facilities under federal regulation and were
therefore point sources.' ASM did not send in any of the requested
information on any of the farms. In 1993, ASM wrote EPA asking
for a "letter of assurance" that the farms could operate without an
NPDES permit.' After receiving the letter, EPA notified the Public
Interest Research Group that EPA "had not considered sea farm
discharges to be a significant environmental concern, falling into the
'minor' permit category that EPA could not address due to resource
constraints.""'
The Court found that escaped farmed salmon were pollutants
under the CWA, insofar as escapees "can negatively affect the en-
dangered wild salmon by spreading pathogens and parasites and by
competing for food, habitat, maters, and spawning sites."'" The
122. Atlantic Salmon, 257 F.Supp.2d at 417.
123. Id. at 410.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 410-12.
126. Id. at 414-15. Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.24(b) (West 2000), Concentrated
Aquatic Animal Production facilities are point sources subject to the NPDES per-
mitting program. A fish farm can be considered a CAAPF either because it meets
certain production criteria, or because EPA determines, through a case-by-case
evaluation, the facility is a "significant contributor of pollution to waters of the
United States." Id. § 122.24(c)(1).
127. Atlantic Salmon, 257 F.Supp.2d. at 415. Delegation to the state of Maine for
the NPDES program did not occur until 2001. Id.
128. Id. at 418. A portion of the case concerns the company's adherence to the
Maine Finfish Aquaculture Monitoring Program, created in 1992. Id. at 417. This
portion of the case is not addressed by the author.
129. Id. at 420.
19
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
introduction of non-native species posed such a problem for the
region that the EPA determined in 2000 that a valid NPDES permit
must prohibit non-North American salmon strains."o Despite the
myriad of environmental harms done by ASM, the Court found that
the company had attempted to mitigate some of the "negative im-
pacts" of its operations, some at considerable costs.'"' Furthermore,
the Court placed much blame where it rightfully belonged - at the
foot of the state and federal agencies involved in the aquaculture
industry."2  The Court noted that "regulatory inertia" had given
ASM "a free pass to continue their heedless despoiling of the envi-
ronment.""'
In order to rectify the damage, the court issued a permanent in-
junction against the use of non-North American strains of Atlantic
salmon and an injunction against operations until the company ob-
tained the requisite NPDES permit." The First Circuit upheld the
injunction irrespective of the fact that Maine issued ASM a general
permit for salmon aquaculture that would permit restocking one of
ASM's farms with non-native salmon."'
As Atlantic Salmon demonstrates, the Clean Water Act could po-
tentially be a powerful tool to remediate and mitigate environmental
harms caused by offshore aquaculture. However, one conclusion of
the court, that pesticides were pollutants from a point source subject
to the NPDES program, can be undercut in future cases by recent
EPA action concerning the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA). The EPA recently added regulations to
FIFRA that would exempt pesticides used in aquaculture from the
proscriptions of the Clean Water Act. In 2005, the EPA issued a
rule that "exclude[s] applications of pesticides to waters of the
United States [from the Clean Water Act] consistent with all relevant
requirements under FIFRA" in two cases:
1) the application of pesticides 'directly to' waters of the United States in
order to control pests; and
2) the application of pesticides to control pests that are present over wa-
ters of the United States, including near such waters, that results in a
130. Atlantic Salmon, 257 F.Supp.2d. at 421n:6. By that time, Maine operated its
own NPDES permit system. See supra, note 127.
131. Id. at 431.
132. Id. at 430-31.
133. Id. at 431.
134. Id. at 434-35.
135. Atlantic Salmon, 339 F.3d at 30-31.
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portion of the pesticides being deposited to waters of the United
States. 116
The regulation specifically affects farming and fishery hatcheries
that produce farm raised finfish, including catfish, trout, goldfish
and any hatching fish of any kind.'" According to the EPA, "these
types of applications do not require NPDES permits under the
Clean Water Act if the pesticides are applied consistent with all rele-
vant requirements under FIFRA (i.e., those relevant to protecting
water quality)."'" FIFRA, however, is not a statute concerned with
water quality; unarguably, the predominant federal statute concern-
ing water quality is the Clean Water Act. Therefore, application of
this FIFRA regulation would preclude a court from enjoining dis-
charges of pesticides from a fish farm.
In Assoc. to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Re-
sources, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that the release of naturally
occurring materials from a mussel harvesting facility, which enter
Puget Sound, were not discharges in violation of the CWA.'" The
critical distinction between these two cases is that Taylor Resources
"does not add any fish food or chemicals to the water; the mussels
are nurtured exclusively by the nutrients found naturally in the wa-
ters of Puget Sound."'" Taylor Resources attaches mussel seeds to
suspension ropes that are anchored to the sea floor."' The ropes are
then surrounded by mesh netting that protects the mussels from
predators; no chemicals or fish food is added to the water and the
mussels develop naturally."' The court found no violation even
though mussel byproduct and shell were released from the facility,
adding "something" to Puget Sound."'
Thus, EPA's mandate is clear: at this point, the only effective
way to control near-shore marine aquaculture on the federal level,
the Clean Water Act, would not now apply to pesticides released
into fish farm waters. Given that the Clean Water Act may no
longer operate as an effective enforcement mechanism for commer-
cial aquatic facilities, something should be done to regulate the ex-
pansion of aquaculture.
136. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 70 Fed. Reg. 5093, 5097-98 (Jan. 25, 2005).
137. Id. § 5094.
138. Id. § 5098.
139. 299 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
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V. CONCURRENT EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT
Given the state of the law, both regional fishery associations
and the federal government recognize the need to regulate aquacul-
ture expanding into the open ocean. Each group has proposed a
solution; the solutions, however, are inconsistent. Both the Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council and the federal government
have proposed a regulatory solution that would allow commercial
aquaculture in federal Gulf of Mexico waters. NOAA has an-
nounced it will neither approve nor disapprove of the GMFMC's
plan to begin aquaculture permitting. NOAA's failure to approve or
disapprove of the plan will likely ensure the exact opposite of its
stated objection - a consistent federal programming scheme.
A. Action by the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council
The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council announced
its intent to amend its fishery management plans (FMPs) covering
red drum, reef fish, and stone crab to allow commercial aquaculture
in the Gulf."' The Council consists of seventeen voting members,
many of whom are chosen by the United States Secretary of Com-
merce upon nomination by the governor of each participant state."'
Other members include the principal state official with marine fish-
ery responsibility and the NMFS regional director for the geo-
graphic area."' Each voting member, several of whom represent
commercial and recreational fishing interests, serves a three year
term and can only serve three consecutive terms."' The Council is
required under the Magnuson-Stevens Act to prepare and submit to
the Secretary a fishery management plan for each fishery under its
authority that requires conservation and management, and amend-
ments to each such plan."' Public hearings are required before
amendments to fishery management plans can be approved by the
Secretary."' A fishery management plan has to specify, among other
things, the number of catch allowable among any given regulated
species in order to prevent overfishing and allocate that number of
catch between commercial and recreational fishing interests.'"
144. See Draft Amendment, supra note 15.
145. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(a)(1)(E), (b)(2)(c) (2006).
146. Id. § (b)(1).
147. Id. § (b)(2)(E)(3).
148. Id. § (h)(1).
149. Id. § (h)(3).
150. 16 U.S.C. § 1853 (2006).
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The Council has to amend its FMPs to include commercial
aquaculture based on an opinion letter of the NOAA's General
Counsel that aquaculture constitutes "fishing" as defined in the
Magnuson-Stevens Act."' Since the Council can control "fishing"
operations only through a fishery management plan, the plans ad-
ministered by the Council must be amended.12  The Council ac-
knowledges that an increase in domestic aquaculture production
may not lessen global marketplace competition for aquaculture
products (and presumably, its harmful economic impacts on Gulf
fishermen).' However, the Council intends to go forward with its
plan to create a regional permitting process for commercial aquacul-
ture "to increase the maximum sustainable yield and optimum yield
of federal fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico by supplementing the har-
vest of wild caught species with cultured product."M  The permitting
scheme would require a National Marine Fisheries Service permit to
operate a facility in the Gulf EEZ.'
Four alternatives were offered as to the types of species avail-
able for possible permitting. Those options include:
1) an option to raise non-native species;
2) an option to raise most species currently managed by the Council
(excluding spiny lobster, stone crab, corals, and shrimp);
3) an option to raise most species currently managed by the Council
plus spiny lobster and stone crab; and
4) an option to allow aquaculture of all marine species currently man-
aged by the Council except shrimp and coral, including highly migratory
species." According to the Council, most reef fish could be raised in
aquaculture systems, including cobia, mutton snapper, amberjack, red
snapper, and red drum.m
Permit durations under the Draft Amendment can range from
one year to indefinitely, although the current "preferred" alternative
151. The Council gets this interpretation of "fishing" under the MSA from a legal
opinion by General Counsel for the NOAA. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 6.
"Fishing," under the MSA is defined as "(A) the catching, taking, or harvesting of
fish; (B) the attempted catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; (C) any other activity
which can reasonably be expected to result in the catching, taking, or harvesting of
fish; or (D) any operations at sea in support of, or in preparation for, any activity
described in subparagraphs (A) through (C)." 16 U.S.C. § 1802(16)(2006).
152. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 6.
153. Id. at xiv.
154. Id. at x.
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id. at xvi (emphasis added).
157. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 73.
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is one that is effective for ten years, and renewable in five year peri-
ods thereafter.'" This "preferred" alternative would limit aquacul-
ture operations to cages and nets for rearing native Gulf species
such as red snapper or grouper, and would not allow federal water
offshore farming facilities for shrimp.'" The "preferred" alternative
would also require an assurance bond payable to the Council, an
operational plan to manage genetic diversity and aquatic health, and
environmental monitoring." The National Marine Fisheries Service
would be responsible for reviewing each request for a commercial
aquaculture site on a case-by-case basis."'
Louisiana created a Platform for Marine Aquaculture Task
Force "to assess the economic feasibility, environmental impact, and
legal/regulatory considerations of utilizing offshore oil and gas plat-
forms for culturing marine organisms in the Gulf."" The task force
found that "it is reported that the central [Gulf of Mexico] shelf
contains the highest density of oil and gas production platforms in
the world. Therefore, it is practical to consider that the use of
existing GOM production platforms could prove beneficial in expe-
diting the development of a mariculture [aquaculture] industry in
Louisiana.""'
Currently, no permit applicants are seeking to construct off-
shore aquaculture operations in the Gulf EEZ."' However, commer-
cial aquaculturists are seeking to utilize offshore oil platforms for
their operations in other geographic areas. In 2003, the Hubbs-Sea
World Research Institute leased part of an oil platform off the coast
of California to conduct a feasibility study of the development of
marine aquaculture using offshore oil platforms."' Also, in the early
1990s, scientists at Texas Sea Grant used an Occidental Petroleum
158. Id. at 2.
159. Chris Kirkham, Fish Farm Plans Under Scrutiny, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (April 6,
2008). See also, Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at xvii.
160. Id. at xvi.
161. Id. at xvii.
162. Id. at 7. The PMATF was created following the passage of Louisiana House
Concurrent Resolution No. 176 (HCR 176) (2004). Louisiana Coastal Management
Program, ASSESMENT & STRATEGY, 64, available at http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/
CRM/COASTMGT/cup/noticer/spn2006.04.01/20060303.draft.pdf
163. Louisiana Platforms for Mariculture Task Force, FINAL REPORT OF FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR, 10 (2005),
available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/mariculture/final-report.pdf.
164. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 14.
165. Id. at 13. This project has currently not been permitted, possibly because
Crystal Energy, another lessee of the platform, began using it as an LNG import
and regasificaiton facility. Id. at 14.
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Corp. platform to grow redfish; the cages were damaged, leading to
escaped fish, after a severe Gulf storm.'" Furthermore, the efforts
to raise the redfish cost $22 per pound; the fish themselves were
only worth $3.50 per pound on the open market.'"
This partnership between oil companies and aquaculture com-
panies has some troubling undertones. The projects operating on
oil platforms "begin" as research projects; Hubbs Sea-World has
eventual plans to turn its project into a commercial venture "using
millions of dollars from fish sales to support the facility and its re-
search."' Oil companies have a vested interest - for instance, Chev-
ron, the lesser of the Hubbs-Sea World platform, funded the insti-
tute's start up costs, and offered $10 million to run the institute for
three years, hopefully avoiding the "substantial expense" of remov-
ing the oil platform completely.'" A 500-acre, four platform oil and
gas complex off the coast of Texas was approved for conversion
from an oil site to an aquaculture site in 1999; since then (and after
litigation), the Gulf Marine Institute of Technology has announced
that it has all the permitting required to begin its production facility.
Devon Energy Corporation (formally Seagull Energy) donated the
platform with a $5 million value to the company, which agreed to
dismantle the platform at an estimated cost of $2.5 million once it
ceases its aquaculture operation.o
Oil companies are looking out for their best economic interests
by shifting the cost of removing abandoned platforms to another
potentially responsible party. However, research-oriented offshore
aquaculture is heavily subsidized by the federal government. For
example, in the Gulf of Mexico alone, Congress distributed more
than $300,000 to fund research projects.' Since 1999, the United
States Department of Commerce has granted close to $3 million to
companies involved with offshore aquaculture and funded over $9
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Dalton, supra note 78, at 502.
169. Id.
170. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Economic Impacts of Gulf Aqua-
culture Amendment, n.4, available at www.gulfcouncil.org.
171. Food & Water Watch, Offshore Aquaculture Kept Affloat with Government Fund-
ing 9 (2007) available at http-://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/fish/fish-
farming/offshore/problems/Offshore-aquaculture keptafloat with-government
funding/ (detailing the amount and type of federal grant money devoted to aqua-
culture research programs over the past several years in all areas of the country in
which near-shore aquaculture is currently practiced).
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million in research.'" The merging of oil interests and commercial
aquaculture fishing interests, especially in areas in which the coast-
line has been undeniably affected by oil exploration and production
activity, should be carefully scrutinized. Further, start-up expenses
for commercial aquaculture will be considerable; federal subsidies
for aquaculture may well create "Big Aquaculture" much like "Big
Agriculture."
The Council's plan has been met with vocal opposition.' Food
and Water Watch, a non-profit consumer advocacy group that has
submitted several public comments to the proposed amendment,
urged the GMFMC to slow down its current pace to finalize the
plan." Food and Water Watch stated that to push a measure
through so quickly was "a failure of the fisheries management sys-
tem and a flagrant disservice to the people whom [the Council]
represents as a trustee of the Nation's marine fisheries resources.""'
B. Proposed New Federal Legislation
Comments on the Draft Amendment indicated the main con-
cern was one of the environmental effects of having any open ocean
aquaculture in the Gulf at all. However, few, if any, have discussed
what possible enactment of the National Offshore Aquaculture Act"'
would do to the Council's proposed plan. The Act (introduced by
Rep. Nick Rahall (D. WV)) would establish an all-encompassing fed-
eral regulatory system for offshore aquaculture in the United States
EEZ.'77 The Act follows on the heels of a similar attempt to intro-
duce a regulatory program in 2005. The program would include
financial support to an offshore aquaculture industry, the establish-
ment of a permitting process, and research and development sup-
172. Id.
173. The Mangrove Action Project, Letter to Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council on Offshore Aquaculture (Oct. 2007) www.mangroveactionproject.
org/news/current headlines/letter-to-gulf-of-mexico-fishing-management-council-
on-offshore-Aquaculture; Food & Water Watch memo regarding the public hearing
draft amendment (Jan. 2008) available at www.foodandwaterwatch.org.
174. Press Release, Food and Water Watch, Gulf Council Ocean Fish Farming
Plan Illegal (Jan. 17, 2008) available at http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/press/
press-releases/gulf-council-ocean-fish-farming-plan-illegal/j. Press Release, Food
and Water Watch, Bad Ocean Fish Farming Plan Blocked (Jan. 31, 2008) available at
http://foodandwaterwatch.org/press/press-releases/bad-ocean-fish-farming-plan-
blocked/.
175. Food and Water Watch memo, supra note 173, at 2.
176. National Offshore Aquaculture Act of 2007, H.R. 2010, 110th Cong. (2007).
177. See Id. at § 2.
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port.'" Legislators are currently debating the Act in the House Sub-
committee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans and the Senate Com-
mittee on Science, Commerce, and Transportation."7
The Act would authorize the Secretary of Commerce to issue
offshore aquaculture permits and establish environmental require-
ments for commercial aquaculture activities.'" Permits issued by the
Secretary would exempt offshore facilities from regional fishery
management council fishing regulations that restrict size, season,
and harvest.' Such permits would be for twenty years (renewable in
up to twenty year increments) and would specify the location of the
commercial facility and the species to be grown.' The permitting
process would require consultation with the regional fishery man-
agement councils established by the Magnuson-Stevens Act and ad-
herence to environmental standards designed to safeguard genetic
resources and preserve marine ecosystems.' In a departure from
an option of the currently proposed Gulf of Mexico Fishery Man-
agement Council plan, however, the Act would require "that marine
species propagated and reared through offshore aquaculture be spe-
cies native to the geographic region unless a scientific risk analysis
shows that the risk of harm from the offshore culture of non-
indigenous or genetically modified marine species is negligible or
can be effectively mitigated."" Under the Act, if any State elected
to "opt-out" of offshore aquaculture, no facilities could be permitted
within twelve miles of that state's coastline."'
According to Wayne Swingle, the former Director of the Gulf
of Mexico Council,
[t]he Congressional act when passed would supersede the amendment
rule. The act would likely apply to all the finfish and most invertebrates,
whereas the amendment will apply to only the fish managed by the
178. Id.
179. National Offshore Aquaculture Act of 2007, S. 1609, 110th Cong. (2007)
(last major subcommittee hearings held 7/12/2007).
180. U.S. DEP'T OF COMM, NOAA Aquaculture Program, Highlights of the 2007
National Offshore Aquaculture Act, March 12, 2007, available at www.aqua-




183. H.R. 2010 at § 4(a) & (d)(4).
184. Id. at § (a)(4)(E).
185. Highlights, supra note 180.
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council, i.e., about 70 species. All firms operating under the amendment
likely would apply for permits issued under the act.
The possibility of "superseding" raises some questions. As it cur-
rently stands, the 2007 Act contains no provision "grandfathering"
in permits possibly issued by the Gulf of Mexico Council or any
other regional fishery council. The Council's Draft Amendment
states that it wants to implement its permitting plan because the na-
tional legislation is currently only in debate, and even if enacted into
law in the near future, would take several years to implement.'
However, a question may arise as to what "interest" a facility opera-
tor would have in continuing a regional permit, if for instance, a
federal permit over the same facility were subsequently denied.'"
For example, if the Gulf Council's plan passes, and a commercial
facility is granted a 10 year permit under the "preferred" alternative,
and then the same company is denied a federal permit if the Act
passes, such company could make an arguable takings claim. A
permit from the Council could contain a disclaimer stating that the
holder has no vested property right; however, the likelihood that a
company would invest significant financial and physical resources
into a facility requiring a permit, when such permit could be easily
superseded, is slim.
Furthermore, the Act purports to exclude "offshore aquacul-
ture conducted in accordance with permits issued pursuant to this
Act" from the definition of "fishing" in the Magnuson-Stevens Act.'"
This deliberate exclusion highlights an interesting issue. According
to the Gulf Council, it has the authority to amend its fishery man-
agement plan to create a permitting program for open-ocean aqua-
culture because "fishing" as defined in the Magnuson-Stevens Act
includes aquaculture." The Act, however, would exclude aquacul-
ture from the definition of "fishing," which could indicate that
Congress did not intend, in passing the Magnuson-Stevens Act, for
186. Email from Wayne Swingle, former Executive Director, Gulf of Mexico Fish-
ery Management Council (March 24, 2008) (on file with author).
187. Draft Amendment, supra note 15, at 16-17.
188. This mirrors problems that have arisen on the strictly federal level concern-
ing the bifurcation of construction permits from operating permits. It seemed
unlikely in a case where a private entity spends millions of dollars to construct a
facility, with a permit from the United States government, that the United States
would deny that facility an operating permit. In this situation, however, the "per-
mit-granting" interests are both federal government and "a quasi-federal agency,"
which likely have divergent interests.
189. H.R. 2010 at § (4)(d)(4).
190. See supra, note 150 and accompanying text.
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the definition of "fishing" to include commercial open-ocean aqua-
culture.
To the extent "fishing" does include aquaculture upon passage
of the Act, from what source would the GMFMC derive its author-
ity? "Fishing," as defined by the Magnuson-Stevens Act, includes the
catching, taking, or harvesting of fish or an attempt to take, catch, or
harvest fish. Irrespective of the NOAA's assertion (through its Gen-
eral Counsel) that "fishing" includes open-ocean aquaculture; the
Council may not have the authority to amend its fishery manage-
ment plan to provide for a region-wide permitting program in the
Gulf of Mexico EEZ. In either case, failure to pass the Act should
spark a debate about whether aquaculture is actually included in the
definition of the term "fishing." Congress's deliberate exclusion of
aquaculture from "fishing" in the 2007 Act could provide evidence
in a legal action challenging the Council's statutory authority. One
could argue that "harvesting" of fish includes commercial aquacul-
ture. However, such a decision should be left to the courts or to
Congress. Even though the construction of the term "harvesting"
could reasonably include commercial aquaculture and the NOAA is
entitled to a certain amount of deference in construing the statute it
is charged with administering, commercial aquaculture will take
such a large effort and expenditure of money and resources that any
federally supported aquaculture actions should be more carefully
considered by Congress.
NOAA, however, has stated it believes current federal laws pro-
vide adequate authority to regulate aquaculture. Interestingly,
NOAA took this position while simultaneously refusing to approve
or disapprove of the GMFMC's plan, stating,
[w]e believe that permitting plans of this scope should be governed by a
national policy. In the absence of a consistent national policy, it was not
prudent to take action on the plan at this time.'9'
NOAA's failure to take action does the exact opposite of its stated
intention to develop a consistent national policy; it instead ensures
that the development of aquaculture in federal waters will be re-
gionally fragmented.
191. Press Release, National Aquaculture and Atmospheric Administration,
NOAA to Pursue National Policy for Sustainable Marine Aquaculture, Press Re-
lease, National Aquaculture and Atmospheric Administration (Sept. 3, 2009).
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VI. CONCLUSION
A clear conflict exists between the interests of the Gulf of Mex-
ico Fishery Management Council on the one hand, and the federal
government on the other. Furthermore, although the evidence is
mixed, one could easily find that current technology is not adept
enough to adequately mitigate the possible environmental damage
from open ocean aquaculture, especially in the Gulf of Mexico.
Both the NOAA and the governing bodies of some coastal areas,
however, are intent on pushing forward with an open-ocean aqua-
culture plan. At this point, the only realistic option is not to stop
both plans (which is likely impossible), but to enact the plan that
best serves the goals of environmental conservation of scarce re-
sources while opening the ocean for commercial purposes. Because
NOAA has chosen to not approve or disapprove of the GMFMC
Plan, recourse to the courts may be needed to determine precisely
what regulatory authority NOAA has to regulate commercial aqua-
culture in federal waters. Congress could also effectively end the
GMFMC's commercial aquaculture plan by specifying that "fishing"
as defined in the Magnuson-Stevens Act, does not include commer-
cial aquaculture. At the moment, the best plan seems to be a com-
prehensive federal regulatory scheme. Such a scheme would safe-
guard the interests of all coastal areas, by preventing a race to the
bottom for commercially favorable environmental laws.
What is it about the ocean that seems to inspire such apprecia-
tion? It may be that unlike land, one cannot stake a clear marker in
the ocean. For the most part, one cannot mark "her territory" in
the ocean, as the United States has done on land, in foreign nations,
and even on the moon. It is the haven of mysterious creatures un-
tamable or commercialized by man, at least, until now.
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KILLING US SWEETLY: HOW TO TAKE
INDUSTRY OUT OF THE FDA
Jason luliano*
For more than a century, the Food and Drug Administration
has claimed to protect the public health. During that time, it has
actually been placing corporate profits above consumer safety. No-
where is this corruption more evident than in the approval of artifi-
cial sweeteners. FDA leaders' close ties to the very industry they
were supposed to be regulating present a startling picture. Ignoring
warnings from both independent scientists and their own review
panels, FDA decision makers let greed guide their actions. They
approved carcinogenic sweeteners such as saccharin, aspartame, and
sucralose while simultaneously banning the natural herb stevia be-
cause it would cut into industry profits. This Article proposes two
reforms that can end these corrupt practices and take industry out
of the FDA. By strengthening conflict of interest regulations and
preventing companies from participating in safety trials, the FDA
will be able to gain the independence it needs in order to regulate
the food and drug industries.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a beautiful summer day. As you cruise down the highway,
the sun shines through the windshield, warming your skin. A sign
appears in the distance. It's too far away to read, but you know what
it says anyway: "Beach 10 miles." You can already see the welcom-
ing white sand and feel the refreshing ocean water. Today promises
to be amazing. It's a shame that the next two hours will be the scari-
est moments of your life.
Just as you lean over to turn on your favorite radio station, eve-
rything flips 180 degrees. The ground and sky have traded places.
Your vision indicates that your car is flying upside down through the
air. You clench your eyes shut and brace for the expected impact
with the ground. After a couple of terrifying, but uneventful, sec-
onds, you risk a glance. Surprisingly, your car is gently coasting
down the road. A thankful sigh escapes your lips. This relief, how-
ever, is short-lived as you notice an even more chilling problem.
Although all the other cars are still in their lanes, they appear to be
driving on the ceiling. Adding to the confusion, the sun is shining
up from the floor. It takes a moment to come to this realization, but
you know that, somehow, your vision has become inverted.
Panicked, you slam the brakes and turn the wheel towards the
shoulder of the road. The car comes to a stop right next to the
beach sign. Just another ten miles. You pull out your cell phone
and dial 911. In the blink of an eye, your entire world has literally
turned upside down.
Fifteen minutes later, the emergency room doctors are running
a series of tests. An hour passes; the results come back negative.
Your mother has arrived and is standing at the bedside sobbing.
Seemingly, in defiance of gravity, a tear slips across her cheek and
falls up.
Yet another doctor approaches. He asks an odd question. Do
you drink diet soda? You grumble inwardly, thinking that there are
more pressing matters at hand than your beverage preferences.
Nonetheless, you tell the doctor that you enjoy diet soda from time
to time and happened to drink a few cans this past week. The doc-
tor nods knowingly and informs you that the aspartame in those diet
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sodas is likely producing this frightening experience. He has had a
number of other patients with similar symptoms, and, in those cases,
artificial sweeteners have been linked as the cause. A short while
later, your vision returns to normal, but you vow never to drink diet
soda again.'
Many people's first reaction is that artificial sweeteners could
not be this dangerous. After all, they are FDA-approved, and the
government would not let a harmful chemical enter the food supply.
Unfortunately, their faith rests on a presumption that no longer
holds true.
If only there were an impartial government administration that
regulated the food and drug industries, that agency surely would
have protected the American people from such a toxic substance.
At one time, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) filled this
role, serving as the much needed corporate watchdog, but now, it is
nothing more than a corporate lapdog. Today, any company with
enough money can buy approval for even the most dangerous
products.
There is also a disturbing corollary to this problem. These
same powerful companies can prevent competing products from
getting FDA approval.! Often, the products most easily targeted are
safe, natural substances that cannot be patented. When a new,
healthy product is submitted to the FDA without a large corporate
backer, approval is anything but certain. If a wealthy corporation
fears that this new product will cut into its profit margin, it can put
1. See JOSEPH MERCOLA, SWEET DECEPTION: WHY SPLENDA, NUTRASWEET, AND THE
FDA MAY BE H-AZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH 36 (2006) (describing a similar experi-
ence); see also HYMAN JACK ROBERTS, ASPARTAME DISEASE: AN IGNORED EPIDEMIC 68
(2001) (Roberts clinically observed 1200 patients who had adverse reactions to as-
partame. More than 500 patients experienced vision problems, and 27 of those
suffered blindness in one or both eyes.).
2. See Delays in the FDA's Food Additive Petition Process and GRAS Affirmation
Process: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Rela-
tions of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 104' Cong., at 78 (1995)
(statement of Robert C. Gelardi, Executive Vice President, Calorie Control Council)
(noting that "the careful timing of their submissions can hold up a review numer-
ous times just short of approval"); id. at 90-91 (describing how anonymous submis-
sions are often used to delay FDA approval for competitive reasons.); see H.R. REP.
No. 104-436, at 5, 9 (1995) (Parties have made anonymous submissions with the
sole purpose of delaying agency decisions.); see FDA Delay in Sucralose Approval Gets
"Golden Grinch " Award from Sen. Mathews, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Aug. 29, 1994, at 46
(Sen. Harlan Mathews observed that "'any third party could indefinitely delay ap-
proval of [a food] additive simply by repeatedly submitting their interpretation of
data'"); see also Lars Noah & Richard A. Merril, Starting From Scratch?: Reinventing the
Food Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U.L REV. 329, 330 & 372.
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up huge roadblocks and use its connections to cause the FDA to
reject the application.
Even many FDA employees are unsettled by their agency's ac-
tions.' In a recent poll, more than one-third of FDA scientists be-
lieved that agency leadership is more concerned with rushing prod-
ucts to market than ensuring consumer safety.' To guarantee that
products are approved, FDA leaders often pressure scientists to un-
ethically change data or alter their conclusions.' Due to the close
ties between upper management and the pharmaceutical industry,
the FDA is willing to engage in these untoward practices. Unsurpris-
ingly, sixty percent of researchers knew of instances in which indus-
try had inappropriately influenced the FDA's decisions.
The deception is not limited to internal documents. A full
twenty percent of FDA scientists "have been asked explicitly by FDA
decision makers to provide incomplete, inaccurate or misleading
information to the public, regulated industry, media, or
elected/senior government officials."' This deceit directly subverts
the FDA's mission statement, which lists "helping the public get the
3. See Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory
Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1, 58 (allowing industry submissions "brings with it the pos-
sibility for strategic manipulation of the regulatory process in pursuit of anticom-
petitive ends"). We will see this process play out with respect to stevia in Part II.D.
4. Union of Concerned Scientists, Survey: FDA Scientists (2006), http://www.
ucsusa.org/scientific-integrity/abuses-ofscience/summary-of-the-fda-scientist.html
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010) ("The results paint a picture of a troubled agency: hun-
dreds of scientists reported significant interference with the FDA's scientific work,
compromising the agency's ability to fulfill its mission of protecting public health
and safety.").
5. Union of Concerned Scientists, Voices of Scientists at FDA: Protecting the Public
Health Depends on Independent Science (2006), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
assets/documents/scientific integrity/fda-survey-brochure.pdf.
6. Id. (Eighteen percent of FDA scientists responded, "I have been asked, for
non-scientific reasons, to inappropriately exclude or alter technical information or
my conclusions in an FDA scientific document."); see also Gardiner Harris, F.D.A
Scientists Accuse Agency Officials of Misconduct, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2008, at Al5.
(According to a letter from FDA scientists to Congress, "Top federal health officials
engaged in 'serious misconduct' by ignoring concerns of scientists at the Food and
Drug Administration and approving for sale unsafe or ineffective medical devices . .
. . The letter says that the scientists have documentary evidence that senior agency
managers 'corrupted the scientific review of medical devices' by ordering experts to
change their opinions and conclusions in violation of the law.").
7. Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 5.
8. Id.
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accurate, science-based information they need to use medicines and
foods to improve their health" as a primary goal.'
Unfortunately, nowadays, little things like facts and science are
no longer relevant to agency leaders. Their main concern is speed-
ing products through the approval process so pharmaceutical com-
panies can earn more money at the expense of America's health.
One FDA scientist from the Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search wrote that "[s]cientific discourse is strongly discouraged
when it may jeopardize an approval. . . . Whenever safety or efficacy
concerns are raised on scientific grounds . . . these concerns are not
taken seriously."" Quite simply, FDA leaders have failed our nation,
and the agency has been captured by the very industries it should be
regulating.
On its own website, the FDA plainly states another urgent prob-
lem: "The Food and Drug Administration relies on data that spon-
sors submit to decide whether a drug should be approved."" If the
FDA hopes to promote public health, it cannot trust corporations to
assess the safety and efficacy of their products. The desire to maxi-
mize profits all but guarantees that companies will distort their find-
ings.
In fact, entire industries have thrived by "manufacturing uncer-
tainty."" Big tobacco is the most prominent," but the examples
9. FDA, What We Do, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
default.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
10. Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 5.
11. FDA, The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effec-
tive, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucml43534.htm
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
12. See DAVID MICHAELS, DOuBT Is THEIR PRODUCT: How INDUSTRY's ASSAULT ON
SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH x (2008) (defining the strategy of "manufacturing
uncertainty" as "preventing or postponing the regulation of hazardous products by
questioning the science that reveals the hazards in the first place").
13. See id. at 9 (The tobacco industry "worked tirelessly for decades to support
their preordained conclusions and suppress any findings that suggested other-
wise .... The industry understood that the public is in no position to distinguish
good science from bad. Create doubt, uncertainty, and confusion. Throw mud at
the 'antismoking' research under the assumption that some of it is bound to stick.
And buy time . . . ."); see Deborah E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Why Review Articles on
the Health Effects of Passive Smoking Reach Different Conclusions, 279 J. AM. MED. AsS'N.
1566, 1566-69 (1998). The authors determined that "the only factor associated with
concluding that passive smoking is not harmful was whether an author was affili-
ated with the tobacco industry." Id. at 1566. They went on to note that the study's
"findings suggest that the tobacco industry may be attempting to influence scientific
opinion by flooding the scientific literature with large numbers of review articles
supporting its position that passive smoking is not harmful to health." Id. at 1569.
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where corporations have funded scientific studies to manufacture
doubt are legion. Some other notable offenders include asbestos,"
vinyl chloride,'" and lead. 6 This Article will make the case that the
artificial sweetener industry deserves a spot among this illustrious
group.
Part I briefly sets the background for artificial sweeteners by de-
scribing America's obesity epidemic and sugar addiction. Together,
these factors explain why artificial sweeteners have developed into
such a profitable industry. Next, Part II explores the controversies
surrounding the three most popular artificial sweeteners: saccharin,
aspartame, and sucralose. By using artificial sweeteners as a case
study, the article shows why the FDA must be reformed."' This sec-
tion will make it clear that the FDA's close ties to pharmaceutical
companies and the agency's blind reliance on industry-funded sci-
ence are threatening consumer safety. Afterwards, Part II further
stresses the ill effects of agency capture by describing how industry
groups pressured the FDA to ban stevia, a safe, natural sweetener.
After ominously noting that "[t]he Congress and federal agencies are already being
dealt with ... by the Tobacco Institute," one tobacco executive suggested that the
American people must be made to doubt the scientific evidence regarding the
harms of smoking. See Smoking and Health Proposal, Brown & Williamson document
no. 680561778-1786, 4, available at http://legacy.1ibrary.ucsf.edu/tid/nvs40f0.
The tobacco executive wrote, "Doubt is our product since it is the best means of
competing with the 'body of fact' that exists in the minds of the general public. It is
also the means of establishing a controversy." Id.
14. See MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 12-18.
15. See GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY
POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 173-78 (2003). Although the industry knew of
vinyl chloride's dangers, it "released only the information that would reassure peo-
ple as to the essentially benign nature of the finished products." Id. at 173. This
practice continued for years. "Motivated by money and power rather than health,
the industry was largely successful in hiding its information about cancer from the
government and in deflecting national attention away from the potential hazards . .
." Id. at 178.
16. See id. at 60-64. (After independent studies determined that lead is poison-
ous, the Lead Industry Association "portray[ed] this growing body of scientific lit-
erature as 'prejudice against lead' rather than the documentation of a serious public
health concern. The [Lead Industry Association] still sought to cast doubt on virtu-
ally every report of lead poisoning, focusing on the reports' methodological prob-
lems rather than the underlying reality." To manufacture uncertainty, the lead
industry mounted a "thirty-five year advertising campaign to convince people that
lead was safe.").
17. Change is unlikely to be initiated by the legislative or executive branch. Even
President Clinton instructed the FDA to treat the pharmaceutical companies as
"partners, not adversaries." David Willman, How a New Policy Led to Seven Deadly
Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/nation/la-122001fda,1,539362.story.
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Finally, Part III proposes two potential reforms. Americans must
lock the revolving door and take industry out of the approval proc-
ess. Only then should we trust the FDA with our health.
I. THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC
A. Economic Effects
Calories in - Calories out = Change in bodyweight.
This equation is the key to combating obesity." Start with the
number of calories eaten in a day, and subtract the number of calo-
ries burned. If the result is positive, you gain weight. If it is nega-
tive, you lose weight.
Every 3500 calories adds up to an extra pound." Whether the
caloric excess come from apples or chocolate cake, the same amount
of weight is gained. This means someone can get fat from eating
health foods such as fruits, vegetables, whole grains, and lean meats.
Likewise, one could eat nothing but McDonald's Big Macs and man-
age to lose weight." It all comes down to calories in versus calories
out. The key to weight control really is that simple.
Despite this clear formulation, obesity is a growing problem. In
2006, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) con-
ducted a study to determine what proportion of Americans have a
weight problem.2' The CDC derived its data by calculating people's
Body Mass Index (BMI)." The following table illustrates how BMI
relates to the various weight categories."
18. See Frank M. Sacks et al., Comparison of Weight-Loss Diets with Diferent Compo-
sitions of Fat, Protein, and Carbohydrates 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 859, 859 (2009) (con-
cluding that "[r]educed-calorie diets result in clinically meaningful weight loss re-
gardless of which macronutrients they emphasize").
19. ROBERTA LARSON DUYFF, AMERICAN DIETETIC ASSOCIATION COMPLETE FOOD
AND NUTRITION GUIDE 29 (2002).
20. Obviously, for nutritional reasons, such a diet would be a poor choice.
21. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Obesity and Overweight,
http://www. cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/overwt.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
22. Because BMI is derived solely from height and weight, some athletes or
bodybuilders may be misclassified as overweight even though they have low body
fat percentages. However, because only a small percentage of people fall within
these exceptions, the CDC's findings are still useful. For the general population,
there is a strong correlation between body fat and BMI. See Magnus Dencker et al.,
BMI and Objectively Measured Body Fat and Body Fat Distribution in Prepubertal Chil-
dren, 27 CLINICAL PHYSIOLOGY AND FUNCTIONAL IMAGING 12, 12-16 (2006) (conclud-
ing that "[p]ercentage body fat [was] closely associated with BMI, suggesting that
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Height Weight BMI Considered
5'9" 124 lbs or less Below 18.5 Underweight
5'9" 125 lbs to 168 lbs 18.5 to 24.9 Healthy weight
5'9" 169 lbs to 202 lbs 25.0 to 29.9 Overweight
5'9" 203 lbs or more 30 or higher Obese
The data show that thirty-four percent of Americans over age
twenty are obese and another thirty-three percent are overweight.4
Eighteen percent of adolescents and more than ten percent of chil-
dren are overweight.5 Another eight to nine percent of Americans
are underweight,"' and, incredibly, only one-quarter of Americans
are a healthy weight. More adults fall into the obese category than
any other classification. Today, obese people outnumber healthy
and underweight individuals combined, and the problem is only
getting worse. Thomas Frieden, the head of the CDC noted that
"[lthe average American is now 23 pounds overweight and collec-
tively we are 4.6 billion pounds overweight."2 In other words,
Americans have eaten sixteen trillion calories too many.
The National Center for Health Statistics found that between
1960 and 2006, the percentage of obese adults has nearly tripled."
BMI serves as a good surrogate marker for obesity in population studies"); See Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, About BMI for Adults,
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/ adult bmi/index.html ("BMI
does not measure body fat directly, but research has shown that BMI correlates to
direct measures of body fat .... ).
23. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Overweight and Obesity: Defin-
ing Overweight and Obesity, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/defining.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 12, 2010).
24. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 21.
25. Id.
26. Meghan A.T.B. Reese, Underweight: A Heavy Concern TODAY'S DIETITIAN Jan.
2006, at 56, available at http://www.todaysdietitian.com/newarchives/tdjan2008
pg56. shtml.
27. Thomas Frieden, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
CDC Weight of the Nation Press Briefing (July 27, 2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090727.htm.
28. Sixteen trillion calories is equivalent to nine billion Burger King Whopper
meals with large fries and a large soda. See Shereen Jegtvig, Burger King@ Whop-
per@ With Cheese, Large Fries and a Large Soda, http://nutrition.about.com/od/
rateameal/a/ whoppermeal.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
29. National Center for Health Statistics, Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity, and
Extreme Obesity among Adults: United States, Trends 1960-62 through 2005-
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During this same period, the proportion of Americans who are "ex-
tremely obese" increased more than 600%."
This shift seems to indicate a fundamental change in caloric in-
take and expenditure." Indeed, over that time, the "calories in" and
"calories out" variables in the equation have shifted drastically.
Americans now eat more" and exercise less." In 1958, the average
American consumed less than 1900 calories per day." By 2007, that
number had grown to 2,775," more than 500 calories above the
USDA's Recommended Energy Allowance of 2,247."
If people needed these extra calories to supply energy for in-
creased physical activity, this trend would not be troubling. We can
return to the formula to see why. If the number of calories burned
2006, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/overweight/overweight-adult.htm
(noting an increase from 13.4% to 35.1%).
30. Id. (noting an increase from 0.9% to 6.2%).
31. See World Health Organization, Obesity and Overweight,
http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/facts/obesity/en (last visited
Apr. 12, 2010) ("The key causes [of obesity] are increased consumption of energy-
dense foods high in saturated fats and sugars, and reduced physical activity.").
32. For a graph charting the increase in caloric intake from 1970-2000, see Judy
Putnam, Jane Allshouse, & Linda Scott Kantor, U.S. Per Capita Food Supply Trends:
More Calories, Refined Carbohydrates, and Fats, 25 FooD REv. 2, 3, Winter 2002, avail-
able at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/FoodReview/DEC2002/fr-vol25i3.pdf.
33. Judy Putnam, U.S. Food Supply Providing More Food and Calories, 22 FOOD REV.
2, 2, Sep.-Dec. 1999, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ foodre-
view/sepl999/frsept99.pdf (noting that "[aill three major per capita food supply
measurements-food available for consumption, nutrients available for consump-
tion, and the food supply adjusted for spoilage and other losses in the home and
marketing system-suggest that Americans in the 1990's are consuming more food
and several hundred more calories per person per day than did their counterparts
in the late 1950's.").
34. See Dana E. King et al., Adherence to Healthy Lifestyle Habits in US Adults,
1988-2006, 122 AM. J. MED. 528, 530 (2009) ("The percent of adults aged 40-74
[engaged in] physical activity 12 times a month or more has decreased from 53% to
43%"). Incredibly, in gym class, children are active an average of 3.5 minutes.
KELLY D. BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATILE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT 78 (2004).
35. Putnam, supra note 33, at 2.
36. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE,
Loss-ADJUSTED FOOD AVAILABILITY DATA, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
data/foodconsumption/FoodGuideSpreadsheet.htm#caloies.
37. Linda Scott Kantor, Food and Rural Economics Division, Economic Re-
search Service, U.S. Dept. of Ag., Agricultural Economic Report No. 772, A DIETARY
ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: COMPARING PER CAPITA FOOD CONSUMPTION
WITH FOOD GUIDE PYRAMID SERVING RECOMMENDATIONS (1998), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer772/aer772.pdf; see also MARION NESTLE,
FOOD POLITICS 8 (2002) (noting that "overeating [is] the most probable cause of
excessive weight gain").
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had increased alongside the number of calories consumed, the
equation would have remained in stasis, and obesity would not be a
problem. Unfortunately, the exact opposite has occurred. People
are now burning fewer calories and are less active than at any other
time in our history."
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics found that, on an average
day, only sixteen percent of Americans participate in sports or exer-
cise activities.' In another study, the CDC determined that fifty-five
percent of adults do not meet the minimum level of recommended
exercise (thirty minutes of moderate activity five times per week)."o
Although this sounds like a lot of exercise, activities such as vacuum-
ing and gardening meet the CDC's requirements for "moderate ac-
tivity." Surprisingly, even under this lenient definition, twenty-six
percent of Americans fail to get any physical activity."
These statistics should trouble us because poor diet and physi-
cal inactivity cause 16.6% of all deaths in America." More specifi-
cally, twenty-three percent of the deaths from major chronic dis-
eases-such as stroke, heart disease, and diabetes-are caused by
Americans' sedentary lifestyle." Proper nutrition and exercise could
save 400,000 American lives every year."
The problems of obesity, however, are not confined to the over-
weight individuals themselves. Losing excess weight is not just
about looking and feeling better; there are also powerful economic
reasons to trim the fat. With obesity-related diseases costing the
medical system an additional $147 billion annually, obesity is now a
greater burden on the health care system than cigarettes or alco-
38. See World Health Organization, supra note 31 ("[L]arge shifts towards less
physically demanding work have been observed worldwide. Moves towards less
physical activity are also found in the increasing use of automated transport, tech-
nology in the home, and more passive leisure pursuits.").
39. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Spotlight on Statistics: Sports and Exercise,
May 2008, available at http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2008/sports/pdf/sports
bls-spotlight. pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
40. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Prevalence of Physical Activity,
Including Lifestyle Activities Among Adults-United States, 2000-2001, 52 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 764, 764-79, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5232a2.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
41. Id.
42. Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N. 1238, 1238 (2004).
43. Robert A. Hahn et al., Excess Deaths from Nine Chronic Diseases in the United
States, 1986, 264J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 2654, 2656 (1990).
44. See Mokdad, supra note 42, at 1240.
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hol." On average, an obese individual spends forty percent more on
health care than a normal-weight person." That amounts to an extra
$1500 per year for every overweight person. Approximately half of
that cost is born by Medicare and Medicaid." That means you, the
taxpayer, are subsidizing other people's bad decisions.
Although the most direct effects of obesity are felt by the health
care system, its problems are not limited to that sector. The entire
U.S. economy suffers due to decreased productivity. Annually, obe-
sity causes the loss of 39.3 million workdays. It is also responsible
for 239 million restricted-activity days, 89.5 million bed days, and
62.7 million physician visits." These direct economic effects check
in at $254 billion, nearly twice as high as the medical costs." In
comparison, smoking only reduces productivity by seventy-nine bil-
lion dollars.'
Curing the obesity problem would not only increase economic
output, it would also redirect current spending. Overweight drivers
burn an additional one billion gallons of gas each year." Airlines
would save another billion gallons of gas, and the industry would
actually become profitable once again. Clothing costs would be re-
duced by ten billion dollars, and food expenditures would decline
by the billions." Between the direct effects on the economy and
health care, obesity costs the nation $487 billion per year." Elimi-
nate all these expenses and each U.S. household would end the year
with an extra $4,270 in its checking account.'
45. Roland Sturm, The Effects of Obesity, Smoking and Drinking on Medical Problems
and Costs 21 HEALTH AFF. 245, 245 (2002).
46. Frieden, supra note 27.
47. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Obesity and Overweight: Eco-
nomic Consequences, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/causes/economics.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010).
48. Anne M. Wolf & Graham A. Colditz, Current Estimates of the Economic Cost of
Obesity in the United States, 6 OBESITY RES. 97 (1998).
49. Ross DeVol & Armen Bedroussian, An Unhealthy America: The Economic Bur-
den of Chronic Disease-Charting a New Course to Save Lives and Increase Productivity and
Economic Growth ii-iii (2007), available at http://www.milkeninstitute.
org/pdf/chronic diseasereport.pdf.
50. Id. at iii.
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Unfortunately, this is just the tip of the iceberg. Once reduced
longevity and quality of life are taken into consideration, the true
cost is incalculable." Being overweight reduces one's life-expectancy
by three years, and being obese reduces one's life-expectancy by 6.5
years.5 ' For comparison, smoking has a similar effect on longevity.57
Not only do overweight people die sooner, but also their quality of
life is lower.
If the problems from obesity are so serious and the formula to
shed those excess pounds is so simple, why are two-thirds of Ameri-
cans overweight? An insatiable sweet tooth is a major cause.
B. The Sugar Addiction
On the one hand, sugar" is delicious. On the other hand, sugar
causes premature aging,' diabetes, and heart disease, raises choles-
terol and blood pressure," suppresses the immune system," and
55. See David S. Ludwig & Harold A. Pollack, Obesity and the Economy: From Crisis
to Opportunity, 301 J. AM. MED. ASs'N. 533, 534 (noting that the economic and health
costs are "likely to be dwarfed by reasonable economic valuation of reduced longev-
ity and quality of life").
56. Anna Peeters et al., Obesity in Adulthood and its Consequences for Life Expec
tancy: A Life-Table Analysis, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 24, 28 (2003) (see table 3).
57. Id. at 24.
58. See Jennifer Klingemann et al., Relationship between Quality of Life and Weight
Loss 1 Year after Gastric Bypass, 26 DIGESTIVE SURGERY 430, 430 (concluding that a
reduction in BMI "dramatically" improves health-related quality of life); See Rebecca
M. Puhl, Perceptions of Weight Discrimination: Prevalence and Comparison to Race and
Gender Discrimination in America, 32 INT'L J. OBEsrry 992, 998 (finding that
"weight/height discrimination occurs in employment settings and daily interper-
sonal relationships virtually as often as race discrimination, and in some cases even
more frequently than age or gender discrimination").
59. Throughout the paper, sugar is used to denote the sugar that has been
added to foods, not the sugar that occurs naturally in fruits. This added sugar gen-
erally takes the form of sucrose (refined table sugar) and high-fructose corn syrup
(a mixture of fructose and glucose).
60. See Antoine E. Roux et al., Pro-Aging Effects of Glucose Signaling through a G
Protein-Coupled Glucose Receptor in Fission Yeast, PLOS GENETICS Mar. 2009 at 1 (not-
ing that "substantial evidence supports the idea that excess glucose acts as a pro-
aging and pathogenic factor").
61. Harry G. Preuss et al., Sugar-Induced Blood Pressure Elevations Over the Lifespan
of Three Substrains of Wistar Rats, 17 J. AM. C. NUTRITION 36, 38 (1998) (finding that
"rats ingesting diets high in sucrose . . . eventually showed statistically higher [sys-
tolic blood pressure] over their lifespan compared to those consuming the base-
line").
62. W. M. Ringsdorf et al., Neutrophilic Phagocytosis and Resistance to Disease, 52
DENTAL SURVEY 46, 46-48 (finding that drinking twenty-four ounces of cola de-
presses the activity of neutrophils, white blood cells that kill bacteria).
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contributes to obesity. The choice seems obvious, but for most
Americans, the short-term benefit of taste outweighs all of these
long-term negative effects.
It is quite obvious that Americans have a sweet tooth. The
USDA sets the maximum daily allowance of sugar at ten teaspoons,
less than the amount of sugar in a twelve-ounce can of Pepsi.' The
American Heart Association recommends even less: six teaspoons
for women and nine teaspoons for men. The average American far
exceeds both upper limits, consuming 22.2 teaspoons each day. In
2008, the USDA determined that, after adjusting for loss during
transport, processing, and uneaten food, per capita sugar consump-
tion was more than 85 pounds.' Each year, every person is eating
154,221 empty calories from sugar." That's more calories than the
average person eats in the first two months of the year.
Where is all this added sugar coming from? Soft drinks are by
far the biggest contributor, accounting for nearly thirty-three per-
cent of our sugar intake." The sheer amount of soda that we con-.
sume is staggering. On average, Americans drink fifty-two gallons of
soft drinks a year, and teenage girls get ten to fifteen percent of
their total caloric intake from these sugary beverages."
A large part of the remaining two-thirds of our sugar intake is,
of course, derived from the usual suspects: sweetened fruit drinks
(ten percent), candy (five percent), cake (five percent), cookies (four
percent), and cereal (four percent)."
63. Center for Science in the Public Interest, America: Drowning in Sugar, http://
www.cspinet.org/new/sugar.html (last visited April 11, 2010).
64. See USDA, Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook: Table 51-Refined cane and beet
sugar: estimated number of per capita calories consumed daily, by calendar year,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/data.htm (Per capita consumption is 46.8
pounds); see USDA, Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook: Table 52-High fructose corn
syrup: estimated number of per capita calories consumed daily, by calendar year,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/data.htm (Per capita consumption is 37.9
pounds).
65. There are four calories in every gram of sugar.
66. John Casey, The Hidden Ingredient that can Sabotage Your Diet,
http://www. medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=56589 (last visited
April 11, 2010); Rachel K. Johnson et al., Dietary Sugars Intake and Cardiovascular
Health: A Scientific Statement from the American Heart Association 120 CIRCULATION: J.
AM. HEART AsS'N. 1011, 1011 (2009) (noting that "[s]oft drinks and other sugar-
sweetened beverages are the primary source of added sugars in Americans' diets").
67. James E. Tillotson, Food Brands: Friend or Foe? NUTRITION TODAY, Mar.-Apr.
2002, at 78-79.
68. Casey, supra note 66.
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The rest tends to come from "hidden" sugar. Over the years,
manufacturers have become ever more creative, managing to hide
sugar in even seemingly healthy foods. Ketchup appears innocuous
enough, right? After all, it's made from tomatoes, one of the best
antioxidants." Well, ketchup producers have managed to squeeze a
full teaspoon of sugar into every tablespoon of ketchup.' Think
about that. One-third of the ketchup bottle is sugar.
Peanut butter is another food that seems healthy. After all, it is
filled with "good" mono- and polyunsaturated fats." Unfortunately,
many brands have also been loaded with sugar."
Ironically, low-fat foods that are marketed to health conscious
consumers are another favorite hiding place for sugar. When
manufacturers take out the fat, the product loses its great taste. To
compensate, producers add additional sugar. Although low-fat
snack foods tend to have fifty-nine percent less fat per serving than
their regular counterparts, the low-fat foods contain only fifteen
percent fewer calories."
At first glance, a fifteen percent reduction may still seem like a
positive step. However, people tend to eat larger quantities of low-
fat foods, more than offsetting any potential caloric savings.
In one study, researchers gave half the subjects a bowl of "low-
fat" granola. The remaining subjects were given a bowl of regular
granola. Although the granola in both bowls were identical, the sub-
jects who believed the granola were low-fat ate forty-eight percent
more.' The researchers concluded as follows:
If participants in [the study] had eaten real low fat granola, and if the
low fat granola had the average level of fat and calories for the category,
participants would have consumed 35% less fat from the low fat granola
69. See Jeanie Lerche Davis, The Tasty Tomato: An Antioxidant Power Blast, http://
www.webmd.com/food-recipes/features/tasty-tomato-antioxidant-power-blast (last
visited April 11, 2010) ("Tomatoes are loaded with health-protective antioxidants
such as lycopene, vitamin C, and vitamin A.").
70. See, Gayle A. Alleman, USDA Nutrition Guidelines, http://recipes.
howstuffworks.com/usda-nutrition-guidelines-ga9.htm (last visited April 11, 2010).
71. See Walter C. Willett, Ask the Doctor: Why is Peanut Butter "Healthy" if it has
Saturated Fat?, HARV. HEART LETTER July 2009, available at http://
www.health.harvard. edu/newsletters/HarvardHeartLetter/2009/July/Ask-the-
doctor-Why-is-peanut-butter-healthy-if-it-has-saturated-fat.
72. See The Daily Plate, Peanut Butter, http://www.thedailyplate.com/nutrition-
calories/food/jif/peanut-butter (last visited April 11, 2010) (noting that there are
three grams of sugar in every serving ofJif Peanut Butter).
73. Brian Wansink & Pierre Chandon, Can Low Fat Nutrition Labels Lead to Obe-
sity, 43J. MARKETING REs. 605, 609 (2006).
74. Id. at 611.
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but would have consumed 33% more total calories. This is a conserva-
tive estimate ... [T]he calorie increase would have probably been even
higher because the ingredients used to replace fat tend to make people
75
hungrier.
So, we have a situation where people think they are eating
fewer calories but are actually consuming thirty-three percent more.
If nothing else, one has to marvel at the brilliant marketing. The
food industry has managed to increase revenue by producing
"health" foods that are more unhealthy than their normal counter-
parts.
Although not surprising, it is disconcerting that corporations
choose to exploit consumer misbeliefs instead of working to correct
them. This action does raise an important question. If companies
are willing to take advantage of existing consumer ignorance, are
they also willing to actively create misperceptions in order to boost
profits? As the rest of this article will show, the answer is a resound-
ing yes. From tobacco to trans-fat to artificial sweeteners, the food
industry has been waging a war against science. Through backroom
political bargains, corporate America and the U.S. government are
trading your long-term health for short-term profits.
Returning to our earlier equation," we find that the average
American could lose nearly ten pounds a year just by cutting his
sugar consumption by a modest twenty-five percent. Keep in mind
that, even with this reduction, Americans would still far exceed the
USDA maximum daily allowance.
Such a weight loss would go far in alleviating many of the prob-
lems discussed in the previous section. Even if Americans compen-
sate by eating additional calories from other foods, it would still be a
beneficial dietary change.
This is true because sugar is full of "empty" calories," meaning
that it lacks vitamins, minerals, and fiber. These are the nutrients
that our bodies need to function properly. Due, in large part, to
excessive sugar consumption, most Americans are not getting suffi-
cient quantities of many essential nutrients. Sugar has the effect of
75. Id. at 614.
76. Calories divided by 3,500 equals change in weight. See Part LA for a detailed
explanation.
77. Roger W. Miller, Empty Calories; Putting on Pounds with Poor Nutrition, FDA
CONSUMER, Nov. 1986, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-ml370/
isv20/ ai_4531709.
78. See e.g., Adit A. Ginde et al., Demographic Differences and Trends of Vitamin D
Insufficiency in the US Population, 1988-2004, 169 ARcHIVES INTERNAL MED. 626, 631-
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crowding out more nutritious foods. As an example, consider the
following: "Over the last 16 years, the percent of adults aged 40-74
... [who eat] 5 or more fruits and vegetables a day has decreased
from 42% to 26%.""7 During the same time, sugar consumption has
increased significantly.
Given all the harmful effects of sugar and its close association
with obesity, it is not surprising that health-conscious Americans are
looking elsewhere to satisfy their sweet cravings.
II. ARTIFICIAL SWEETENERS AND STEVIA
Non-caloric and hundreds of times sweeter than sugar, artificial
sweeteners seemed like a godsend, both for America's sweet tooth
and its waistline. Unfortunately, these products did not live up to
their promises.
First, artificial sweeteners lack the magical weight loss proper-
ties many people associate with them. In fact, they may actually
cause weight gain." It turns out our bodies have a natural ability to
count calories based on the sweetness of foods. Artificial sweeteners
disrupt that mechanism by tricking our brains into thinking sweet
foods have fewer calories. In turn, people overindulge when they
eat sweet products, further aggravating the obesity epidemic dis-
cussed in the prior sections.
Setting this indirect problem aside, artificial sweeteners are
harmful in their own right. Ironically, in a quest to eat healthier
foods, the public has embraced even less healthy alternatives. There
are currently five FDA-approved artificial sweeteners: saccharin, as-
partame, acesulfame potassium, sucralose, and neotame. This paper
will focus on the most popular ones: saccharin, aspartame, and su-
cralose. The first three sections will document the suspicious cir-
cumstances surrounding each additive's approval and examine what
independent studies actually concluded about these sweeteners.
The fourth section will contrast these products with stevia, a safe,
natural, non-caloric sweetener. Stevia's lengthy approval history will
show that corporations manipulate the FDA to increase their own
profits. In the end, regardless of one's thoughts on the merits of
32 (finding that only one in four Americans gets an adequate amount of Vitamin
D).
79. King, supra note 34, at 530.
80. See T.L. Davidson & S.E. Swithers, A Pavlovian Approach to the Problem of Obe-
sity, 28 INT'L.J. OBESITY & RELATED METABOLIC DIsoRDERS 933, 934-35 (2004).
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these sweeteners, the FDA approval process will be cause for con-
cern.
A. Saccharin
In 1879, two researchers at Johns Hopkins University discov-
ered saccharin, the world's first artificial sweetener." Although the
scientists realized saccharin's commercial potential early on, the
product was not marketed in the United States until 1901. Due to
the chemical's intense sweetness,"2 it soon became popular. The
sweetener also stirred up controversy.
In 1907, the USDA launched an investigation to determine
whether saccharin was safe. Fearing that the USDA would ban the
sweetener, future vice president James Sherman met with President
Theodore Roosevelt on behalf of a New York food manufacturing
firm. Sherman told the President how the sweetener had saved his
company thousands of dollars in production costs. Harvey Wiley,
the first commissioner of the FDA," also happened to be at this
meeting. He was extremely concerned about the dangers of saccha-
rin consumption and warned President Roosevelt that "[e]veryone
who ate that sweet corn was deceived. He thought he was eating
sugar, when in point of fact he was eating a coal tar product totally
devoid of food value and extremely injurious to health." Roosevelt
angrily responded, "Anybody who says saccharin is injurious to
health is an idiot.""
Nevertheless, to placate Wiley, the President appointed a Refe-
ree Board of Consulting Scientific Experts to reexamine saccharin's
safety. Since the head of the Board was Ira Remsen, one of the
Johns Hopkins researchers who discovered the sweetener, the out-
come was predetermined." From the beginning, big business had
managed to intervene and prevent the government from seriously
reviewing saccharin's health risks.
81. Victoria Gilman, Artificial Sweeteners, 82 Sci. & TECH. 43, 43. (2004).
82. Depending on how saccharin is used, it is between 200 and 700 times
sweeter than sugar. See SUGAR ASS'N, ARTIFICIAL SWEETENERS, http://www.sugar.
org/consumers/sweet-by nature.asp?id=283 (last visited April 2, 2010).
83. At the time, the agency was known as the Bureau of Chemistry.
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A few years later, World War I sugar shortages created addi-
tional demand for saccharin, and with the health concerns forgot-
ten, the artificial sweetener market expanded for half a century.
Then, in 1972, the safety controversy was reignited.
That year, saccharin came directly under attack when two stud-
ies linked consumption of the sweetener with cancer in lab animals.
Although the Delaney Clause now required the FDA to ban saccha-
rin, commissioner Charles Edwards refused to act. In 1977, yet an-
other study linked saccharin to bladder tumors in rats," and within a
few years, the carcinogenicity of saccharin was reaffirmed by addi-
tional trials."
Within months, Canada instituted a ban on saccharin that is still
in effect today.o The FDA, now under the leadership of a new
commissioner, also proposed a ban. However, fearing large finan-
cial losses," the U.S. sweetener industry immediately mounted a
campaign to save saccharin. Industry pressure prevailed, and Con-
gress passed the Saccharin Study and Labeling Act which forbade
the FDA from banning the sweetener for 18 months." This short-
term prohibition has since been extended numerous times,' pre-
venting the FDA from regulating saccharin up until the present day.
Although Congress ultimately preempted any saccharin ban,
one must wonder why the FDA failed to act sooner. It was not until
87. PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 923 (2d ed. 1991).
88. 42 FED. REG. 19996, 19999 (proposed April 15, 1977)
89. See R.A. Squire, Histopatholocial Evaluation of Rat Urinary Bladders from the
IRDC Two-Generation Bioassay of Sodium Saccharin, 23 FOOD & CHEM. Toxic. 491,
493-496 (1985); J.M. Taylor et al, Chronic Toxicity and Carcinogenicity to the Urinary
Bladder of Sodium Saccharin in the In Utero-Exposed Rat, 54 Toxic. & APPLIED PHARMA.
57, 74 (1980) (reaffirming that saccharin causes an increase in bladder neoplasia
and hyperplasia in rats).
90. See Robert Trumbull, Canada's Saccharin Ban Leaves a Bitter Taste, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 1978, at F3.
91. See id. (In Canada, "[flinancial losses to food and beverage concerns have
been heavy. The head of one major Canadian concern involved in the saccharin
trade said his company had lost two-thirds of its sales. The production chief of
another hard-hit company called the costs converting to different food lines crip-
pling.").
92. See The Great Saccharin Snafu, CONSUMER REPORTS, July 1977, at 410, 410-14.
93. Pub. L. No. 95-203, § 1, 3; 91 Stat. 1451, 1452 (1977).
94. See Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509(b), 93 Stat. 695 (1979); Pub. L. No. 96-273, 94
Stat. 536 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-42, § 2, 95 Stat. 946 (1981); Pub. L. No. 98-22, § 2,
97 Stat. 173 (1983); Pub. L. No. 99-46, 99 Stat. 81 (1985); Pub. L. No. 100-71, § 101,
101 Stat. 431 (1987); Pub. L. No. 102-142, 105 Stat. 910 (1991); Pub. L. No. 104-180,
§ 602, 110 Stat. 1594 (1996).
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five years after studies began showing saccharin's carcinogenic
properties that the FDA seriously contemplated doing something.
When discussing his failure to regulate the sweetener, Commis-
sioner Charles Edwards explained, "American consumers demand
the availability of diet food products. It is irrelevant whether these
diet products produce quantifiable health benefits or whether con-
sumers simply like them . . . . [Saccharin] has come to be accepted
and expected by the American public, and any law which does not
recognize this simply will not work."'
At its most basic level, this is appealing. Let the American peo-
ple determine what additives they want to consume. However, Ed-
wards's position breaks down for several reasons. First, by claiming
that he deferred to majority rule, Edwards actually undermined ma-
jority rule. Because it is impossible for Americans to evaluate the
safety of every potential product, they have assigned this task to the
FDA. The public essentially views the FDA as "the mechanism
through which the government attempts to compel corporations to
act responsibly, and to not damage our health . . . ."' By allowing
saccharin to remain on the market, the FDA is implicitly stating that
the sweetener is not a health risk. This seal of approval allows con-
sumers to discount research that provides evidence of saccharin's
dangers. Regardless of the FDA's true motives for not banning the
sweetener, the fact that it is on the market is a powerful signal of
safety.
Second, and more importantly, if the FDA actually wants to re-
spect consumer preferences, it is doing a terrible job. The agency
consistently bans safe, natural substances only to turn around and
legalize prescription drugs that are nothing more than patented
knock-offs.
One of the most egregious examples involves lovastatin and red
yeast rice. When the pharmaceutical industry isolated lovastatin, a
cholesterol lowering drug, the market potential seemed enormous.
There was just one problem. Red yeast rice, a product that had
been in the food supply for more than two thousand years," con-
tained monacolin K, a naturally occurring compound identical to
95. Oversight of Food Safety, 1983: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983) (statement of Charles Ed-
wards).
96. See MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 232.
97. Ozlem Erdo rul & Sebile Azirak, Review of the Studies on the Red Yeast Rice, 2
TURKISH ELECTRONICJ. BIOTECH. 37, 38 (2004).
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lovastatin." Because red yeast rice could not be patented, supple-
ments derived from it would severely hamper sales of lovastatin.
Big Pharma brought this problem to the FDA, and the agency
set about finding a solution. The FDA ultimately determined that
because red yeast rice contains a substance identical to a drug, it can
be regulated as a drug. Essentially, the FDA allowed pharmaceutical
companies to patent a substance in red yeast rice. The agency then
turned around and banned red yeast rice for containing that pat-
ented compound. It is simply incredible that the FDA can redefine
a natural substance as a drug and then subsequently ban any natural
products that contain the "drug." This would be no different if a
pharmaceutical company had patented vitamin C, and the FDA had
then banned oranges because they naturally contain vitamin C.
The FDA has proven time and again that it is willing to ban safe
products if it will increase the profits of pharmaceutical companies.
Some additional examples include L-tryptophan," pyridoxamine
(vitamin B6),'00 ephedra,o' estriol," and even information regarding
the health benefits of cherries.'o One second the FDA proclaims
98. Mayo Clinic, Red Yeast Rice (Monascus Purpureus), http://
www.mayoclinic.com/health/red-yeast-rice/NS-patient-redyeast (last visited Apr. 9,
2010).
99. The FDA banned L-tryptophan but allowed the substance to be used in pre-
scription drugs. This caused the effective price of tryptophan to increase by 500%.
The ban was eventually lifted after more than a decade of vocal opposition from
consumers and organizations such as the Mayo Clinic. See Dean Wolfe Manders,
The FDA Ban of L-Tryptophan: Politics, Profits and Prozac, 26 SOc. POL'Y. 55, 55-58
(1995).
100. See American Association for Health Freedom, When is a Vitamin Not a
Vitamin? When the FDA Says So!, http://aahf.nonprofitsoapbox.com/
index.php?option= comcontent&task=view&id=677&ltemid (last visited Feb. 26,
2010).
101. See Mike Adams, FDA Declares Form of Vitamin B6 a Drug Effectively Banning
Pyridoxamine from Dietary Supplements, http://www.naturalnews.com/025606.html
(last visited Feb. 26, 2010) ("The same thing happened with ephedra, a Traditional
Chinese Medicine herb known as ma huang. The FDA banned the herb, saying it
was 'dangerous at any dose,' but pharmaceuticals containing the very same mole-
cules (ephedrine) are still being sold over-the-counter as cold medicines, meaning
they're available to any child without a prescription.").
102. See American Association for Health Freedom, Natural Substance Knock Offs
in the FDA Pipeline Could be Dangerous, Sep. 6, 2008, http://
foodconsumer.org/7777/8888/C-onsumer A-ffair_26/090606512008_NaturalSub-
stanceKnockOffsin theFDAPipeline Could beDangerous.shtml.
103. See American Association for Health Freedom, Big Pharma and the FDA: Sup-
press the Science, Ban the Natural Substances, Sell the Drugs, http://www. organiccon-
sumers.org/articles/article18219.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) ("When the 2005
ban was instituted, the FDA sent warning letters to twenty-nine companies that
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that a natural substance is dangerous, despite independent scientific
consensus to the contrary. The very next moment, it determines
that a prescription drug derived from that same substance is per-
fectly safe.'" The Article will further explore the FDA's double
standard with respect to the natural sweetener stevia in Part II.D.
The agency's past actions have led to a worrisome process: base
approval decisions on consumer preferences when doing so en-
riches big business, and base approval decisions on food safety when
doing so enriches big business. This shadowy practice does make
one thing very clear. The FDA is broken."os The following sections
will make it even more apparent that the agency must be reformed.
B. Aspartame
Consumed by over two hundred million people and used in
more than six thousand products, aspartame is the king of artificial
sweeteners." In the U.S., it is marketed under the brand names
NutraSweet and Equal. Aspartame is found in everything from diet
sodas and sugar-free desserts to children's vitaminso and vegetable
juice." At one point, it accounted for sixty-two percent of the world
artificial sweetener market.o' Americans alone ingest more than
8,000 tons of aspartame each year." That statistic is even more in-
market cherry products. In these letters, they ordered the companies to stop publi-
cizing scientific data about cherries. According to the FDA, when cherry companies
disseminate this peer-reviewed scientific information, the cherries become 'unap-
proved new drugs' and are subject to seizure. The FDA warned that if those in-
volved in 'cherry trafficking' continue to inform consumers about these scientific
studies, criminal prosecutions would ensue.").
104. See Adams, supra note 101 (noting that "another classic oppression tactic of
the FDA [is to] [b]an the herb, but promote the drug using the same chemicals").
105. See, e.g., American Association for Health Freedom, supra note 102 (arguing
that, if you pay off the FDA, "the Agency will try to reward you with monopoly
control of the market").
106. Aspartame Information Center, Products, http://www.aspartame.org/as-
partame products.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
107. See, e.g., Bayer, Flintstones FAQs, http://flintstonesvitamins.com/faqs (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010) (stating that "the Flintstones Complete formula and Plus Cal-
cium formula contain aspartame").
108. For a partial list of products containing aspartame, see Aspartame Informa-
tion Center, supra note 106.
109. James Fry, The World Market for Intense Sweeteners, 85 WORLD REV. NUTRITION
& DIETETICS 201, 204 (1999).
110. United States National Library of Medicine, Hazardous Substances Data
Bank: Aspartame, http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-bin/sis/htmlgen?HSDB (search
for "aspartame") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
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credible when one considers that aspartame is 200 times sweeter
than table sugar."' This sweetener has become so pervasive that it is
almost impossible to find certain consumer products without it.' 2
In addition to being the most prominent artificial sweetener in
the world, aspartame also has the distinction of receiving more
complaints than any other substance in FDA history."'3  By 1992,
Americans had filed more than ten thousand aspartame-related
complaints, and approximately eighty percent of all non-drug com-
plaints to the FDA involved the sweetener."' People complained
that aspartame caused, among other side effects, headaches, rashes,
dizziness, menstrual problems, and seizures." Unfortunately, be-
cause the FDA stopped tracking aspartame complaints in 1992, the
current number of aspartame-related problems is unavailable."'
Nevertheless, the danger is still present. The following sections will
examine the evidence regarding aspartame's safety and the unset-
tling circumstances surrounding its approval.
1. The Evidence
In the course of writing Aspartame Disease: An Ignored Epidemic,
the author clinically observed 1200 patients who had suffered aspar-
tame reactions. He found that common side effects include vision
problems, tinnitus, headaches, memory loss, depression, heart palpi-
tations, diarrhea, itching, and severe joint pain."' Additional studies
have reinforced these observations, strengthening the link between
aspartame and depression,"' headaches,"' and seizures. Other case
111. Sugar Association, supra note 82.
112. Nearly every brand of chewing gum has aspartame. Even gum that contains
sugar is now supplemented with the artificial sweetener. See e.g., Wrigley, Double-
mint, http://www.wrigley.com/global/brands/ doublemint.aspx (last visited Apr.
9, 2010) (indicating that regular Doublemint gum now includes sugar, aspartame,
and acesulfame K).
113. Aspartame earned this honor in just three short years. See Janet Starr Hull,
How Many Aspartame Complaints are Registered with the FDA?, Oct. 7, 2005,
http://wwwjanethull.com/askdrhull/article.php?id=044.
114. Id.
115. 131 CONG. REC. 9981, 10807 (1985).
116. See Janet Starr Hull, Is it True that the Majority of FDA Complaints are for Aspar-
tame?, Oct. 7, 2005, http://wwwjanethull.com/askdrhull/article.php?id=043 (The
FDA "began putting the complaints into generic categories not related to aspar-
tame, such as death. If death by seizure was reported as a reaction to aspartame,
the death was recorded as seizure only and not as an 'aspartame' seizure.").
117. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 68-71.
118. See Ralph G. Walton et al., Adverse Reactions to Aspartame: Double-blind Chal-
lenge in Patients from a Vulnerable Population, 34 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 13, 13
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studies have also connected aspartame to "angry outbursts",'' skin
lesions," and panic attacks.'" Aspartame has even been linked to
cancer.' The FDA complaints present a similarly stark picture.'
Given all of these dangerous side effects, how could the FDA
have ever approved this artificial sweetener? Well, it turns out that
there is also evidence supporting aspartame's safety. Funding for
the trials providing this "evidence," however, came from the Nu-
traSweet industry. A survey of aspartame research found that "[o]f
the 166 studies felt to have relevance for questions of human safety,
74 had NutraSweet industry related funding and 92 were independ-
ently funded. One hundred percent of the industry funded research
attested to aspartame's safety, whereas 92 percent of the independ-
ently funded research identified a problem."'2 6
These numbers actually understate the unanimity of independ-
ent scientific opinion. Of the seven non-industry funded studies
that were favorable to aspartame, one was a literature review that
focused on industry research, and six were conducted by the FDA.'2 7
Due to the FDA's pro-business bias and controversial ties to G.D.
(1993) (concluding "that individuals with mood disorders are particularly sensitive
to this artificial sweetener and its use in this population should be discouraged").
119. See e.g., Stephen K. Van Den Eeden et al., Aspartame Ingestion and Headaches:
A Randomized Crossover Trial, 44 NEUROLOGY 1787, 1787 (1994) ("Subjects reported
headaches on 33% of the days during aspartame treatment. . . ." The paper con-
cluded "that some people are particularly susceptible to headaches caused by aspar-
tame and may want to limit their consumption."); see e.g., Rebecca B. Lipton et al.,
Aspartame as a Dietary Trigger of Headache, 29 HEADACHE 90, 90 ("[A]spartame may
be an important dietary trigger of headache in some people.").
120. See T.J. Maher & R.J. Wurtman, Possible Neurologic Effects of Aspartame, a
Widely Used Food Additive, 75 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 53, 56 (1987).
121. See 131 CONG. REc. 10,805-6 (1985).
122. See Nelson Lee Novick, Aspartame-Induced Granulomatous Panniculitis, 102
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 206, 206-7 (1985).
123. SeeJ.M. Ferguson, Panic Attacks and Excessive Aspartame Ingestion, 328 LANCET
631, 631 (1986).
124. See John Olney et al., Increasing Brain Tumor Rates: Is There a Link to Aspar-
tame?, 55 J. NEUROPATHOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 1115, 1115-23 (1996)
(concluding that "there is need for reassessing the carcinogenic potential of aspar-
tame"); see generally Morando Soffritti et al., First Experimental Demonstration of the
Multipotential Carcinogenic Effects of Aspartame Administered in the Feed to Sprague-
Dawley Rats, 114 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 379, 379-85 (2006).
125. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 72.
126. Ralph G. Walton, Survey of Aspartame Studies: Correlation of Outcome and
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Searle, the maker of aspartame, the independence of these six stud-
ies is questionable.'"
Moreover, thirty-three of the industry funded studies were, with
minor changes, published in different journals from two to six times
each.'" Repeatedly publishing the same study in multiple journals is
a deceptive and unethical practice commonly employed by pharma-
ceutical companies.'" It seems that Searle was more interested in
swamping the media with pro-aspartame studies than in actually as-
certaining the safety of a product that could harm millions of peo-
ple.''
Aspartame producers routinely state that the sweetener is the
most tested food additive ever approved by the FDA. However, this
wonderful marketing line hides the fact that a single valid study is
more useful than any number of flawed studies. Because Searle
could not boast of the quality of its studies, the company relied on
sheer quantity. The experiments were so poorly run that Alexander
Schmidt, the FDA commissioner at the time Searle submitted its
research, called the studies "incredibly sloppy science," adding that
"[w]hat was discovered was reprehensible."'2
Two of the most extensive trials on aspartame were run by a
group of Italian researchers.' 2  Unlike the Searle safety tests, their
studies were both independently funded and published in peer-
reviewed journals, the gold standard in science. The scientists were
motivated to perform their first "mega-experiment" because Searle's
studies "did not comply with today's basic requirements for testing
the carcinogenic potential of a physical or chemical agent."'" In
particular, the scientists noted that Searle's experiments were termi-
128. See infra Part II.B.2.
129. Walton, supra note 126 (indicating that "[v]irtually all journals require that
an affidavit be signed by all authors to the effect that neither the manuscript nor
the data it contains have been previously published or concurrently submitted else-
where for publication. Violation of this policy may have a detrimental impact on
scientific progress and ethics.").
130. See MIcHAEIs, supra note 12, at 149.
131. Many industries have employed a similar strategy. See supra notes 13-16 and
accompanying text.
132. 131 CONG. REc. 10,808 (1985).
133. See Soffritti supra note 124; Morando Soffritti et al., Life-Span Exposure to Low
Doses of Aspartame Beginning during Prenatal Life Increases Cancer Effects in Rats, 115
ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1293, 1293 (2007).
134. Soffritti, supra note 124 at 380.
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nated prematurely and failed to include a large enough population
sample.'1"
A major purpose of this study was to determine a safe accept-
able daily intake (ADI) for aspartame. On the basis of Searle's trials,
the FDA set the ADI at 50 mg/kg of bodyweight." In more con-
crete terms, a 150-pound adult would need to drink twenty cans of
diet soda to reach this limit.'3 7 The makers of aspartame went even
further, claiming that not even this high amount would be danger-
ous because the ADI has a "built-in safety factor."'3 8
Since most people do not consume that much aspartame, Sof-
fritti and his group of researchers sought to determine if aspartame
is a carcinogen when ingested in smaller quantities. Their study
showed that aspartame's "carcinogenic effects are evident even at a
daily dose of 20 mg/kg of bodyweight."'"
This is the equivalent of eight cans of diet soda, a limit many
Americans exceed."o Because aspartame is found in over 6,000
products, it is easy to see how a person can quickly surpass this level.
Nonetheless, aspartame proponents are likely to claim that this is a
relatively high limit, so it is still safe to ingest a lesser amount of as-
partame on a daily basis.
However, just because most people drink less does not mean
they are safe from the harmful effects. Recall that the FDA set the
ADI at fifty mg/kg of bodyweight. Soffritti's team of researchers
showed that aspartame is carcinogenic at a mere forty percent of the
FDA's supposedly safe level. Future research at lower quantities is
necessary, but the outcome for aspartame looks bleak.
To see why, it is perhaps easiest to draw an analogue to smok-
ing. Adhering to the previous ratios, the FDA has, in effect, claimed
that smoking five packs of cigarettes a day is safe. Soffritti's study
showed that not even two packs a day would be safe. Although we
135. Id. FDA statistician Robert J. Condon expressed similar concerns, finding
problems in the conduct and power of the studies. 131 CONG. REc. 10,807 (1985).
Satya D. Dubey, a statististician at the FDA's Center for Drugs and Biologics also
noted "certain statistical difficulties" with Searle's studies. Id.
136. The NutraSweet Company, How much aspartame do people actually con-




139. Soffritti supra note 124, at 384.
140. Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast May 19, 2007), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/weekend/story?Id=3191903&page=1.
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would certainly want to explore whether smoking fewer cigarettes
would cause cancer, even pack-a-day smokers should be worried.
The equivalent holds true for aspartame. The FDA has set a
high ADI of twenty cans of diet soda for the average adult. Scien-
tists undercut this number by showing that consuming a more plau-
sible eight cans of diet soda increases the likelihood of cancer. At
this point, even people who only drink a few cans of diet soda a
week may want to consider whether it is worth the health risk.
The same group of researchers conducted an additional ex-
periment that confirmed the first study and further determined that,
when pregnant rats eat aspartame, there is an increased incidence of
cancer among their offspring."'
Unhappy with these results, the aspartame industry went on the
offensive by funding a literature review that attacked the Soffritti
studies."' This particular piece was sponsored by Ajinomoto, a
Japanese supplier of aspartame. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the authors of the review accepted industry-research as gospel and
discounted any independently-funded research that showed evi-
dence of aspartame's dangers. Interestingly, after this review con-
cluded that the sweetener's "safety is clearly documented," Ajino-
moto rebranded aspartame as AminoSweet. The company did this
to hide aspartame's history of causing health problems and to trick
the public into thinking it is a natural product."'
Given all of this evidence, one cannot help but wonder how as-
partame has remained on the market for nearly thirty years. The
FDA's close relationship with G.D. Searle will resolve this mystery.
Unfortunately, the FDA-the very agency established to protect
Americans from unsafe food and drugs-placed corporate earnings
above our health.
2. FDA Approval
G.D. Searle, the creator of aspartame, has an extensive history
of manipulating reports to hide the dangers of its drugs. Between
141. See Life-Span Exposure, supra note 133, at 1297 (demonstrating that "when
life-span exposure to APM [aspartame] begins during fetal life, its carcinogenic
effects are increased").
142. B.A. Magnuson et al., Aspartame: A Safety Evaluation Based on Current Use
Levels, Regulations, and Toxicological and Epidemiological Studies, 37 CRITICAL REV.
TOXICOLOGY 629, 669 (2007).
143. See Ethan Huff, Aspartame Has Been Renamed and is Now Being Marketed
as a Natural Sweetener, http://www.naturalnews.com/028151_aspartame
sweeteners.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
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1975 and 1977 alone, the FDA investigated Searle for fraud involv-
ing the safety testing of Aldactone, Flagyl, Norpace, and aspar-
tame.' The FDA reported its findings to the Subcommittee on
Health of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and what they found was
startling. In some of the Aldactone studies, gross legions requiring
histopathological examinations were never examined, malignant
tumors were removed and never reported, and a full thirty percent
of the animal tissues earmarked for examination were never exam-
ined."' FDA commissioner Alexander Schmidt noted one study was
so bad that even "after three separate reviews by Searle personnel of
the same data . .. we are continuing to discover errors that compli-
cate review of this study."'4 6
Searle used even more dubious practices while preparing re-
ports for its other drugs. In the clinical trials for Flagyl, Searle often
had two pathologists examine the animals. When the pathologists'
opinions differed, Searle used the reports that cast Flagyl in the
more favorable light,"' and any data that questioned Flagyl's safety
was conveniently withheld from the FDA. Searle went even further
in its quest to approve aspartame. When pathologists submitted
unfavorable reports, Searle simply changed the findings.4 1
In a study of the drug Norpace, the FDA found "inadequate
ante-mortem observations: e.g. animals reported in good condition
were actually dead . . . .""' Searle's data are so contradictory that
individual rats die and come back to life as many as four times.
When manipulating data wasn't enough, Searle forced its scientists
to lie. Despite voicing his objections, John W. Sargatz, Searle's prin-
cipal pathologist, was ordered to write "reassuring comments on
post-mortems of rats .... "
This pattern of serious errors led the FDA to question the valid-
ity of all of Searle's studies. The agency noted that "the cumulative
findings of problems within and across the studies we investigated
144. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 75-
78 (1984).
145. Id. at 76.
146. Id.
147. Id. In a 1976 report to the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt criticized Searle for this prac-
tice.
148. Id. at 77 (Commissioner Schmidt noted that FDA "investigators found that a
pathologist's summary was edited in such a manner as to alter, generally in a favor-
able direction, some of the pathologist's findings.").
149. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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reveal a pattern of conduct which compromises the scientific integ-
rity of the studies."'"
Due to Searle's actions regarding Aldactone, Flagyl and Nor-
pace, the FDA General-Counsel's office wanted the government to
launch a criminal investigation. However, the Justice Department
decided that a criminal prosecution would be useless because senior
executives would pass the blame to a handful of junior managers.
Searle handled the aspartame approval process in a similarly
deceptive manner. In 1980, the FDA had two separate panels evalu-
ate aspartame. Both panels recommended not approving the sweet-
ener due to concerns about brain tumors.'5 ' The FDA task forces
determined that the Searle experiments were seriously flawed.'5
Raw data were missing, and the information that was available con-
tained numerous errors and discrepancies. The Searle's researchers
had disposed of dead rats without checking to see if aspartame
killed them and had operated on others to remove evidence of tu-
mors." The scientists even secretly administered antibiotics.'
Searle's scientists also failed to properly mix aspartame with the lab
animals' food. This allowed the rats to eat around the chemical. It's
pretty hard to find aspartame-related side effects when the rats
aren't even ingesting the aspartame.
The tactics uncovered in the FDA reports show that Searle mis-
represented the carcinogenic effects of aspartame and hid incrimi-
nating data from the agency.' Adrian Gross, a lead researcher on
the FDA task force, noted the following: "At the heart of FDA's
regulatory process is its ability to rely upon the basic safety data
submitted by sponsors of regulated products. Our investigation
clearly demonstrates that, in the G. D. Searle Co., we have no basis
for such reliance now."'5  Gross went on to state that, ironically,
150. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
151. See 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Dec. 29, 1996), available at
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5805190307148690
8 3 0#.
152. See FDA, The "Bressler Report", available at http://www.dorway.com/
bressler.txt.
153. See 60 Minutes, supra note 151.
154. Id.
155. Id. (The FDA investigation revealed "a pattern of conduct which compro-
mises the scientific integrity of the studies." Former Senator Howard Metzenbaum,
an active opponent of aspartame, said that "according to the FDA themselves,
Searle, in making their presentation to the FDA, had willfully misrepresented the
facts and had withheld some of the facts that they knew would possibly jeopardize
the approval of the product.").
156. Morton Mintz, Metzenbaum: NutraSweet Inquiry Needed, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
1986, at B9.
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Searle's own studies "established beyond a reasonable doubt that
aspartame is capable of inducing brain tumors in experimental ani-
mals." 15
FDA officials were so upset by Searle's deception that they sent
the file to the U.S. Attorney's office and urged them to present the
information to a grand jury. Unfortunately, it was never presented.
Samuel Skinner, the head of the grand jury probe, withdrew from
the case to accept a position at Searle's Chicago law firm Sidley &
Austin. During this delay, the statute of limitations ran out.'
Skinner was not the only government official tainted by Searle.
After leaving the FDA, former Acting Commissioner Michael
Friedman was hired as vice president of G.D. Searle. Unsurpris-
ingly, Friedman defended aspartame by arguing that despite the
numerous problems, "the scientists looking at that information de-
cided that the basic strength of the conclusions remains intact."'
Apparently, Friedman failed to read any of the FDA task force's re-
ports that directly contradict this statement.
The most striking corruption, however, involves FDA Commis-
sioner Arthur Hayes, Jr. and Donald Rumsfeld. Between 1977 and
1985, Donald Rumsfeld served as CEO, President, and eventually
Chairman of Searle. On January 21, 1981, a mere day after Presi-
dent Reagan's inauguration, Searle resubmitted its aspartame appli-
cation to the FDA. Hayes quickly appointed a five-member commit-
tee to determine whether aspartame should be approved. When it
became apparent that the committee would reject the application by
a vote of three to two, Hayes installed a sixth member. This tied the
vote and allowed Hayes, as FDA Commissioner, to break the dead-
lock and approve aspartame. Shortly after this incident, Hayes left
the FDA to take a job at Bursen-Marsteller, Searle's public relations
firm.'" Even if one fervently believes that aspartame is safe, this un-
derhanded process by which it was approved should be unsettling.
. C. Sucralose
If aspartame is the king of artificial sweeteners, sucralose is the
upstart prince making a grab for the crown. Since receiving FDA
approval in 1999, sucralose has become the most popular artificial
sweetener in the United States and aspartame's main rival in the
157. Id.
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global market. Sucralose is marketed by McNeil Nutritionals.' un-
der the brand name Splenda. It is currently used in more than
4,000 products and is 600 times sweeter than sugar.' Sucralose's
main advantage over aspartame is that it remains stable at high tem-
peratures.'" This property allows the sweetener to be used in baked
goods. Because sucralose can be added to a much wider variety of
products, people will have more opportunities to consume it.
Therefore, it is even more important to ensure that the sweetener is
safe.
Sucralose's problems start with its name. The similarity to su-
crose is not a coincidence. McNeil wants the public to think that
sucralose is a natural product.'" Even before approval, consumer
advocacy groups alerted the FDA that the name sucralose would
create confusion. They suggested that the product be labeled in a
manner that would accurately describe its chemical structure." The
FDA rejected this idea because other artificial sweeteners had not
been named according to this convention.'" The FDA made the
absurd argument that because people had not confused aspartame
with sucrose, they would not confuse sucralose with sucrose.
McNeil won this round, but in its quest to fool the public, the
company thought that similar names would not be enough. It also
developed slogans that would force consumers to mentally align
sugar with sucralose. One example is "Think sugar, say Splenda."'6 7
Another successful approach was to substitute "Splenda" for "sugar"
in childhood fairy tales. This led to such memorable advertisements
161. McNeil Nutritionals is a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. Linkedin, McNeil
Nutritionals, http://www.linkedin.com/companies/mcneil-nutritionels (last visited
Apr. 6, 2010).
162. Tate & Lyle, About SPLENDA@ Sucralose, http://www.tateandlyle.com/
TateAndLyle/products-applications/_products/sucralose/default.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2010).
163. Id. ("SPLENDA@ Sucralose retains its sweetness through all commonly used
food and beverage manufacturing processes and also throughout the shelf life of
finished products.").
164. McNeil Nutritionals' deceptive marketing has tricked forty-seven percent of
Splenda users into thinking that it is a natural product. Center for Science in the
Public Interest, "Splenda Should Stop Confusing Consumers, Says CSPI: Statement
of CSPI Executive Director Michael F. Jacobson," Feb. 14, 2005
http://www.cspinet.org/new/200502141.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
165. Sucralose's chemical name is trichlorogalactose.
166. FDA Final Rule on Sucralose, §102.5(a), http-//vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~1rd/
fr980403.html.
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as "The Dance of the Splenda Plum Fairy," "Splenda and Spice and
Everything Nice," and "Roses are Red, Violets are Blue, Splenda is
Sweet and So Are You."1'
Rival Merisant, the maker of aspartame-based Equal, felt that
these marketing techniques had gone too far. In 2006, the company
sued McNeil Nutritional for unfair profits and lost sales due to these
misleading advertisements.'" After it became clear that the jury
would find against McNeil, the two companies settled.
A major focus of the trial was the main promotional slogan for
Splenda: "Made from sugar, so it tastes like sugar."' Apparently,
the marketing team that thought up this line was unfamiliar with
even the most basic principles of chemistry. Two products with
similar constituent elements are often vastly different, both in terms
of safety and function."'
By McNeil Nutritionals' standard, we could create a similar slo-
gan for table salt: "Made from chlorine, so it tastes like chlorine."
No doubt this seems laughable. As anyone who has swallowed pool
water can confirm, fast food chains are unlikely to start putting
chlorine packets next to the salt shaker. Nevertheless, McNeil Nutri-
tionals has successfully promoted sucralose with a slogan that uses
identical reasoning.
In its elemental form (Cl), chlorine is a powerful disinfectant
and bleaching agent. However, when the chlorine atom combines
with sodium (Na), we get common table salt (NaC1). One was used
168. For a discussion of McNeil Nutritionals' distinct marketing campaign, see
Elizabeth Esfahani, Finding the Sweet Spot, Nov. 1, 2005, http://noney.cnn.com/
magazines/business2/business2 archive/2005/11/01/8362835/index.htm ("[T]he
bottom line is, Splenda is not sugar. It is a completely artificial chemical com-
pound.").
169. See Amy S. Clark, Equal and Splenda Settle Lawsuit, May 11, 2007
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/11/business/main2793207.shtml (last
visited Apr. 6, 2010) ("Merisant was seeking more than $200 million from McNeil -
at least $183 million for unfair profits since 2003 and compensation for at least $25
million in lost sales."); For additional details of the lawsuit, see Associated Press,
Splenda Settles Lawsuit Over 'Sugar' Claim, May 11, 2007, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/18618557 (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
170. Clark, supra note 169.
171. As early as the 1820s, scientists had discovered this property of chemical
compounds. See JOHN THEODORE MERZ, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 406 (1904) ("W6hler in 1823, Liebig in 1824, and Faraday in
1825 found that entirely different qualities indicating a different constitution, could
belong to bodies that have the same elements in the same numerical proportions.").
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as a weapon during World War I, and the other is a common food
ingredient.
Another familiar example is carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon
dioxide (CO 2). If McNeil Nutritionals were charged with making up
a slogan for this gas, it might go something like the following: "Car-
bon Monoxide! Made with the same elements as carbon dioxide, so
it's just as safe as carbon dioxide." Again, this is obviously false, but
it operates under the same mistaken assumption as the sucralose
slogan, namely that chemicals with similar constituent elements have
similar qualities.
Sucrose (C6H,20,) and sucralose (C12H,,O,) are even less alike
than the preceding examples. McNeil Nutritionals makes sucralose
by chlorinating sugar. This process involves replacing three of the
hydroxyl groups (OH) with chlorine atoms and results in a major
change to the molecular structure. Ethanol provides a clear exam-
ple of how replacing a hydroxyl group creates an entirely unrelated
chemical. When ethanol (C2H6 0) is chlorinated, it becomes chloro-
ethane (C2H5Cl). The substance starts as the alcohol found in drinks
and ends up as an effective refrigerant and aerosol spray propellant.
When sugar undergoes this chlorination process to become su-
cralose, it is converted into a chlorocarbon. McNeil Nutritionals
tries to brush this matter aside by pointing out that we eat chlorine
every day in the form of table salt. By making this argument,
McNeil conveniently ignores a fundamental difference in the chemi-
cal bonds. The defining feature of chlorocarbons such as sucralose
is a covalently bonded chlorine atom. In table salt, however, sodium
and chlorine form an ionic bond to become sodium chloride. 73 The
difference between a covalent and ionic bond is night and day."
As a class, chlorocarbons consist of insecticides, pesticides,
bleaches, chemical weapons, and sucralose." Because McNeil did
172. See New York State Department of Health, The Facts about Chlorine, Aug. 5,
2004, http://www.health.state.ny.us/environmental/emergency/chemical-terrorism/
chlorinetech. htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
173. For further discussion of the difference between chlorine and chloride, see
Roald Hoffman, Legally Sweet, Vol. 95, 310 (2007), available at http://
www.americanscientist.org/issues/id.3749,y.0,no.,content.true,page.1,css.print/
issue.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
174. "If the logic of [McNeil's] argument were correct, we could all be guzzling
drain cleaner without consequence because, after all, lye, also known as sodium
hydroxide, is merely sodium, hydrogen, and oxygen-all very common components
of food." Sucralose Q&A Setting the Record Straight Part 2, 1 INTEGRATED SUPPLEMENTS
NEWSLETTER, July 2007, at 2, available at http://www.integratedsupple-
ments.com/articles/ Newsletter2007O4.pdf.
175. For a table of chlorocarbons, see MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 81-83.
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not want its artificial sweetener to be associated with these toxic sub-
stances, it created a completely new chemical category: chloro-
carbohydrates. Conveniently for McNeil, sucralose is the only
chloro-carbohydrate in the world.
Since McNeil Nutritionals can magically create a new chemical
category, perhaps it has also miraculously developed a safe chloro-
carbon. Let's see what science has to say. McNeil boasts that
"[s]ucralose has been extensively tested in more than 100 studies
during a 20-year period and found to be a safe and remarkably inert
ingredient.""' This is an incredibly crafty sentence. Anyone who
reads it would reasonably assume that those studies were long-term
and focused on human safety. Both of these assumptions, however,
would be wrong. Only three studies lasted a year or more, and none
of those involved humans. On top of this, the vast majority of trials
went unpublished. If these unpublished studies had safe results,
why would McNeil withhold them from the public? Equally disturb-
ing, more of the published studies examined whether sucralose
causes tooth decay rather than if the product is safe to consume."
You can sleep soundly at night knowing that McNeil thoroughly in-
vestigated any potential dental problems. Unfortunately, whether
sucralose has a toxic effect on the rest of your body was not a con-
cern.
The current state of safety literature is reminiscent of aspar-
tame twenty years ago. No long-term studies have been done on
humans,"' the manufacturer's own tests found evidence of toxicity
in rats,"'7 and consumers have reported many adverse reactions.'"
The Sucralose Toxicity Information Center has received complaints
linking the following ailments to sucralose: "skin rashes/flushing,
panic-like agitation, dizziness and numbness, diarrhea, swelling,
176. All About Sucralose, Sucralose Facts, http://www.sucralose.org/facts/
brochure.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
177. Oddly, all of the safety studies involving animals were published in a single
issue of one journal.
178. See MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 89 (noting that the longest safety study involv-
ing humans was just thirteen weeks).
179. Marcelle Pick, Sugar substitutes and the potential danger of Splenda, Nov.
14, 2005, http://www.womentowomen.com/healthyweight/splenda.aspx (last vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2010) (noting that pre-approval studies showed that sucralose "caused
shrunken thymus glands, enlarged livers, and kidney disorders in rodents").
180. See Food and Diet, Splenda, http://www.foodanddiet.com/NewFiles/
splenda-story-list.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (listing consumer complaints that
include headaches, depression, anxiety, diarrhea, vomiting, extreme fatigue, drug-
like feelings of disorientation and confusion, and more).
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muscle aches, headaches, intestinal cramping, bladder issues, and
stomach pain.""'
McNeil Nutritionals states that sucralose "passes rapidly
through the body virtually unchanged."'" Note the qualification. By
its own estimates, McNeil believes that fifteen percent of the su-
cralose humans ingest is absorbed into the body.'" Apparently to
McNeil, "virtually unchanged" is equivalent to a significant rate of
absorption. Let's give McNeil the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps it
meant that fifteen percent of a single dose of sucralose is "virtually"
negligible. Unfortunately, this fails to account for the fact that peo-
ple will be consuming multiple servings of sucralose every day for
years. Is fifteen percent over a lifetime really insignificant? Until
long-term human studies have been conducted, we won't know the
answer for certain." Until then, I ask you to consider whether a
corporation that has repeatedly deceived consumers really views
public health as a top priority.
D. Stevia
In the previous sections, we examined how pharmaceutical
companies can push their unsafe products through the FDA ap-
proval process. This section is even more alarming. It demonstrates
how powerful corporations can prevent safe, natural products from
obtaining FDA approval. The FDA's treatment of stevia provides
the clearest example of how the agency's decisions are made to
maximize corporate profits and have nothing to do with science or
consumer health. However, before we explore the extent of this
corruption, let's briefly look at why this herb is a threat to the artifi-
cial sweetener industry.
Stevia is a natural, non-caloric sweetener derived from the
South American plant Stevia rebaudiana Bertoni. When refined
181. Id.
182. All About Sucralose, http://www.sucralose.org/facts/brochure.asp (last
visited Apr. 8, 2010).
183. See B.A. John et al., The Pharmacokinetics and Metabolism of Sucralose in the
Mouse, 38 FOOD & CHEM. ToxIc. S107 (2000). The FDA estimates that between
eleven and twenty-seven percent is absorbed. Food Additives Permitted For Direct
Addition to Food for Human Consumption; Sucralose, 63 FED. REG. 16, 417, 16419
(Apr. 3, 1998).
184. See Betty Kovacs, Artificial Sweeteners, http://www.medicinenet.com/ artifi-
cial sweeteners/page9.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (stating that "the only way to
be sure of the safety of sucralose is to have long-term studies on humans done").
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into a white powder extract, stevia is approximately 300 times
sweeter than sugar.'
Unlike artificial sweeteners, independent clinical studies have
confirmed that stevia is not toxic.' The earliest safety study was
conducted in 1931, and since then, the findings have been reaf-
firmed by multiple experiments. In that first study, the researchers
determined that humans cannot digest stevia. Unlike McNeil's su-
cralose trials, this study did not need to qualify its findings with
words like "virtually" or "almost." Stevia passes through our bodies
completely unchanged.
During the 1970s, while stevia was going through the approval
process in Japan, many Japanese scientists conducted additional
tests. These trials uniformly indicated that the sweetener is safe for
human consumption.17 Since that time, stevia has been widely used
in Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland with no ill effects.
In Japan, stevia became so popular that, at one point, 1700 tons
were consumed annually," accounting for forty percent of the
sweetener market.'" More recent studies have once again confirmed
stevia's safety.'" It bears emphasizing that, unlike the artificial
sweetener safety tests, these trials were independently funded.
185. See David Richard, Questions & Answers about Stevia,
http://www.stevia.com/Stevia Article.aspx?Id=2269 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
186. See e.g., H. Fujita & T. Edahiro, Safety and utilization of stevia sweetener, 22 THE
FOOD INDUSTRY 1, 1-8 (1979); IKHLAs A. KHAN & EHAB A. ABOURASHED, LEUNGS
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMON NATURAL INGREDIENTS: USED IN FOOD, DRUGS AND
COSMETICS 577 (2009) ("Subacute toxicity studies on rats over a 50-day period up to
7.0% concentration of stevioside in feed produced no remarkable toxic effects.").
187. See e.g., H. Akashi & Y. Yokoyama, Dried Leaf Extracts of Stevia: Toxicological
Test, 18 J. JAPANESE Soc. FOOD SCI. & TECH. 34, 34-43 (1975); H. Fujita & T. Eda-
hiro, 22 J.JAPANESE Soc. FOOD SCL & TECH. 66 (1979).
188. See IKHLAs A. KHAN & EHAB A. ABOURASHED, LEUNGS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMMON NATURAL INGREDIENTS: USED IN FOOD, DRUGS AND COSMETICS 577 (2009)
(citing M. BLUMENTHAL, WHOLE FOODS 29 (1992)).
189. "[F]ood manufacturers there began using Stevia extracts to sweeten every-
thing from sweet soy sauce and pickles to Diet Coke. Stevia and its extracts have
since captured more than 40 percent of the Japanese sweetener market." Herbal
Advantage, Stevia - the 'Herbal Advantage' Over Sugar (and its Substitutes),
http://www.stevia-products.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
190. See K. Toyoda et al., Assessment of the Carcinogenicity of Stevioside in F344 Rats,
35 FOOD & CHEM. Toxic. 597, 597-603 (1997) (concluding "that stevioside is not
carcinogenic in rats under the experimental conditions described"); for a review of
additional studies, see RAY SAHELIAN & DONNA GATES, THE STEVIA COOKBOOK 28-31
("[R]esearchers determined that giving laboratory rats 550 mg/kg of stevioside
every day for two years did not cause any abnormalities.").
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At one point, upon reviewing the literature on stevia, one re-
searcher noted the following:
Few substances have ever yielded such consistently negative results in
toxicity trials as have stevia. Almost every toxicity test imaginable has
been performed on stevia extract [concentrate] or stevioside at one time
or another. The results are always negative. No abnormalities in weight
change, food intake, cell or membrane characteristics, enzyme and sub-
strate utilization, or chromosome characteristics. No cancer, no birth
defects, no acute and no chronic untoward effects. Nothing.'9'
Perhaps the best proof of stevia's safety, however, is that it has
been consumed, with no adverse effects, for more than fifteen hun-
dred years by the indigenous people of South America.'" In fact,
the Guarani tribes of Paraguay, Brazil, and Bolivia have long used
stevia to lower blood sugar'' and treat heartburn and hyperten-
sion.'" Recent research has corroborated stevia's medicinal proper-
ties.'" Additionally, since stevia is an excellent source of the anti-
oxidant superoxide dismutase, the herb may also reduce the risk of
cancer.' Not only is stevia safe, it actually has health benefits,
something no artificial sweetener can claim.
The interesting part is that the FDA should have approved ste-
via even without this safety evidence. The Federal Food, Drug, and
191. James May, Stevia - Sweetener of Choice for Future Generations,
http://www.stevia.com/SteviaArticle.aspx?d=2413 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010)
(quoting Daniel Mowrey).
192. See MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 205.
193. Id.
194. See Ashraf Tanvir, Sugar Leaf - A New Breed of 'Sweetener',
http://www.parc.gov.pk/articles/sugar_1eaf.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
195. See M.H. Hsieh et al., Efficacy and Tolerability of Oral Stevioside in Patients with
Mild Essential Hypertension: A Two-Year, Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Study 25
CLINICAL THERAPY 2797, 2798 (2003) ("In this 2-year study in Chinese patients with
mild hypertension, oral stevioside significantly decreased SBP and DBP compared
with placebo. QOL was improved, and no significant adverse effects were noted.");
see R. Curi et al., Effect of Stevia Rebaudiana on Glucose Tolerance in Normal Adult
Humans, 19 BRAz. J. MED. Bio. RES. 771, 771 (1986) (finding that "[t]he extract of
Stevia rebaudiana increased glucose tolerance [and] significantly decreased plasma
glucose levels during the test and after overnight fasting in all volunteers"); see J.O.
Atteh et al., Evaluation of Supplementary Stevia (Stevia Rebaudiana, Bertoni) Leaves and
Stevioside in Broiler Diets: Effects on Feed Intake, Nutrient Metabolism, Blood Parameters
and Growth Performance, 92 J. ANIMAL PHYSIOLOGY & ANIMAL NUTRITION 640, 646-47
(2008) (finding that stevia leaves reduced blood levels of glucose, triglycerides and
triiodothyronine).
196. See S. Ghanta et al., Oxidative DNA Damage Preventive Activity and Antioxidant
Potential of Stevia Rebaudiana (Bertoni) Bertoni, a Natural Sweetener, 65 J.
AGRICULTURAL & FOOD CHEM. 10962, 10962 (2007) (concluding "that Stevia rebaudi-
ana may be useful as a potential source of natural antioxidants").
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Cosmetic Act has a carve-out for food additives Generally Recog-
nized as Safe (GRAS). The statute provides that the FDA has no
regulatory power over any "substance used in food prior to January
1, 1958, [that is determined] through either scientific procedures or
experience based on common use in food to be safe under the conditions
of its intended use."'" As already noted, stevia had been used for
more than a millennium in South America. In addition, prior to
1958, the sweetener had been commonly used in the United States.
Nevertheless, this did not stop the FDA from banning stevia in
1991 to satisfy an anonymous trade complaint.'" After nearly twenty
years and numerous Freedom of Information Act requests, the FDA
has steadfastly refused to release the name of the company that re-
quested the ban. These suspicious circumstances led Arizona con-
gressman Jon Kyl to conclude that the FDA's stevia ban is "a re-
straint of trade to benefit the artificial sweetener industry."'" Evi-
dence for this claim has mounted in recent years.
In 1992, the American Herbal Products Association submitted a
petition to the FDA requesting that stevia be granted GRAS status.
The introduction to the petition states that "various extract forms of
stevia have been extensively studied and tested. These tests include
acute, sub-acute, carcinogenic evaluation and mutagenicity studies.
These scientific data . . . demonstrate cumulatively that there is no
safety problem associated with the use of an extract of stevia. It ap-
pears to be extraordinarily safe."2' The GRAS affirmation petition
went on to cite over 900 articles dealing with stevia, and not a single
one reported any adverse health effects.20'
197. 21 U.S.C. 321, §201(s).
198. See FDA, Import Alert No. 45-06 (May 17, 1991).
199. Healthy News Service, FDA Continues Pushing Natural Herb Sweetener Stevia
Out of U.S., http://stevia.com/Stevia-article/FDA Continues PushingNatural
Herb_ SweetenerSteviaOut of US/8134 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (quoting a
1993 letter fromJohn Kyl to former FDA Commissioner David Kessler).
200. Id.
201. Id. (A 1995 supplement to the petition indicates that "[t]he petition cites
over 120 articles about stevia written before 1958, and over 900 articles published
to date. In this well-chronicled history of stevia, no author has ever reported any
adverse human health consequences associated with consumption of stevia leaf."
The petition itself states "Stevia leaf is a natural product that has been used for at
least 400 years as a food product, principally as a sweetener or other flavoring
agent. None of this common usage in foods has indicated any evidence of a safety
problem. There are no reports of any government agency in any of the above
countries indicating any public health concern whatsoever in connection with the
use of stevia in foods.").
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Despite this overwhelming evidence, the FDA refused to act un-
til Congress forced its hand in 1994. That year, Congress passed the
Dietary Supplement and Health Education Act." This law pre-
vented the FDA from regulating any dietary supplement unless it
was proven unsafe. Because studies did not attribute any health
risks to stevia, the FDA was forced to allow manufacturers to market
the herb as a dietary supplement. The agency, however, still refused
to approve stevia for use as a sweetener.
Due to the strict regulations regarding the labeling, marketing,
and sales of dietary supplements,"' many consumers still wanted the
partial ban lifted. In spite of public support for stevia,0 6 the FDA
refused to grant approval. At one point, the FDA claimed its con-
cerns were largely based on the work of Mauro Alvarez.05 Upon
learning of this, Alvarez wrote that the FDA had clearly misinter-
preted his research:
[T]he only possible way to report that the results showed detrimental ef-
fects is by taking information out of context. If this is the case, one con-
cludes that these FDA scientists are incompetent and irresponsible, or if
not, they must belong to some sort of conspiracy group to carry on a
sinister agenda against this plant with the objective to keep it away from
American consumers by attributing to it safety issues that do not exist.m
Nevertheless, for more than a decade, the FDA stuck to the bi-
zarre position that stevia was a safe "dietary supplement" but a toxic
"food additive."m2 " Never mind the fact that stevia could legally be
added to foods in the exact same manner as a food additive so long
202. Dietary Supplement and Health Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417,
108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
203. See Cooking with Stevia, The FDA and the 1st Amendment or Why The
Book Cooking With Stevia Was Banned!, http://www.cookingwithstevia.com (last
visited Apr. 7, 2010) ("Simply suggesting that the stevia be mixed with water could
be construed as mislabeling and force a recall of the products.").
204. Recall that the FDA refused to ban saccharin because it would upset some
consumers. Apparently, consumer support only matters when it aligns with corpo-
rate profits. See note 95 and accompanying text.
205. Stevia.net, The 19 Studies, http://www.stevia.net/19studies.htm (last visited
Apr. 7, 2010).
206. Letter from Mauro Alvarez, Professor, Parque Tecnologico Agro-Industrial
do Oeste Uan. 19, 1998) available at http://www.stevia.net/19studies.htm.
207. Many have attributed stevia's paradoxical state to the power of big business.
See e.g., Alexandra Marks, Bitter Dispute Over All-Natural Sweetener, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR, Sept. 1, 1999, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0901/
p2sl.html ("They say it's safe as long as you use it as a dietary supplement, but if
you try to use it as a food it's unsafe? The battle goes back to influence on the FDA
from the artificial sweetener industry." (quoting James Kirkland, author of The
Stevia Cookbook)).
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as the product was labeled a "dietary supplement." These strict
supplement regulations, however, did have several important effects.
They made major grocery chains reluctant to carry the herb, relegat-
ing the sale of stevia to health food stores. This ensured that the
vast majority of consumers were unaware of stevia and, in doing so,
preserved the market share of artificial sweeteners. For these rea-
sons, the FDA's partial ban could not have been due to safety con-
cerns. It was done purely for economic profit. Remember, in the
FDA's view, corporate health comes before consumer health.
Then suddenly, in 2008, the FDA had a change of heart and
began allowing stevia to be marketed as a sweetener. What could
engender this reversal? Had a new conclusive scientific study been
published? Nope, merely the players supporting stevia had changed.
In May 2008, Cargill, Merisant, Coca-Cola, and Pepsi submitted peti-
tions to the FDA asking that stevia be granted GRAS approval. For
the past two decades, the FDA had denied the exact same requests
from consumer groups. However, now that major corporations
were behind stevia, the FDA decided it must be safe for consump-
tion. It seems like corporate backing and not science dictates safety.
Maybe if corporations wished hard enough, cigarettes would magi-
cally become safe, too?1
At any rate, in order to fully appreciate the FDA's reversal, one
must understand the companies behind the petitions. Merisant is
the maker of aspartame-based Equal. Due to the rising popularity of
sucralose, Merisant's share of the artificial sweetener market had
declined substantially. In fact, sales had fallen so much that the
company was pushed into bankruptcy.
Since sucralose had become the dream artificial sweetener in
terms of taste and usability, Merisant needed a completely new ap-
proach if it hoped to return to profitability. The company ulti-
mately decided to capitalize on the natural and organic trends that
are spreading across America. This meant finding a natural product
208. See e.g., Erica Orden, Calorie-Free, Stevia's 11-Year War with FDA, Newsday,
May 2, 2006, available at http://www.steaz.com/pdf/news_2006/News-
day05O6.pdf. "In January 2004, Steaz, a Pennsylvania-based natural soda manufac-
turer, introduced a diet line made with stevia rather than aspartame or Nutrasweet.
To comply with the legal guidelines, the company can't market it as a soda or even
as a beverage (it calls the product a dietary supplement) and must list 'supplement
facts' rather than 'nutrition facts' on its back label.
209. See generally MIcHAELs, supra note 12, at 3-11.
210. See Chelsea Emery et. al., Merisant, Maker of Equa4 Gets $20 mln DIP Financ-
ing, REUTERS, http://in.reuters.com/article/privateEquity/idNN1232403220090112
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
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that could compete with sucralose. Lo and behold, stevia was the
perfect candidate. Merisant developed a stevia-based sweetener
called PureVia'" and teamed up with Pepsi to market a line of diet
soft drinks."'
Cargill followed a somewhat similar path. Although it is Amer-
ica's largest agricultural corporation,'13 it had never entered the arti-
ficial sweetener market. Like Merisant, Cargill saw that the trend
was moving towards natural products. Therefore, it developed Tru-
via,' another stevia-based sweetener, and teamed up with Coca-Cola
to produce diet soft drinks."'
At this point, there was still one minor problem. The FDA had
consistently claimed that stevia was not safe for humans. But with
four major corporations now backing stevia (Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Car-
gill, and Merisant), the agency's stance quickly changed.
As previously noted, these corporations asked that stevia be
given GRAS approval in May of 2008. The FDA handled this re-
quest in an extremely clever way. Instead of granting GRAS ap-
proval which would have allowed every company to use the sweet-
ener, the FDA issued a letter of "no objection."" This means that
the FDA does not object now, but it may object later. Essentially,
the FDA has reserved the right to selectively target companies. Al-
though it has not yet done so, the FDA can allow Coca-Cola and
Pepsi to market stevia while preventing smaller companies from
producing the sweetener."
211. PureVia contains the following ingredients: erythritol, isomaltulose, stevia
extract, cellulose powder, and natural flavors. Lynn Smythe, Zero Calorie Stevia
Sweeteners, http://spices.suiteI01.com/article.cfm/zero-calorie-stevia-sweeteners
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
212. Betsy McKay, FDA Clears Use of Herb As Sweetener, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008,
at B3.
213. Andrea D. Murphy & John J. Ray, America's Largest Private Companies,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/28/largest-private-companies-business-private-
companies-09_land.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (listing Cargill as #1 with reve-
nue of $106.3 billion);
214. Truvia contains the following ingredients: stevia extract, erythritol, and natu-
ral flavors. Smythe, supra note 211.
215. Cargill, Honestly Sweet, http://www.cargill.com/connections/more-stories/
truvia-natural-sweetener/indexjsp (last visited Aug. 6, 2010).
216. McKay, supra note 212; see Mike Adams, FDA Approves Stevia, Ends the Era
of Oppression of this Herbal Sweetener - Update 1, http://www.naturalnews.com/
News_000626_steviaTruviaFDA.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (stating that the
FDA's issuance of "no objection" letters really means "the FDA hasn't technically
granted approval to stevia but has affirmed it will not object to companies using it
in foods and beverages.").
217. See Adams, supra note 216.
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Over the past twenty years, stevia has had quite the adventure.
One commentator sums up the sweetener's history quite nicely:
When stevia threatened the profits of aspartame, it was routinely sup-
pressed by the agency. FDA thugs seized imports of stevia at the border,
destroyed millions of dollars in stevia products, threatened companies
with fines for daring to sell stevia, and even ordered one company to de-
stroy its recipe books that mentioned stevia in dessert recipes. But now,
when Coca-Cola and Pepsi want stevia approved, the FDA suddenly re-
218
verses its oppression and decides to legalize the herb.
Although stevia's use as a food additive benefits Americans, the
process by which it was approved presents a disturbing picture.
Corporations routinely manipulate the FDA to maximize profits. If
a product hurts the bottom line, the FDA bans it. If it helps the bot-
tom line, the FDA approves it. Science and safety are irrelevant.
Obviously, fundamental change is needed."' Minor tweaks will only
whitewash the problem. Industry must no longer be permitted to
corrupt the FDA. The final part of this Article presents two major
reforms that can provide the change we need.
III. TAKING INDUSTRY OUT OF THE FDA
Senator Charles Grassley plainly identified the problem when
he said that the FDA "needs to reestablish its relationship with its
own scientists and distance itself from the drug industry. The FDA
needs to get rid of its mind-set that it's a facilitator for the drug in-
dustry and become regulator once again. The FDA's focus should
be only on science and the public good.""o
The first section describes the current FDA approval process.
The final two sections present reforms that will take industry out of
the FDA and ensure that the agency adheres to its mission of "pro-
tecting the public health," not filling the corporate coffers."'
218. Id.
219. See H.R. REP. No. 104-436, at 12-13 (1995) ("Manipulation of the food addi-
tive review process for anti-competitive purposes is inconsistent with the purposes
of premarket review.")
220. Jonathan D. Rockoff, FDA Scientists Report Their Safety Concerns in Poll, L.A.
TIMES, July 21, 2006, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/
21/nation/na-fda21.
221. FDA, supra note 9.
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A. FDA Approval Process
After a pharmaceutical company develops a drug," it conducts
preclinical testing in laboratory animals. Next, the company submits
its results to the FDA in the form of an Investigational New Drug
Application (IND). By examining the IND, the FDA determines
whether it is safe for the drug company to begin testing on humans.
If the FDA approves the IND, the pharmaceutical company can
begin the first of three clinical stages. Phase one studies generally
use small sample sizes and are conducted on healthy volunteers.
The main objective is to identify common side effects and determine
how humans absorb and excrete the drug.
The FDA reviews these results and allows the corporation to
move onto phase two if the product does not appear unacceptably
dangerous. The corporation's goal in phase two is to prove effec-
tiveness. These studies use a moderate sample size (up to 300 par-
ticipants). To determine if the drug works, subjects in the test
group are given the new drug and subjects in the control group are
given a placebo or a different FDA-approved drug.
If the corporation can provide evidence of the drug's efficacy,
the FDA allows phase three to begin. In this final phase, the phar-
maceutical company conducts large-scale tests with up to 3,000 sub-
jects. The purpose of this phase is to check the drug's safety and
effectiveness in different populations and at different dosages.
After phase three, the drug company submits a New Drug Ap-
plication to the FDA. This report should contain all of the data and
results gathered during the previous tests. However, as evidenced
most prominently by G.D. Searle's aspartame reports, damning data
is often withheld.
The FDA forms a review team consisting of medical doctors,
chemists, statisticians, microbiologists, pharmacologists, and other
experts to evaluate whether the drug company's trials show conclu-
sive evidence of safety and effectiveness. At times, the FDA calls on
advisory committees for help. Finally, higher level directors deter-
mine whether the drug should be approved. "'
At first glance, this appears to be a relatively sound approval
process. However, there are two major flaws that should make
Americans question the reliability of the FDA's conclusions. First,
due to their close financial ties to the businesses they are regulat-
222. Food additives undergo a similar but less rigorous process.
223. For a more detailed explanation of the process, see FDA, supra note 11.
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ing,"' the people making the final decisions are often guided more
by politics than scientific analysis." This is particularly true of top
directors and commissioners who often leave the FDA and join
pharmaceutical companies or lobbying firms for especially lucrative
salaries.2 "' As a remedy to this problem, the next section will pro-
pose life tenure and strengthened conflict-of-interest regulations.
The second major flaw in the current approval process is that
pharmaceutical companies conduct the studies to determine their
own products' safety and effectiveness. Since drug companies only
care about profit maximization, they are not concerned with accu-
rately assessing a product's health risks. This has caused the indus-
try to employ countless deceptive strategies to trick the FDA and the
general public into believing that toxic chemicals are actually safe.
To guarantee that the FDA's decisions are based on valid data, the
final section advocates adopting a system that takes industry out of
science.
B. Locking the Revolving Door
Currently, thirty-six percent of FDA scientists feel they cannot
express "concerns about public health without fear of retaliation."2
Since more than one-third of researchers are afraid to do their jobs,
the FDA obviously needs to reform its entire culture.
224. See Andrew Bridges, Ex-FDA Chief Pleads Guilty in Stock Case, THE WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/17/AR2006101700573.html ("Former FDA Com-
missioner Lester Crawford pleaded guilty Tuesday to conflict of interest and false
reporting of information about stocks he owned in food, beverage and medical
device companies he was in charge of regulating.").
225. Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 5, at 3 (quoting a scientist from
the Center of Devices and Radiological Health as saying "In my experience, it is
never the 'low level' reviewers in the FDA who breach the integrity of our work. It
is usually at much higher levels, such as center directors and above. Those higher
levels are so far removed from the scientific work we do that politics has even more
sway over their decisions.").
226. The FDA's revolving door is well documented. See e.g., Mike Palmedo, Re-
volving Door Between the U.S. Government and Industry, http://www.cptech.org/
ip/health/politics/revolvingdoor.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010); Jennifer Ferrara,
Revolving Doors: Monsanto and the Regulators, 28 THE ECOLOGIST 280, 280-87 (1998);
Policy Directions Inc., Professionals: Lester M. Crawford, DVM, PhD, Senior Sci-
ence Advisor, http://www.policydirections.com/professionals.php?queue=crawford
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (Former FDA Commissioner Lester Crawford is now
working for a Washington lobbying firm, Policy Directions Inc.).
227. Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 5, at 3.
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Agency scientists have made it clear that any solution should
start with high level directors.' Therefore, the new system must
focus on developing a culture of independence at the top. For our
purposes, the top means the FDA Commissioner and the forty-eight
advisory committees.
In order to create an independent agency, all conflicts of inter-
est must first be eliminated. "A conflict of interest is a set of condi-
tions in which professional judgment concerning a primary interest
(such as a patient's welfare or the validity of research) tends to be
unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain)."
Because even the smallest secondary ties can create undue influ-
ence, 2o committee members must be completely removed from the
industries they will be regulating.
In theory, each committee should consist of independent ex-
perts who advise the agency on product safety and effectiveness.3
Recognizing that an extremely important requirement is independ-
ence, federal law already forbids anyone with a conflict of interest
from serving on an advisory committee. However, given the ease
with which waivers are granted, this prohibition has become mean-
ingless.
The FDA published a whopping twenty-two page document for
determining a conflict of interest.2" Despite these lengthy rules,
228. Id. at 2, ("Less than half (44 percent) say they 'respect the integrity and pro-
fessionalism of FDA leadership."').
229. Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 573, 573 (1993).
230. See generally, JEROME P. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: How MEDICINE'S COMPLICITY
WITH BIG BusINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 1-24 (2005) (describing how even
insignificant gifts like pens and coffee mugs can create a conflict of interest that
influences doctors).
231. See Food and Drug Administration, Advisory Committees, http://
www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (The
FDA "uses 48 committees and panels to obtain independent expert advice on scien-
tific, technical, and policy matters." (emphasis added)).
232. See Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for the Public, FDA Advisory
Committee Members, and FDA Staff on Procedures for Determining Conflict of Interest and
Eligibility for Participation in FDA Advisory Committees (2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM125646
.pdf.
233. See MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 163 ("[B]etween 1998 and 2000, the FDA
waived [the conflict of interest] restriction more than 800 times.").
234. See Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance for the Public, FDA Advisory
Committee Members, and FDA Staff on Procedures for Determining Conflict of Interest and
Eligibility for Participation in FDA Advisory Committees (2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/07d-0101-gdlOOO1.pdf.
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"doctors who earn hundreds of thousands of dollars each year in
'consulting fees' from drug companies are not only allowed to vote
on the recommendations for FDA approval of their drugs, there is
not even any FDA requirement to disclose such conflicts of inter-
est.""' Instead of complex guidelines, the agency could use a
straightforward one-sentence test: Within the past five years, have
you or your immediate family had financial ties to the industry you
will be regulating? If the answer is yes, the person is disqualified,
regardless of expertise. Financial ties would include more than
monetary compensation. Any sort of remuneration would preclude
someone from serving in a top level position. This is a necessary
measure so that corporations do not influence experts with vaca-
tions, televisions, cars, meals, or other incentives.
So where do we get enough pure souls to staff the FDA com-
mittees? After all, more than half of the current advisory commit-
tees have financial ties to the companies they are regulating."' This
is a troubling statistic, but there is a bit of hope contained within it.
Nearly half of the advisory committees did not have financial con-
flicts of interest. Since the FDA can currently staff almost half of its
panels with independent experts, there is no reason it cannot fill all
of its panels with such people. Although this Article has painted a
stark picture, the vast majority of scientists at the FDA are commit-
ted to protecting the public health. Therefore, promoting from
within is one viable option.
Because only the FDA commissioner and the committee mem-
bers will be subject to the five year regulation, people with recent
ties to industry will still be able to work at the FDA. However, by
barring them from immediately taking high-level positions, the cul-
ture of the agency will change. This top-down approach will foster a
sense of independence within the FDA. It will also allow low level
scientists to do their job without fear of retribution from their supe-
riors. No longer will the FDA and corporations be partners in a
quest for greater profits.
Another option is to recruit scientists from universities. Admit-
tedly, industry has tainted medical schools, but in recent years, many
have committed to regaining independence. This past year, Har-
vard Medical School strengthened its conflict of interest regulations,
235. Mike Adams, Americans Fed up with Drug Industry Influence, FDA Corrup-
tion, Reveals Remarkable Consumer Reports Survey, http://www.naturainews.
com/021795.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
236. See MERCOLA, supra note 1, at 163.
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and other schools have followed suit.3 7 Trade organizations have
pressured other schools to make similar policy changes. The Asso-
ciation of American Medical Colleges views connections between
researchers and industry as a "peril to academic medicine and pub-
lic health."2" The American Medical Student Association now rates
schools based on their conflict of interest policies. In 2008, just
eight schools obtained an "A" ranking." In 2009, that number in-
creased to twelve, with forty-seven other schools earning a "B" rank-
ing.20 As universities continue their reforms, they will become an
even better resource for the FDA.
Now that we have identified our candidate pool, how does the
FDA make its selection? Because the judiciary is the most trusted
branch,4 it serves as a good model for FDA committees. To begin,
an oversight committee should be created. The members of this
panel should be granted life tenure. They shall be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.
When vacancies need to be filled on any of the forty-eight sub-
committees, the FDA commissioner will nominate a candidate and
the oversight committee will approve or reject the nomination.
When a new drug or food additive application is submitted, the ap-
propriate subcommittee will review the available studies and make a
recommendation. The oversight committee will have the final say
237. See Liz Kowalczyk, Harvard Will Stiffen Rules for Staff at Med School,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 3, 2009, available at http-//www.boston.com/news/local/
massachusetts/articles/2009/02/03/harvard willstiffen_rulesfor staffatmed
school (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) ("Many top medical schools, including Stanford
University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of California at Los Ange-
les and at San Francisco, and the University of Massachusetts have adopted stricter
policies in the past two years.").
238. Susan Ehringhaus & David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Re-
search, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGIES (Winter 2002), available at
http://www.issues.org/19.2/ehringhaus.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
239. Dane Secor, AAMC joins Movement to Restrict Pharmaceutical Company-
Physician Relationships, 6 ACAD. INTERNAL MED. INSIGHT 6 (2008) ("Only eight out of
the approximately 150 medical schools surveyed received an 'A,' which indicates the
institution has strong policies that address conflicts of interest caused by pharma-
ceutical industry marketing.").
240. See AMERICAN MEDICAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION, CONFLICT OF INTEREST
POLICIES AT ACADEMIC MEDICAL CENTERS, http://www.amsascorecard.org (last vis-
ited Apr. 7, 2010).
241. See generally Frank Newport, Americans' Trust in Legislative Branch at Re-
cord Low, GALLUP, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/122897/
americans-trust-legislative-branch-record-low.aspx (Since 1974, Americans have
trusted the judiciary more than the executive or legislative branches.).
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on all applications, but great deference should be given to the deci-
sion of the subcommittees.
For five years after stepping down, the FDA commissioner and
committee members will be unable to accept any compensation
from a regulated industry. This is a necessary measure to prevent
corporations from making promises of future gain to entice regula-
tors to approve a drug or food additive. This is not an unfamiliar
proposal, but its enforcement would be novel. In the past, Presi-
dents have placed similar restrictions on some of their appointees.
Unfortunately, they have merely served as talking points rather than
stringent policies."'
The proposal does not provide for a perfect selection mecha-
nism, but any effective system will inevitably produce false positives.
If the policy is overly restrictive, we can rest assured that it is much
better to exclude too many people than to permit those with bad
intentions to control the FDA.
The most common argument in favor of the revolving door is
that industry consultants are the only people with sufficient exper-
tise to evaluate the latest drugs. Jerome P. Kassirer, the former Edi-
tor-in-Chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, calls this claim
the "fallacy of unique expertise.""' He argues that we should not
need to rely on conflicted experts because independent scientists
quickly develop the necessary skills." In fact, relying on industry
experts may be detrimental for reasons beyond the obvious conflict
of interest. When people with similar views come together, they are
subject to group polarization.' Because the industry experts are
already sympathetic to pharmaceutical companies, this bias will be
amplified when they try to reach a group consensus.'
242. President Clinton enacted a measure that prevented certain appointees from
working in regulated industry. In the last days of his presidency, he repealed the
measure. Likewise, President Obama's restrictions are set to expire at the end of
his presidency.
243. KASSIRER, supra note 230, at 204.
244. See id. at 204-05 ("[N]obody has provided any evidence that people with
financial ties to industry are better in assessing evidence on any a particular subject
than those without such ties . . . . There is no fundamental reason to think that such
panels of intelligent clinicians who have no industry connections would be unable
to assess a body of clinical data and arrive at useful recommendations.").
245. See generally, Cass Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization 1-15 (John M. Olin
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 91, 1999), available at www.law.vchicago.edu/
Files/Files/9 1.CRS_.Polarization.pdf.
246. See KAssIRER, supra note 230, at 205 ("[T]here is real risk that like-minded
people with 'unique' knowledge may have similarities of thought and come up with
a uniform conclusion that is biased (or even completely wrong).").
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Even if one concedes that industry scientists are the most quali-
fied experts, this argument ignores a more fundamental issue. The
FDA will make better decisions if it is run by good, independent
scientists than if it is run by excellent, corrupt scientists. Nonethe-
less, as discussed above, there is no reason to believe that the FDA
will be unable to staff its committees with excellent, independent
scientists.
Now that we have setup independent committees, the next step
is to determine what standard they should apply when approving
new substances. It is clear that the FDA must presume a product is
unsafe until studies show otherwise,"4 so three possibilities jump to
mind: preponderance of the evidence,"' clear and convincing evi-
dence,"' and beyond a reasonable doubt."'0 In choosing a standard,
our goal should be to build in a margin of safety without unduly
restricting food and drugs from reaching the market.
For this reason, I think it is fair to rule out preponderance of
the evidence. If the committee determines it is only slightly more
probable than fifty percent that the food or drug is safe, it should
deny the application. On balance, it is better to reject a product that
is harmless than approve a product that is dangerous. After all, the
rejected substance can undergo additional tests to better ascertain
247. The law already provides for this presumption, even though recent history
seems to indicate that the FDA presumes a substance is safe until proven otherwise.
See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) ("No such regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation
of the data before the Secretary-fails to establish that the proposed use of the
food additive, under the conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be
safe . . . .").
248. See Neil Orloff &Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-
of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983) (noting that the tradi-
tional preponderance of the evidence standard "requires demonstrating that the
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence").
249. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 2004) (defining clear and convincing
evidence as "evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or
reasonably certain. This is a greater burden than preponderance of the evidence,
the standard applied in most civil trials, but less than evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, the norm for criminal trials.").
250. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850)) (defining reasonable doubt as "a term
often used, probably pretty well understood, but not easily defined. It is not a mere
possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending on
moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the
case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds ofjurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.").
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its safety, but once the toxic food or drug enters the market, the
damage is done.
The more difficult decision involves choosing between clear
and convincing evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. They
both prove useful in their own way.
At present, food additives require less rigorous testing than
drugs. This is backwards. Although it may seem counterintuitive at
first, the standard required to approve food additives should be
higher than drugs. Accordingly, I recommend using the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard for food additives and the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard for drugs.
Food additives are generally marketed on a national scale and
included in many products. Due to the sheer number of options,
most people do not know which products contain which additives.
Therefore, when someone consumes an additive, it is, with few ex-
ceptions, the result of an indirect choice.
For example, no one buys Swedish Fish gummy candies because
they want to eat the food dye Red No. 40. People buy the candy
because they like the taste. In fact, I would wager that most people
who have eaten Swedish Fish never even thought about what food
additive is used to make the red coloring. To go one step further,
despite the fact that Red No. 40 is the most widely used food color-
ing,"' the vast majority of Americans have likely never even consid-
ered its safety. FDA approval is such a powerful signal that millions
of people are willing to eat food additives everyday just because the
FDA says it is okay. The faith is so strong that the average American
consumes 150 pounds of food additives each year,' ten pounds of
which are chemical in nature.
Another argument for a beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
that the costs of a false negative are much lower. Rejecting a safe
food additive will not lead to deaths or prevent the cure of diseases.
On the other hand, denying the application for a safe drug can
251. The History of Food Dyes, http://www.red40.com/pages/history.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010). Manufacturers use this orange-red color in all sorts of gelatins,
beverages, dairy products and condiments. FDA certified more than 3 million
pounds of the dye in fiscal year 1992-almost a million pounds more than the run-
ner-up, FD&C Yellow No. 5. Id.
252. DEANNA MINICH, AN A-Z GUIDE TO FOOD ADDITIVES: NEVER EAT WHAT You
CAN'T PRONOUNCE 10 (2009).
253. The Myth of Convenience- Which Nutritional Supplement Ingredients May Be Si-
lently Undermining Your Health?, 1 INTEGRATED SUPPLEMENTS NEWSLETTER 4 (Inte-
grated Supplements), April 2007, at 1, available at http://www.integratedsupple-
ments.com/articles/Newsletter2007O4.pdf.
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cause people to die or otherwise reduce their quality of life. Fur-
thermore, although Americans consume more drugs than people in
any other nation,M the total still pales in comparison to the amount
of food additives we consume.
But the principal reason that the FDA should use a clear and
convincing evidence standard for drugs is that taking medicine is a
concerted choice. Although chemical additives are crammed into
nearly every food imaginable, drugs are not. No one buys a differ-
ent brand of cereal one day only to find out that it is loaded with
drugs.
There is also a line of defense between the FDA and the con-
sumer. As experts on medication, doctors are supposed to inform
the patient of the side effects and benefits of prescriptions. This
process adds a layer of reflection to taking drugs, something that is
absent from food additives. For these reasons, the FDA should re-
verse its policy, and food additives should be held to a higher stan-
dard than drugs.
Now that we have laid out an approval process, one key feature
is still missing: data. Even if the committee members are independ-
ent experts, their decisions can only be as good as the studies they
review. Therefore, it is imperative that industry no longer be per-
mitted to participate in the testing process. The following section
explores an alternative system that can ensure these new independ-
ent FDA committees are only reviewing high quality studies.
C. Taking Industry out of Safety Trials
Pharmaceutical companies are skilled at manipulating data in
ways that cast their products in a favorable light. One common tac-
tic is to fund dozens of clinical trials with the expectation that only a
few studies will be published."' Random chance explains why this is
a useful but deceptive strategy. To be accepted by the scientific
community, the results of an experiment must be statistically signifi-
cant at the five percent level. In statistical terms, the p-value must
be < .05. This means that if a drug is no different than a placebo,"'
only five percent of the experiments will have data at least this ex-
treme.
254. Associated Press, American's Remain World's Most Medicated People, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, April 17, 2005, http://www.sptimes.com/2005/0
4 /1 7/
Worldandnation/Americans remainworl.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
255. See MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 150.
256. This is the null hypothesis.
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From the pharmaceutical industry's perspective, if a drug is in-
effective, ninety five percent of its clinical trials will yield data sup-
porting this conclusion. However, due to random chance, five per-
cent of its trials will still provide evidence that the drug is beneficial.
By funding dozens of experiments, corporations are exploiting the
test for statistical significance. The drug manufacturer holds back
the ninety five percent of trials that show the product's inefficacy."'
At the same time, it publishes the five percent of trials that attest to
the drug's usefulness."
Another common ploy is to truncate data. If a clinical trial lasts
for two years and the results show that a given drug is ineffective,
industry scientists simply look at smaller chunks of the data. Maybe
the trial passes the test for statistical significance during a one year
period. Maybe six months is the magic number." If cutting out
time doesn't work, the beneficiaries can also be reframed. Instead
of using data for the entire population, industry scientists often look
at smaller demographics. If the drug doesn't have an effect on
Asians, don't worry. Simply drop them from the study. Do Hispan-
ics meet the test for significance? If so, leave them in. When that
doesn't work, get more creative. Maybe the magic group is women
aged twenty-seven to thirty-two with blue eyes.s" Never mind that
only a couple trial participants may have fallen into this category.
Even more deceptive tactics include fabricating data, discon-
tinuing studies that yield unfavorable results, and excluding individ-
ual subjects that develop adverse reactions, such as malignant tu-
mors. When these strategies are insufficient, corporations have
257. Although data for all of the trials is required to be submitted to the FDA,
many corporations withhold adverse studies.
258. See, Erik H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and its
Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 255 (2008) (Ninety-four
percent of the published studies reported positive results, whereas only 51% of the
FDA-registered studies had positive results. "Overall, the studies that the FDA
judged as positive were approximately 12 times as likely to be published" as neutral
or negative studies.); see also David S. Liebeskind et al., Evidence of Publication Bias in
Reporting Acute Stroke Clinical Trials, 67 NEUROLOGY 973, 973 (2006) (concluding
that "publication bias is evident in the acute stroke research literature").
259. The drug manufacturer Pharmacia used this strategy to provide evidence
that Celebrex reduces the incidence of ulcers. The highly respected Journal of the
American Medical Association was fooled into publishing this "science." See
MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 150.
260. VaxGen manipulated the data for AidsVax, an AIDS vaccine, in a similarly
absurd manner. See MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 151.
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simply ordered their scientists to write favorable reports regardless
of the evidence."'
The extent of these manipulative practices is easily observed
when independent scientists conduct meta-analyses. Although this
article has focused on how pharmaceutical companies employed
these misleading tactics to gain FDA approval for artificial sweeten-
ers, the problem is much more pervasive. Richard Smith, the Edi-
tor-in-Chief of the British Medical Journal, has pointed out several
other notable examples of industry bias:
"The major determinant of whether reviews of passive smoking con-
cluded it was harmful was whether the authors had financial ties with
tobacco manufacturers. In the disputed topic of whether third-
generation contraceptive pills cause an increase in thromboembolic dis-
ease, studies funded by the pharmaceutical industry find that they don't,
and studies funded by public money find that they do."2
62
This abuse of the scientific process undermines both industry
and independent research. It essentially creates a presumption that
corporate science is false, going so far as to taint companies that do
not engage in deceptive practices. As the junk science piles up, the
public is pushed towards a tipping point."' When distrust of science
reaches this critical mass, it will be extremely hard to convince
Americans that scientific results cannot be bought by the highest
bidder. The inevitable result is that the public will lose confidence
in science as a whole. The first effects of this phenomenon are al-
ready being felt.
For example, many parents refuse to vaccinate their children
because they do not believe the science that shows vaccines are
safe.2 ' Fear of industry deception has led to actual problems, such
261. See Keith J. Winstein & David Armstrong, Top Pain Scientist Fabricated Data in
Studies, Hospital Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at A12. (Scott S. Reuben, former
chief of acute pain at Baystate Medical Center fabricated data for twenty-one stud-
ies involving Vioxx, Celebrex, and Lyrica. Pfizer (maker of Celebrex and Lyrica)
funded part of Reuben's research and paid him generous speaking fees.) For addi-
tional examples of these tactics, see footnotes 144-149 and accompanying text.
262. Richard Smith, Making Progress with Competing Interests, 325 BRIT. MED. J.
1375, 1375-76 (2002).
263. Malcolm Gladwell describes the tipping point as "the moment of critical
mass, the threshold, the boiling point." See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING
POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 12 (2002).
264. See Nadja Popovich, Vaccine Scare Shows How Emotions Can Trump Facts, NPR
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/02/risky-business reactions-to-th.html
(last visited May 23, 2010).
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as an increased incidence of measles." A more salient example in-
volves the HINI vaccine." Many people declined to get vaccina-
tions because they believed the pharmaceutical companies were
promoting unsafe vaccines." Although the HiN1 virus did not be-
come a major threat, it is easy to envision a scenario in which an
actual epidemic breaks out and people refuse to get vaccinated.
The loss of faith in science is not limited to health issues. The
polarizing debate over global warming has accentuated the prob-
lem." Ralph Cicerone, president of the National Academy of Sci-
ences noted that "[t]here is evidence that the corrosion in the public
attitude to climate science has spread over to other areas of sci-
ence."'"
The lesson to be learned is that industry-funded science un-
dermines legitimate science. Government agencies must stop using
it as a basis for decisions. Given the importance of public health,
the FDA, in particular, should only rely on independently funded
trials.
With this in mind, an entirely new pre-market approval system
must be implemented. There are two options for such a system.
First, the FDA could take on the responsibility of conducting the
clinical trials. This presents some tangible benefits. For instance,
because studies would be done in-house, an intermediate layer of
FDA scientists would not need to review the trials. Additionally, as
265. Rong-Gong Lin II, Rise in Measles Prompts Concern, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2008,
available at http://articles.1atimes.com/2008/may/02/local/me-vaccine2 (last vis-
ited May 23, 2010); see also BBC News, Rise in Measles 'Very Worrying',
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7872541.stm (last visited May 23, 2010).
266. See Paul A. Offit, Nothing to Fear but the Flu Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009, at
A23, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/opinion/12offit.html?_r-2&em (last
visited May 23, 2010).
267. Id.
268. See Rasmussen Reports, Americans Skeptical of Science Behind Global
Warming, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/current
events/environment-energy/americans skeptical-of science behind-global-warmi
ng (last visited May 23, 2010). A recent poll noted the following:
Fifty-nine percent (59%) of Americans say it's at least somewhat likely that
some scientists have falsified research data to support their own theories
and beliefs about global warming. Thirty-five percent (35%) say it's Very
Likely. Just 26% say it's not very or not at all likely that some scientists fal-
sified data. This skepticism does not appear to be the result of the recent
disclosure of e-mails confirming such data falsification as part of the so-
called "Climategate" scandal. Id.
269. Clive Cookson, Public Losing Faith in Science, FINANCIAL TIMES
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/1700ab46-ldbc-1 ldf-9e98-00l44feab49a.html (last
visited May 23, 2010).
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the people running the studies and the people making approval de-
cisions would be working within the same agency, communication
should be more open. This may lead to better information when
questions arise at the top.
On the downside, the federal government is not known for its
efficiency."'o Even if one does not subscribe to this view, a majority
of the American people do, and that provides a compelling reason
to prevent an FDA expansion. First, the public no longer trusts the
federal government." They think it is corrupt and inefficient."
The average American believes the federal government wastes half
of all its revenues.' In addition, a majority of Americans want
smaller government." These views have become even more domi-
nant during the current recession.
As another matter, corporate America constitutes a powerful
interest group that will oppose any reform of the FDA's regulatory
system. An expansion of government would provide powerful am-
270. Friedrich Hayek nicely sums up a major tenet of classical liberalism, calling
the free market a "more efficient allocation of resources than any design could
achieve." CHRISTINA PETSOULAS, HAYEK'S LIBERALISM AND ITS ORIGINS: His IDEA OF
SPONTANEOUS ORDER AND THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 2 (2001).
271. See Jason luliano, Eliminating Earmarks: Why the Congressional Line Item Vote
can Succeed Where the Presidential Line Item Veto Failed, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 947, 957-
58 (2010); Andy Barr, Poll Finds Low Trust in Feds, http://
www.politico.com/news/ stories/0109/17424.html (last visited May 23, 2010) (For
example, a recent poll of registered voters found that "[o]nly 5 percent said they
have a 'great deal' of trust that the federal government will manage its finances
responsibly, while 23 percent expressed 'some' trust that the government will be
financially responsible. Meanwhile, an overwhelming 63 percent of respondents
described their amount of trust as 'not very much' or 'none at all."').
272. See CNN, Half of Americans Think Congress is Corrupt,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POL1T1CS/10/19/congress.poll/index.html (last
visited May 23, 2010).
273. See Lydia Saad, Americans: Uncle Sam Wastes 50 Cents on the Dollar,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122 9 5 1/americans-uncle-sam-wastes-50-cents-dollar.
aspx (last visited May 23, 2010) (finding that "Americans believe 50 cents of every
tax dollar that goes to the government in Washington, D.C., today are wasted").
274. See e.g., David Boaz, Americans Want Smaller Government, http://www.cato-
at-liberty.org/2009/06/23/americans-want-smaller-government (last visited May 23,
2010) (citing a Washington Post-ABC News poll that found Americans prefer
smaller government to larger government by a margin of 54 to 41); Rasmussen
Reports, National Survey of 1,000 Likely Voters Conducted March 18-19, 2009
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/toplines/ptsurvey-top-
lines/march_2009/toplines-benchmarksmarch_18_19_2009 (last visited May 23,
2010) (finding that 66% of Americans prefer a smaller government with lower taxes
and only 25% prefer a larger government with higher taxes).
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munition, allowing corporations to mobilize public opposition.
Hence, keeping the research process privatized is preferable.
This leads to the second option. The FDA could hire inde-
pendent universities and clinical research centersm (CRCs) to per-
form the safety trials. This would maximize efficiency, alleviate pub-
lic concern over government expansion, and still remove conflicts of
interest. Since pharmaceutical companies already use CRCs to con-
duct their safety tests, this may seem like a misguided recommenda-
tion. However, the problem with the current system is that it lacks
independence. Because CRCs contract directly with corporations,
they are unwilling to bite the hand that feeds them. This causes
CRCs to rig the data and draw faulty conclusions. If we can insert
an intermediary into this process, the CRCs incentives will change.
Their goal will no longer be to please the pharmaceutical industry,
but rather, to please the intermediary. The FDA can fill this role
well.
When a corporation submits a new food or drug to the FDA for
approval, the agency will construct the specifications for clinical tri-
als and hold an auction to select the CRC or university lab that will
test the new product. The sponsoring corporation will pay the FDA
the low bid amount, and the FDA will pass this money along to the
winner. The government routinely uses sealed first-price auctions to
grant procurement contracts and to lease the mining rights to
land,7 so there is no reason such a system cannot work in this con-
text.
Naturally, not all CRCs and universities will be permitted to bid
at the auction. If this were not the case, corporations could simply
fund their own CRCs and underbid all the competitors. Instead,
only labs with strict conflict of interest policies will be permitted to
participate. At present, there are nearly a thousand CRCs, so find-
ing a sufficient number of bidders should be easy. Even if few labs
currently meet the FDA's strict standards, a market for independent
CRCs will quickly develop. Also, as noted in the preceding section,
many universities are tightening their rules regarding conflicts of
interest.
275. The FDA defines a clinical research center as "a person [i.e., a legal person,
which may be a corporation] that assumes, as an independent contractor with the
sponsor, one or more of the obligations of a sponsor, e.g., design of a protocol,
selection or monitoring of investigations, evaluation of reports, and preparation of
materials to be submitted to the Food and Drug Administration." 21 CFR 312.3(b).
276. See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. EcON.
LIr. 699, 702 (1987).
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To promote independence, a blind review process should be
setup. The corporation should not know which CRC is evaluating
its product. Likewise, the CRC should not know which corporation
developed the test substance. Due to the number of companies that
are researching similar drugs, this should not pose a problem, but
even if determined CRCs figure out which corporation's drug they
are testing, they have no incentive to act on that information. Be-
cause of the conflict of interest rules, their loyalties will lie with the
FDA, not the pharmaceutical industry.
When the tests are completed, all data should be made available
for public examination.'" Then the appropriate FDA advisory
committee should review the studies and vote to approve or reject
the product. Because the advisory committees will be composed of
experts in specific fields and will have more time to evaluate indi-
vidual substances, the oversight committee should grant strong def-
erence to the lower committees' decisions. In judicial terms, the
standard of review should be akin to abuse of discretion.
Taken together, these two changes can reform the entire cul-
ture of the FDA. No longer will industry be able to control the food
and drug approval process.
CONCLUSION
In the last half century, an obesity epidemic has swept across
America, leading to a surge in health problems. Excessive sugar
consumption has further aggravated this situation. The problem
persists because the public wants to both trim its waistline and sat-
isfy its sweet tooth. To fill this market, corporations developed a
series of non-caloric artificial sweeteners. It was truly a miracle:
hundreds of times sweeter than sugar and none of the calories. Un-
fortunately, like most things that are too good to be true, artificial
sweeteners came with a heavy price. They may not add extra calo-
ries to your diet, but they will cause a litany of health issues.
Corporations, which stood to make billions if their products
succeeded, hid the dangers of artificial sweeteners from the Ameri-
277. The public overwhelmingly supports this reform. See Consumer Reports,
Consumer Reports Survey Finds Strong Backing for Drug Reforms, http://
www.consumerreports.org/health/prescription-drugs/consumer-reports-survey-finds-
strong-backing-for-drug-reforms-4-07/overview/consumer-reports-survey-finds-strong-
backing-for-drug-reforms.htm (last visited May 23, 2010) ("Ninety-two percent of
Americans agree that pharmaceutical companies should make public the results of
all of their clinical trial studies, which reveal a drug's effectiveness as well as possi-
ble hazardous side effects.").
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can people. Some FDA scientists caught on to this deception and
alerted their superiors. Sadly, the decision makers at the FDA had
serious conflicts of interest. Like the corporations they were sup-
posed to be regulating, these people would profit greatly if the arti-
ficial sweeteners were approved. Quite simply, FDA leaders put
their personal welfare above everyone's safety.
If the FDA is to break free of industry control, reform is neces-
sary.m First, conflict of interest regulations must be strengthened.
The public can only be confident in the FDA's decisions if its leader-
ship does not have ties to corporations. The second proposed
change requires hiring independent organizations to conduct the
clinical trials. Corporations have repeatedly shown that they will
employ deceptive tactics to get their drugs and food additives ap-
proved. Because the profit motive has corrupted their ability to per-
form legitimate studies, corporations should no longer be permitted
to participate in the safety and efficacy tests. America's health is too
important to trust with conflicted actors. To restore the agency's
integrity, industry must be taken out of the FDA.
278. Although this Article focused on the FDA, the recommendations are equally
applicable to other government agencies. Even those that have resisted industry
capture can benefit by adopting more stringent conflict of interest regulations. The
public's perception of the entire government is so poor that every agency has room
to improve its image.
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NOT COOL: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MANDATORY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING
Matt Mullins*
I. INTRODUCTION
The much anticipated and hotly debated Country-of-Origin La-
beling (COOL) provision of the 2002 Farm Bill went into effect on
September 30, 2008.' The interim final rule published on August 1,
2008 finally put into law a provision first passed in the 2002 farm
bill.2 This provision requires grocery stores and other retailers3 who
sell food products to the private consumer to label certain meats,
vegetables, fruits, and nuts with their country of origin.' Foods that
must be labeled are identified in the bill as "covered commodities."'
But, for all of the covered commodities, there exists a substantial list
of products that do not require the COOL label: "processed food
items."' The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the
* The author would like to give special thanks to Professor Harrison M.
Pittman, E. Conner McNair, and my wife, Meagan, for their guidance, encourage-
ment, and patience during the process of writing this comment.
1. Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat
Meat, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Maca-
damia Nuts, 74 Fed. Reg. 2682 (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts.60 and
65) [hereinafter Mandatory COOL].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Mandatory COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. 2682 (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R. pts.60 and 65).
5. Geoffrey S. Becker, CRS Report for Congress: Country of Origin Labeling for
Foods, (May 13, 2008). These covered commodities include the following: muscle
cuts of beef (including veal), lamb, chicken, goat, and pork; ground beef, ground
lamb, ground chicken, ground goat, and ground pork; perishable agricultural
commodities (fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables); macadamia nuts; pecans;
ginseng; and peanuts. Id.
6. Mandatory COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. 2682 (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R. pts.60 and 65) [hereinafter The Final Rule]. The Final Rule defines "proc-
essed food item" as a retail item derived from a covered commodity that has un-
dergone specific processing resulting in a change in the character of the covered
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purveyor of the interim final rule, has broadly defined processing to
include any item "undergoing a specific processing to change the
character of the commodity or combining it with at least one other
covered commodity or substantive food component."' These excep-
tions lead to some puzzling distinctions between covered and ex-
empted commodities. For example, raw peanuts would require a
label, but roasted peanuts would be exempt since roasting is consid-
ered by the rule to be a further processing; pork chops would re-
quire a COOL label, but ham and bacon would not require the la-
bel; and chopped lettuce in the produce section of the grocery store
must be labeled, but chopped lettuce on the salad bar at the grocery
store would be exempt under the restaurant exception.
The COOL provision also draws some arbitrary lines between
end-retailers that must label and retail establishments that are ex-
empt. The rule imposes the labeling requirements on any retailer
whose invoice cost of all purchases of perishable agricultural com-
modities exceeds $230,000 during a calendar year.' Based on a strict
reading of the rule, this means that most grocery stores would be
required to adhere to the provisions while those operating pure
butcher shops would be exempt since their perishable agricultural
commodities invoices would not total $230,000 per calendar year.'o
commodity, or that has been combined with at least one other covered commodity
or other substantive food component (e.g., chocolate, breading, tomato sauce),
except that the addition of a component (such as water, salt, or sugar) that en-
hances or represents a further step in the preparation of the product for consump-
tion, would not in itself result in a processed food item. Id.
7. Produce Marketing Association, PMA Analysis: USDA Final Rule for Manda-
tory Country of Origin Labeling, http://www.pma.com/issues/COOLAnalysis.cfm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
8. Consumer Union's "COOL TOOL": Don't Be Fooled By Country of Origin
Labeling (COOL); This Guide Will Tell You What Is COOL & What Is Not 1
(2008), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/CU-Cool-Tool.pdf.
9. Mandatory COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. 2682 (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R. pts.60 and 65). The term "retailer" adopted in the final rule is the same defi-
nition found in the original Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930
(PACA) 7 U.S.C. §499(a)(4). Also, this definition, which originally was signified as
"dealer", was updated in the 1995 Amendments to the PACA. In addition, the
term retailer specifically means any person who purchases more than $230,000 per
year of "perishable agricultural commodities". 7 U.S.C. 499(a)(b)(b). Perishable
agricultural commodities is defined as "fresh fruits and fresh vegetables of any kind
or character). See 7 U.S.C. 499a(b)(4), (11).
10. Id.
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These results, while puzzling to the average person, are nothing new
in the United States government's regulation of food."
II. HISTORY
While the COOL provision in its current form was first passed
in the 2002 farm bill, some primitive forms of origin labeling re-
quirements have been on the books since the Tariff Act of 1930.1
The 1930 Act required every imported item to be conspicuously and
indelibly marked in English to indicate its country of origin to the
ultimate purchaser. 3 This meant that articles arriving at the U.S.
border in retail-ready packaging must display the origin identifica-
tion. But, the 1930 provision exempts articles destined for U.S.
processors which are slated to undergo substantial transformation.
Also exempted were products on the "J List". While this list ex-
empted such individual items from the labeling requirements, it did
require their immediate containers to have country-of-origin labels."
While several other acts throughout the subsequent years modi-
fied some substance and form of the labeling requirements, the next
major step came with the passage of the 2002 farm bill. This Act
required retail-level COOL for fresh produce, red meats, peanuts,
and seafood." This Act also exempted further processed foods and
restaurant and food service establishments.o
The COOL provisions were originally slated to take effect on
September 30, 2004, but political wrangling delayed the program
starting date twice. The first delay of full implementation occurred
11. See generally Note, Reforming the Food Safety System: What if Consolidation Isn't
Enough, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1356-57 (2007).
12. Becker, supra note 5, at 1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Becker, supra note 5, at 1.
16. Id The "J-list" is named because it is found in §1304(a)(3)(J) of the Tariff
Act. Becker, supra note 5, at 1. The list is specifically created by the empowerment
of the Secretary of the Treasury and allows him to specifically exempt certain
classes of items. Id. The Secretary placed specific agricultural products on the J-list
including: natural products such as vegetables, fruits, nuts, berries, and live or dead
animals, fish and birds. Id; see also, 19 C.F.R. 134.33(2009).
17. 19 C.F.R. 134.33
18. Ron Hale, A COOL Review - Country of Origin Labeling 2003, available at
www.asi.k-state.edu/desktopModules/ueudocument.aspx?DocumentlD=1601.
19. Becker supra note 5, at 1.
20. Id.
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with the passage of The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004.
The only provision that received a final rule implementing COOL
provisions regarded seafood and fish.' The seafood and fish provi-
sion was championed by the Alaskan Congressional delegation on
behalf of the Alaskan fishing industry." Alaskan Senator Ted Ste-
vens was credited with pushing the measure through as a way to
support his state's wild fish industry.24 Another delay on the remain-
ing COOL provisions was passed as part of the 2006 appropriations
bill. That provision moved the mandatory implementation date to
September, 30 2008.
Many people did not want to see mandatory COOL legislation
implemented. Industry trade groups are mostly responsible for the
delays in the implementation of COOL. Large producers and quali-
fied grocers lobbied to keep the provision inactive due to their per-
ceived cost increases. 6 Others predicted that the USDA used faulty
assumptions and incorrect data in their original calculations of the
economic impact on producers, processors, and retailers. Other
critics focused on the lack of evidence to support the proposition
that COOL labeling will provide valuable information to the con-
sumer or that COOL will lead to an increased demand for covered
commodities bearing the U.S. origin label.2 ' However, once the Re-
publicans lost control of Congress following the 2006 elections, the
way was paved for the final implementation of the COOL provi-
sions.
21. Consolidated Appropriations Act '04 Pub. L. No. 108-199 at § 749, 118 Stat.
37 (2004).
22. Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling for Fish and Shellfish, 69 Fed. Reg.
59708 (Oct. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60).
23. Jane Kay, Seafood to Get Country of Origin Labels, SAN FRANSISCO
CHRONICLE, Feb. 4, 2004, available at http://www.organicconsumers.org/
foodsafety/seafood020504.cfm.
24. Id.
25. Becker, supra note 5, at 3.
26. See Barry Krissoff, et al., Country-of-Origin Labeling: Theory and Observa-
tion, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/WRS04/janO4/wrs0402/
wrs0402.pdf.
27. Becker, supra note 5, at 5.
28. Letter fromJohn D. Graham, Ph.D. to Hon. William T. Hawks, Under Secre-
tary for marketing and Regulatory Programs, United States Department of Agricul-
ture (Oct. 27, 2003) (on file with the author).
29. Andrew Martin, Labels Lack Food; Origin Despite Law, NEW YORK TIMES,
July 2, 2007, available at http-//www.nytimes.com/2007/07/02/business/
021abel.html.
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ISSUES REGARDING MANDATORY COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING
A. Violation of the World Trade Organization's ban on
Non-Tariff Barrier's to Trade
1. Brief History of WTO, the Agreement on Agricultural, and
NTBs
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the international fo-
rum used by member governments to resolve disputes regarding
commerce and trade." While the WTO was officially formed on
January 1, 1995, its origins can be traced back to earlier agreements,
specifically, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
The GATT operated from 1947 through the end of 1994 when the
WTO assumed and expanded the original GATT." The agreement,
known as the Marrakech Agreement after the Moroccan city in
which it was signed, created new policy initiatives that expanded the
role of the new WTO beyond its original inclusions to reflect new
business practices as well as the expansion of the trade of services
between member nations."
Prior to 1995, the GATT rules were largely ineffective in regu-
lating the world agricultural trade.' Countries created trade imbal-
ance by placing fiscal restraints on imports while simultaneously
granting export and domestic subsidies for their own producers."
In addition to the subsidy policies, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were
used to stifle market entry.' These NTBs included import quotas,
regulatory labeling measures, and country of origin requirements."
The Uruguay Round of negotiations largely put an end to these dis-
parate policies by enacting the Agreement on Agriculture." The
30. World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatis-e/wto dg-stat e.htm (last visited February 9, 2009).
31. Id.
32. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIs, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 8 (2007).
33. Id. at 11.
34. World Trade Organization, 70 Agriculuture Negotiations: The Issues, and





38. World Trade Organization, Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif e/agrm3_e.htm (last visited
Feb. 9, 2009).
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stated goal of the Agreement on Agriculture was to "reform trade in
the sector and to make policies more market-oriented.""
The Marrakech Round specifically addressed rules of origin and
the WTO regulations that would govern these rules."o These rules
outlined procedures for implementation, guidelines for require-
ments, and information for resolving certain disputes within these
guidelines."
2. Basis of Claim for Complaining Member-Countries
While no real challenge has been made regarding labeling re-
quirements on agricultural products, a legitimate case can be
formed to challenge the new Mandatory COOL legislation recently
implemented by the USDA. The history of WTO Rules of Origin
resolutions has been limited to a claim between India and the
United States regarding apparel and textile labeling rules. Here,
the WTO panel upheld the origin labeling laws passed by the United
States." This challenge represents the only instance where the WTO
has issued a ruling based on the Agreement on Rules of Origin
(Agreement)." However, the specific language in the Agreement
opens the door to challenges for the new U.S. Mandatory COOL
legislation. In Article 9 of the Agreement, the WTO describes the
trade rules regarding new origin requirements." Article Two (c)
specifically states that origin rules should "not themselves create
restrictive, distorting or disruptive effects on international trade.""
B. Background on Importing Standards and Processing Procedures
When an animal is imported into the United States for process-
ing, the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906 (FMIA) says that no
39. Id.
40. World Trade Organization, Agreement on Rules of Origin, Dec. 2005, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/22-roo.pdf.
41. Id.
42. See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Dispute D5243: United




44. U.S. Wins WTO Ruling on India Challenge to textile Rules Washington File,
June 20, 2003, available at http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/wash/s/
20030620/2003062003clt.html.
45. World Trade Organization, supra note 41.
46. Id.
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animal shall be imported "unless they comply with all the inspection,
building, construction standards, and all other provisions of this act
and regulations issued thereunder applicable to such articles in
commerce within the United States."" So, an animal imported into
the U.S. must comply with all of the safety, inspection, sanitary, and
verification standards to which a domestically produced animal must
comply." This means that at any given U.S. processing facility, cattle
imported from Mexico or Canada must be produced using the same
standards as domestically grown cattle. However, under the Manda-
tory COOL legislation, in order for the domestically grown beef to
get the desired "Product of the U.S.A." label, these virtually identical
cattle must be segregated during the entire fattening, feeding, and
production process." This will add additional segregation costs for
the processors at the finishing plants." Additionally, foreign animals
are required to have more documentation to evidence their journey
through the supply chain." To compensate for the additional costs
and remove the chance for mistakes in the segregation process,
some U.S. producers are refusing to accept cattle imports."
Another factor affecting processors is the simple economical
mechanics of the processing plant. A typical commercial processing
plant will process orders for a variety of customers each day. Some
will be institutional customers ordering products that, under the
interim final rule, are exempt from the COOL requirements be-
cause of the restaurant exception." Others will be classic retailers
which, under the PACA and the final rule, will require the COOL
labeling. This alternating order-filling can create additional diffi-
culty for recordkeeping as well as increase the chances of a segrega-
tion error and further increase the costs. In addition, it is estimated
that 45% of U.S. beef is processed for sale to customers who either
are exempted from COOL under an exception like the restaurant
47. 21 U.S.C. § 620(a).
48. Id.
49. Telephone Interview with Mark Dopp, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, The American Meat Institute, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 13, 2008).
50. Id.
51. Iowa Public Television, Mexico joins Canada in WTO beef dispute vs. U.S., Dec.
19, 2008, http://www.iptv.org/mtom/story.cfm/news/1353 (last visited Feb. 26
2010).
52. Id.
53. Producers Marketing Association, supra note 8.
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exception or who further process the beef so that it is exempted
from the COOL requirements.'
C. Analysis
WTO member-countries that import agricultural products al-
ready act within a scheduled framework of certain import controls
as well as other methods of regulating imports, such as tariffs." But,
in the administration of label of origin rules, member-countries
must do so in a manner proscribed in the Agreement.' The ulti-
mate goal is to create a system that is easily administered, easily un-
derstood, and applied objectively." And as with the WTO in gen-
eral, the ultimate goal is the free flowing of trade and commerce
between member-countries."
With the implementation of the Mandatory COOL, member-
countries have a regulatory framework in place to challenge the
provisions by virtue of being placed in an economic disadvantage.
First, costs will increase due to increased recordkeeping require-
ments, segregation costs, and product labeling requirements. While
cost estimates vary widely within the industry, the USDA estimates
that the first year incremental costs for directly affected firms will be
around $2.5 billion." Consequently, the report further indicates
that the directly affected industries will recover a percentage of their
higher costs by raising the price of their products.' However, stan-
dard economic theory suggests that higher prices will reduce de-
mand for the affected products." In other words, when consumers
pay more for the affected commodity, they will purchase less of that
54. Telephone Interview with Mark Dopp, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, The American Meat Institute, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 13, 2008).





58. HOEKMAN & MAVROIDIS, supra note 33, at 1.
59. Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, 73 Fed. Reg. p. 45106, 45128 (Aug.
1, 2008) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.pt. 65) (compare that with the estimates from the
VanSickle article which estimate the costs to be somewhere in the neighborhood of
$193 million, or 7.7% of the USDA estimate). But see VAN SICKLE, ET AL., COUNTRY
OF ORIGIN LABELING: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIs 18 (2003), available at
http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/FE/FE38400.pdf (estimating the costs to be
somewhere in the neighborhood of 193 million, or 7.7% of the USDA estimate).
60. Mandatory Cool, 73 Fed. Reg. at 45129 (Aug. 1, 2008).
61. Id.
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commodity and look to replace that commodity with an alternative
selection that will provide a better value." For example, if the in-
cremental price of beef increases, consumers might look to replace
some beef with chicken in their diet. The chicken industry, unlike
the beef industry, is highly vertically integrated, drastically reducing
some of the recordkeeping and administrative costs that are pre-
dicted to plague the mandatory COOL." Also, pork is less affected
by the change in rules since pork, unlike beef and chicken, has a
relatively high rate of further processing, which exempts those
products from the COOL requirements.' The reduced demand for
the affected commodities will ultimately reduce the demand for
those imported commodities as well, ultimately disadvantaging the
importing trade partner.
Additionally, reduced demand and increased hassle on the part
of the American producers will likely cause producers to reduce
their acceptance of imported affected commodities." The final rule
estimates a reduction in the import of beef, pork, veal, and broiler
chickens."
Therefore, these reasonable assessments lay the foundation for
WTO member-countries to make a prima facie case against the im-
plementation of the Mandatory COOL provisions of this interim
final rule. In fact, at the time of this writing, Mexico and Canada
have both filed separate complaints with the WTO against the Man-
datory COOL legislation."
62. Id.
63. Id. at 45130. (This section indicates that 95% of chickens are pro-
duced/processed under vertical integration). This means that the integrators, like
Tyson Foods for example, own the birds from the time they hatch until the time
they sell the birds directly to the retailer. Id. This drastically reduces costs associ-
ated with record keeping as well as the need for segregation. Id.
64. Id. at 45131.
65. Klapper, supra note 52.
66. Mandatory COOL, 73 Fed. Reg. 45, 129 (Aug. 1, 2008).
67. Klapper, supra note 52. See also Anna Bahney, Meat Labeling Law Blasted,
Feb. 8, 2010, available at http://www.argusleader.com/article/20100130/
NEWS/1300303/1001/news (discussing that after two failed rounds of negotiation
between Canada and the United States, Canada has successfully petitioned the
WTO for a panel). This panel represents the next step in the process under current
WTO regulations.
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III. LACK OF ECONOMIC AND CONSUMER PURCHASING DATA TO
SUPPORT A COST/BENEFIT RATIONALE FOR COOL
A. Economic Rationale of Labeling
The food we consume today contains many different ingredi-
ents that are grown, processed, or produced in many different
places. Producers, governments, retailers, and consumers all play a
role in determining which of the various bits of information are ac-
tually displayed on food labels.' These different contributors often
act with very different goals in mind. Consumers desire many dif-
ferent kinds of information including the ingredients contained in a
given product,' the origin of those ingredients, and even the
method of cultivation and harvesting." And the consumer can use
their own purchasing power to influence the way companies label
their products."
The government's rationale for certain labeling requirements
can have different social and economic goals." For example, the
government requires many different foods to contain nutritional
information." This label may provide the consumer with more in-
formation while also furthering the government's social goal of cre-
ating a healthier population." By promoting a healthier society, the
government aims to enrich the lives of its citizens, as well as reduce
costs for government-sponsored healthcare programs like Medicaid
and Medicare."
Third parties also have incentives to label their products by
highlighting attributes designed to reach certain consumer seg-
ments. Products labeled with certain specific information can create
a demand for the product among the targeted consumer groups. A
popular example of this trend is the rise in "organic" labeled prod-
68. ELISE GOLAN, ET. AL., ECONOMIcS OF FOOD LABELING 1 (2000), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer793/aer793a.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Many consumers are concerned about the use of pesticides, herbicides, har-
vesting techniques (hand-picked versus machine harvesting, for example), and
transportation issues. See id.
7 1. Id.
72. Id.
73. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: A FOOD LAEBLING GUIDE
(1998) available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/ -dms/21g-7a.html (discussing regular-
tory requirements under Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act); 21 US.C. §301, et. seq., 15 U.S.C. § 1451, et. seq.
74. Golan, supra note 69, at 1.
75. Id. at 13-14.
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ucts. The National Organic Program, implemented in the early
1990's," was born from the increased demand for certain products
grown without chemicals." Producers began to see opportunities to
grow this segment of the market to capitalize on the increased de-
mand for these products. Producers also noticed that the increased
demand for certified organic foods translated directly into a price
premium.'
Whatever the underlying rationale, food labeling requirements
are being advanced by many different segments of the food supply
and regulatory chain. But, as with all costly inputs, economics plays
a large role in the decision to label certain products. If the cost to
change a label cannot be recuperated with an increase in price or
increase in volume, companies do not have an economic incentive
to change their label.
B. History of Voluntary COOL Labeling
In October of 2002, the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)
published the "Guidelines for the Interim Voluntary Country-of-
Origin Labeling of Beef, Lamb, Pork, Fish, Perishable Agricultural
Commodities, and Peanuts" in the Federal Register." This Volun-
tary Rule opened the door for producers and retailers to begin la-
beling their products with country-of-origin information. However,
participation in the voluntary program did not garner significant
participation." The drafters of the Final Rule noted that this lack of
participation primarily indicated consumer's unwillingness to pay
76. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 6501-6522(2000). This comment does not focus spe-
cifically on the National Organic Program. For a general overview and history of
the National Organic Program and the Organic Food Production Act of 1990, see
Kate L. Hudson Organic Plus: Regulating Beyond the Current Organic Standards, 25
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 211. (2008).
77. See Golan, supra note 69, at 26.
78. Id.
79. Country of Origin Labeling: Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5071922 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2010). The Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) is the arm of the
USDA charged with the responsibility of drafting and implementing the COOL
regulations. The Interim Voluntary Rule was published in the Federal Register at
67 Fed. Reg. 63367.
80. Mandatory COOL, 74 Fed. Reg. 2658, 2682 (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be codified at
7 C.F.R. pts. 60 and 65) (noting, "the lack of widespread participation in voluntary
programs for labeling products of United States origin provides evidence that con-
sumers do not have strong enough preferences for products of United States origin
to support price premiums sufficient to recoup the costs of labeling").
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for country-of-origin information.' Some executives in the industry
who oppose the mandatory COOL legislation point to this as a sig-
nal that Congress passed a bill without empirical data to justify it.'
C. Contrasting Participation in the National Organic Program
with the Voluntary COOL Program
Food producers continually innovate their labels hoping to ul-
timately influence consumers to purchase their products versus
those of their competitors." While food producers provide a prod-
uct that is necessary for human existence, most producers' ultimate
goal is financial success. And, most producers will seek to market a
new or improved attribute if they believe there is money to be made
from marketing that desirable attribute of their product to their tar-
geted consumers.'
A great example of a consumer-demand driven innovation in
voluntary food labeling is the National Organic Program. By the
1980's, the USDA noticed that organically grown produce had
formed a distinct market and that "average premiums in the stores
ranged from over 40% to as high as 175%."' The sale of organic
foods exceeded $10.3 billion for 2003, and estimates have set the
growth rates over 20% on an annualized basis." From a pure eco-
nomic standpoint, organic products are more expensive to grow
than non-organics. And, in order for organic producers to remain
8 1. Id.
82. R-CALF USA, Separating Fiction from Truth, How the Voluntary COOL Bill
will Impact the U.S. Cattle Industry, Sept. 10, 2004, available at www.r-
calfusa.com/COOL/COOL%2OFact%us%2OFiction.pdf. Boyle stated, "We as
consumers want to know pertinent information about the food products we pur-
chase, such as its price, nutritional value, calorie content, sell-by dates and safe han-
dling instructions. But only the Congress, in its infinite wisdom, would believe that
consumers are interested in the family tree of fresh meats, produce, seafood and
peanuts sold in grocery stores. In fact, surveys repeatedly show that consumers care
most about price, freshness and quality." Citing "Make COOL Meat Labeling Vol-
untary,"J. Patrick Boyle, Guest Opinion, Billings Gazette, August 3, 2004.
83. See Krissoff, supra note 27, at 1-7.
84. Id. at 6.
85. Golan, supra note 69, at 6.
86. ORGANIC TRADE ASSOCIATION, ORGANIC FOOD FACTs, 1, http://
www.ota.com/organic/mt/food.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). (The Organic
Trade Association is a membership based trade organization who promotes organic
initiatives for the organic industry).
87. Golan, supra note 86, at 26.
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economically viable, they must secure a premium price that covers
the additional costs of the organic program.'
A sharp contrast to the grass-roots beginning of the National
Organic Program is the bureaucratic origin of the COOL legislation.
Producers and retailers did not rush to participate in the voluntary
COOL program that was implemented in 2002. Several theories
have been given to explain why retailers have not found an eco-
nomic incentive to label their products with the country-of-origin."
One idea is that consumers just don't care to know from which
country their food originates." The lack of domestic COOL on
meat products indicates that most "consumers neither give the
product's country of origin much thought nor view imported prod-
ucts as inferior."' Another theory says that some consumers prefer
certain food items to be imported because they perceive the im-
ported products as being superior to their domestic counterparts."
Because certain products are labeled with their exporting country's
name prominently displayed on the label, there appears to be an
economic benefit to informing the consumer of the product's coun-
try-of-origin."
While some studies have indicated that consumers do value
COOL information and are willing to pay a premium for this infor-
mation, even the researchers involved in those studies acknowledge
the relative uncertainty of the economic success of a mandatory
program.' The overall conclusion drawn by most observers is that
"the infrequency with which voluntary country-of-origin can be ob-
88. Golan, supra note 86, at 26.
89. Krissoff, supra note 27, at 6, 7.
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id.
93. Id. (Examples include New Zealand lamb products, Burgundy wine, Parma
ham, or Columbian coffee). Krissoff, supra note 27, at 7. When consumers associ-
ate superior quality with certain regional production and are willing to pay a pre-
mium to obtain products from that region, the producer has an incentive to label
and advertise the products accordingly. Id.
94. Wendy J. Umberger, et. al., Consumer Demand for Country of Origin and Source
Verification Labels, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/getfile?
dDocName=STELPRD3319323; Wendy J. Umberger, et. al., Country-of-Origin Label-
ing of Beef Products U.S. Consumers' Perceptions, available at http://
agecon.unl.edu/mark/pdf/Umberger.pdf (Compare Wendy j/ Umberger, et. al's
study in March 2003 showing U.S. consumer's willingness to pay on average 19%
premium for domestic beef with her co-authored study presented in December
2003 showing that when COOL information was compared with other food attrib-
utes such as food safety inspections, tenderness, price and traceability, COOL
ranked as the least important attribute to this survey group).
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served suggests that food suppliers see little or no advantage in la-
beling domestic products as domestic."" That is to say, consumers
are either not willing to pay a premium for the products or the
premium derived will not cover the incremental costs of the addi-
tional labeling requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION
American consumers like to know the origins of the products
they buy. We look at labels on everything from clothes to cars when
making a purchasing decision. We associate certain positive quali-
ties with certain country's production of certain products. But, we
also stigmatize certain countries with certain products. We also en-
joy free trade and the ability to market our products to the world as
well as receive products made in every corner of the world.
But our food supply is not like a car or a pair of pants. We pay
special attention to the safety and health of the food we eat so that
we can remain healthy as well as satisfied. Information about the
food we eat comes at a cost to the producers and retailers providing
that information. Recordkeeping, testing, verification, and certifica-
tion costs directly affect the price of everything we buy. While com-
paring similar products gives us the opportunity to make informed
and rational choices, most consumers can neither grasp an infinite
list of product attributes nor afford to pay the increased premium
for this mountain of information. With the passage and implemen-
tation of the Mandatory COOL legislation, Congress has levied an
additional "food tax" on the consuming public. Not only could
these additional costs create an unfair trade environment for our
WTO trading partners, but it could also place some domestic pro-
ducers in an unfavorable economic position.
Congress should revise the mandatory provision and reinstall
the voluntary program as an alternative for people who want to label
their products with the country of origin information. Also, this
would allow states to regulate their certain food industries where
producer and consumer demand for the COOL information can be
better recognized and implemented.
95. Krissoff, supra note 27, at 6.
96. Id. at 7.
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UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE: INITIAL
FOOD SAFETY RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS,
POULTRY PRODUCTION CONTRACT REFORMS
AND GENETICALLY ENGINEERED RICE
LITIGATION
A. Bryan Endres* and Michaela N. Tarr-
This edition of the food law update will address recent events
that may serve as bellwether signs that significant, long sought
changes to the food and agricultural production system may be on
the horizon. The first section of the update focuses on several gen-
eral food safety initiatives. These efforts may, in the near term, coa-
lesce into comprehensive food safety legislation. The second section
analyzes two food safety actions relating to specific product catego-
ries: oysters and eggs. Section three provides a brief overview of
poultry production contracts that may signal a broader restructuring
of the legal relationships between farmers and the upstream corpo-
rations, which heavily influence production practices. Although
none of the events alone create drastic change, combined they re-
veal a political atmosphere primed for larger restructuring of the
food system. Finally, section four discusses two significant jury ver-
dicts in the on-going genetically engineered rice litigation that im-
poses liability on the developer of genetically engineered seed that
became commingled in the international rice supply chain.
As in previous editions of this update, necessity dictates that
not every change is included; rather, the authors limited their analy-
* Associate Professor of Agricultural Law, University of Illinois, Department of
Agricultural and Consumer Economics. This research was supported in-part by the
USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture, Hatch Project No. ILLU470-309.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the
funding agency.
** Legal Research Associate, University of Illinois, Department of Agricultural
and Consumer Economics.
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sis to significant changes within the broader context of food produc-
tion, distribution, and retail. The intent behind this series of up-
dates is to provide a starting point for scholars, practitioners, food
scientists, and policymakers determined to understand the shaping
of food law in modern society. Tracing the development of food
law through these updates also builds an important historical con-
text for the overall development of the discipline.
I. GENERAL FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVES
A. The President's Food Safety Working Group
In recognition of the growing public concern with food safety,'
and the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report listing,
for the first time, federal oversight of food safety as a "high risk,"'
President Obama established the President's Food Safety Working
Group (Working Group) in 2009.2 Chaired by the Secretaries of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture,' the stated purpose of the Working Group is to
"enhance our food safety systems by fostering coordination
throughout the government including enhancing our food safety
laws for the 21st century."' In the typical aspirational language of
many new initiatives, the Working Group seeks to "break down
stovepipes, address cross-cutting issues and increase coordination of
food safety activities across the U.S. government."'
1. Mary L. Nucci, et. al., The U.S. Food Import System: Issues, Processes & Proposals,
Food Policy Institute Working Paper No. RR-0208-001, at 28(Mar 2008), available at
http://www.foodpolicyinstitute.org/docs/pubs/Final_lmportsReport 3-08.pdf (ci-
ting a study by the International Food Information Council, available at
http://www.foodinsight.org/Press-Release/Detail.aspxtopic-FoodSafetyConcerns_
DoNotInclude Biotechnology).
2. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, HIGH RISK SERIEs: AN UPDATE at 26 (Jan.
2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07310.pdf.
3. Weekly Address, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President
Barack Obama Announces Key FDA Appointments and Tougher Food Safety
Measures, (Mar. 14, 2009) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/Weekly-Address-President-Barack-Obama-Announces-Key-FDA-Appoint-
ments-and-Tougher-F/(announcing in the weekly address the creation of the Food
Safety Working Group).
4. Id.
5. See Presidents Food Safety Working Group, http://www.foodsafetyworking
group.gov/Home.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
6. See FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP KEY FINDINGS, at 5, available at
http://www.foodsafetyworkinggroup.gov/FSWGKeyFindings.pdf.
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As of this writing, the Working Group has announced several
initiatives, but, as discussed below, has not been able to coordinate
passage of comprehensive food safety reform in Congress. On July
31, 2009, the USDA and HHS issued a joint announcement noting
that "prevention and partnership" would guide their respective
agency's food safety efforts.! At the center of the announcement
were new policies by both agencies. USDA, in a change from previ-
ous practice, announced its intention to inspect periodically bench
trimmings' in beef processing for E. coli contamination.' HHS con-
currently announced the publication of three draft FDA industry
guidance documents to minimize contamination in leafy greens,
tomatoes and melons. 0
To actually solve the "stove-pipe" issues identified as one of the
core missions of the Working Group, however, it must go beyond
merely issuing joint press announcements of individual agency ac-
tivities. In October 2009, the Working Group announced a tepid
first step in this effort-a cooperative effort between FDA and the
Fresh Products Branch of USDA to develop new produce safety
rules and a joint outreach effort to assess the impact of these rules
on the industry, including small and organic farmers." As another
example of increased agency coordination, the Working Group
scheduled a public meeting in December of 2009 to improve coor-
dination between FDA and USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service
(FSIS). The goal of the integrated effort is to "increase the speed
and accuracy of traceback investigations and the traceforward" ca-
7. Press Release, USDA, Agriculture Secretary Vilsack, Health and Human
Services Secretary Sebelius Announce new Strategies to Keep America's Food Sup-
ply Safe, No. 0359.09 (July 31, 2009) available at http://www.usda.gov/
wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1RD?printable=true&contentidonly'true&conten
tid=2009/07/0359.xml.
8. Bench trim consists of the pieces leftover from steaks and other cuts of meat
that are subsequently used to make ground beef. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/ucm174200.htm; FDA,
Guidance for Industry: Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards of Tomatoes;
Draft Guidance, available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegu-
latorylnfornation/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/ucm173902.htm;
FDA, Guidance for Industry: Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards of Melons;
Draft Guidance, available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegu-
latoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/ucml74171.htm.
11. Press Release, FDA, USDA Joins FDA Efforts on New Food Safety Regula-
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pabilities of industries confronting a foodborne illness outbreak."
Finally, at the close of the year, the Customs and Border Protection,
upon the recommendation of the Working Group, opened the
Commercial Targeting and Analysis Center (CTAC) to enhance the
inspection of imported food products." Although the Working
Group undoubtedly has increased the cooperative efforts of the
various federal agencies with food safety responsibilities, one must
defer judgment of the actual effectiveness of this presidential-level
initiative until the coordination efforts solidify into operational
changes within the food supply chain, including an assessment of
the collective government-industry response to a food safety crisis.
The creation of the Working Group leaves unresolved the ques-
tion of which government entity should take the lead in food safety
oversight and establishing policy-or if a lead agency is necessary.
The current shared governance system at the federal level includes
fifteen separate agencies with complicated jurisdictional authority,
as well as fifty states, each with their own statutes, regulations and
agencies." Further complicating the federal allocation of responsi-
bility is the agencies' increased reliance on guidance (rather than
notice and comment rulemaking) and marketing orders developed
by industry, to develop food safety initiatives that attempt to address
evolving threats under existing legislative authority." This fragmen-
tation has led to repeated calls for consolidation and reform.'
12. Press Release, FDA, FDA and FSIS Collaborate to Improve Tracing of Un-
safe Food Products (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm 189311 .htm.
13. Press Release, FDA, USDA and HHS Continue Food Safety Working Group
Efforts; Customs and Border Protection Opens Import Food Safety Center, avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucml93668.htm.
14. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED COUNTRIES'
SYSTEMS CAN OFFER INSIGHTS INTO ENSURING IMPORT SAFETY AND RESPONDING TO
FOODBORNE ILLNESS, at 2 (June 2008) available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08794.pdf [hereinafter Food Safety: Selected Countries Systems].
15. A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Pasteurized Almonds and
County of Origin Labeling, 5 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 111, 122-24 (2009) (discussing the
increased use of marketing orders for food safety considerations).
16. See, e.g., Michael R. Taylor, Lead or React?: A Game Plan for Modernizing the
Food Safety System in the United States, 59 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 399, 399 (2004) (noting
that the current system requires "serious modernization" as it is "organizationally
fragmented, bound by obsolete statutes, and unable to make the best use of its
scarce resources to protect the safety and security of the American food supply");
Timothy M. Hammonds, It is Time to Designate a Single Food Safety Agency, 59 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 427, 427 (2004) (noting that the current "patchwork quilt creates in-
consistencies, gaps, overlaps, and duplication of effort that are becoming increas-
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Reform, thus far, has proved difficult. In 2005, a GAO report
and recommendation to consolidate the nation's food safety system"
was met with stiff resistance from key agency stakeholders." A fol-
low up report in 2008 noted that the fragmented federal food safety
system "has caused inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination,
and inefficient use of resources . . . [that] calls into question whether
the government can plan more strategically to inspect food produc-
tion processes, identify and react more quickly to outbreaks of
foodborne illness, and focus on promoting the safety and integrity
of the nation's food supply."" Although the House of Representa-
tives passed a far reaching bill, the Food Safety Enhancement Act,"
the bill has garnered little support in the Senate. Rather, a related
bill that does not reallocate food safety authority from USDA, the
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act-sponsored by Senate Assistant
Majority Leader Durbin, a long time advocate of food safety re-
form-has a more promising future, but remains in the Senate
ingly unworkable"); Food Safety: Selected Countries Systems,, supra note 14, at 2 (rec-
ommending "that Congress enact comprehensive, uniform, and risk-based food
safety legislation and commission the National Academy of Sciences or a blue rib-
bon panel to conduct a detailed analysis of alternative organizational structures for
food safety"); GAO, Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries in Consolidating their
Food Safety System (hereinafter GAO, Food Safety: Exp. of 7 Countries at 24-25
(Feb. 2005), available at http-//www.gao.gov/new.items/d05212.pdf (noting that
the current federal food safety system "could benefit from statutory and organiza-
tional reforms"); but see Stuart M. Pape et. al., Food Security Would be Compromised by
Combing the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture into a
Single food Agency, 59 Food & Drug L.R. 405, 406 (2004) (arguing that the "massive,
time-consuming, and costly merging of two regulatory agencies" would not result in
"a substantial benefit from a food security standpoint", especially in the near term).
A subsequent GAO study of the experiences of other countries, however, tends to
mollify this concern. See GAO, Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries, supra
note 16, at 4 (noting that "government officials in each of the seven countries [sub-
ject to the review] believe that these consolidation costs have been or will likely be
exceeded by the benefits" including "significant qualitative improvements in food
safety operations that enhance effectiveness or efficiency").
17. See GAO, Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries supra note 16, at 24-
25.
18. See id. at 25-26 (referencing agency comments to GAO report and recom-
mendations); see also, GAO Calls for Single Food Agency; Veneman Opposes Consolida-
tion, FOOD & DRINK WEEKLY (Oct 15, 2001) available at http://
www.allbusiness.com/retail-trade/food-beverage-stores/816846-1.html.
19. See GAO, Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries, supra note 14, at 2.
20. The Food Safety Enhancement Act, H.R. 2749 (passed July, 30, 2009).
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Health, Education, Labor and Pensions committee-a victim of Con-
gress' singular effort to enact health care reform legislation."
Absent a legislative overhaul, the President's Working Group
perhaps offers a "middle ground" or first step towards coordinating
food safety at a higher, inter-agency level. On the other hand, an
informal "working group" may be more susceptible to the vulgarities
of shifting policy initiatives to satisfy a fickle polity and the needs of
an ever-shorter news cycle. To that end, real reform may require a
formal institution, such as a dedicated agency, with a singular, fo-
cused mission of food safety insulated by at least one institution
from the political winds that chart policy at the presidential level.
B. FDA Office of Food
One step toward this coordinated policy, at least at the individ-
ual agency level, is the FDA's establishment of the Office of Food.
On August 18, 2009, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg cre-
ated the Office of Food to coordinate the agency's three major op-
erating units relating to food: the Center for Food Safety and Ap-
plied Nutrition (CFSAN), the Center for Veterinary Medicine
(CVM), and the foods-related activities of the Office of Regulatory
Affairs (ORA).' In addition, the Office of Food is expected to co-
ordinate the agency's implementation of recommendations from the
President's Food Safety Working Group and any food safety legisla-
tion developed by Congress."
The Office of Food's "One Mission, One Program" initiative to
unify FDA's foods program has identified ten critical, cross-cutting
topics: preventive controls; risk-based decision-making; inspection
and compliance strategy; import safety; federal/state integration;
incident preparedness and response; science, technology and re-
search integration; information systems; strategic communications;
and resource planning." It will be interesting to see whether the
USDA adopts a similar approach to unify its various food safety
programs and to what extent these intra-agency initiatives and ac-
21. See S. 510, FDA Food Safety Modernization Act. A companion House bill,
Safe FEAST Act, H.R. 1332 (2009), is, as of this writing, in both the House Energy
and Commerce and Agriculture committees.
22. See FDA, Office of Foods: Overview and Mission, http://www.fda.gov/
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companying priority development processes inform the work of the
President's Food Safety Working Group.
C. Reportable Food Registry
In addition to the organizational and structural changes dis-
cussed in the preceding two subsections-the President's Food Safety
Working Group and the FDA's Office of Food-the FDA imple-
mented a significant new food safety initiative to facilitate the track-
ing of foodborne illnesses-the Reportable Food Registry." Section
1005 of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
200726 required the agency to create a registry for firms to report
food safety problems, thereby facilitating the agency's ability to track
patterns of adulteration and better target inspections.
Facilities that manufacture, process, pack or hold food,"2 must
submit a report through the FDA's electronic portal at http://
rfr.fda.gov" as soon as practicable after discovery, but within at least
twenty-four hours," of a food item "for which there is a reasonable
probability that . . . [it] will cause serious adverse health conse-
quences or death to humans or animals."" In addition to reporting
the adulterated food, the Act requires the reporting party to investi-
gate the cause of the adulteration.
Although these requirements include animal feed and pet
food," they do not extend to products regulated exclusively by the
USDA under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products
25. See Department of Health & Human Services, Food and Drug Administra-
tion, Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers Regarding the Reportable
Food Registry as Established by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 46434 (Sept. 9, 2009); see also FDA, Guidance
for Industry: Questions and Answers Regarding the Reportable Food Registry as
Established by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/
GuidanceDocuments/FoodSafety/ucm 1 65626.htm.
26. Pub. L. 110-085, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350f.
27. FDA, Reportable Food Registry [RFR]: At a Glance, at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/FoodSafetyPrograms/RFR/UC
M181885.pdf.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 350f(a)(1) (defining responsible parties).
29. FDA, Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers, supra note 25.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 350f(d)(1)(A).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 350f(a) (defining "reportable food").
32. 21 U.S.C. § 350f(d)(1)(B).
33. FDA, Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers, supra note 25 (answering
question number 18, "Are animal feed and pet food included in the definition of
reportable food?").
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Inspection Act or the Egg Products Inspection Act.' This is a sig-
nificant gap in coverage, as the Center for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) notes that "[r]aw foods of animal origin are the most
likely to be contaminated; that is, raw meat and poultry, raw eggs,
unpasteurized milk, and raw shellfish."3  Moreover, foods derived
from or processed with many individual animals to form a batch
(e.g., pooled raw eggs, ground beef, broiler chickens) "are particu-
larly hazardous because a pathogen present in any one of the ani-
mals many contaminate the whole batch.""
Although an important development toward increasing the
traceability of foodborne illnesses within the food supply chain, the
Reportable Food Registry obviously is not a comprehensive system
as it fails to account for most meat and poultry and many egg prod-
ucts. It also highlights the fragmented nature of federal food safety
oversight and lends support to those calling for the creation of a
single food safety agency that would eliminate the jurisdictional gaps
illustrated above. On the other hand, the President's Food Safety
Working Group, in accordance with its stated goal of breaking down
"stovepipes" and increasing "coordination of food safety activities
across the U.S. government"" could use this registry as a tool to
bridge the divide between the USDA and FDA.'
34. Id. (answering question number 22, "Are products regulated exclusively by
the USDA subject to the reportable food registry requirements?").
35. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Foodborne Illness: Frequently Asked
Questions, at 9 http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfect-
ions-g.htm#riskiestfoods (answering the question "What foods are most associated
with foodborne illness?").
36. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Foodborne Illness: Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfections-g.
htm#riskiestfoods (answering the question "What foods are most associated with
foodborne illness?"). The CDC notes that "[a] single hamburger may contain meat
from hundreds of animals. A single restaurant omelet may contain eggs from hun-
dreds of chickens. . . . A broiler chicken carcass can be exposed to the drippings
and juices of many thousands of other birds that went through the same cold water
tank after slaughter." Id.
37. See Food Safety Working Group Key Findings, supra note 6, at 5.
38. To that end, the USDA and FDA have developed a "widget" that tracks all
food safety information from the respective agencies. See http://www.
foodsafety.gov/widgets/index.html. This, however, is a long way from the Report-
able Food Registry as USDA does not require meat, poultry or egg processors to
submit the information upon detection of a food safety issue.
[VOL. 6:103110
UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE
II. SPECIFIC FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVES
In addition to the general attempts to revise the food safety sys-
tem to be more effective, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
initiated two specific food safety actions in the fall of 2009. One, a
plan to mandate post-harvest processing of Gulf coast raw oysters
harvested during summer months, ultimately led to no actual policy
change. However, it was politically highly controversial and raises
important issues concerning FDA's authority and activities. The
other initiative, final implementation of FDA regulations for the
control of Salmonella Enteritidis in shell eggs, although necessary and
reasonable, adds yet another level of complexity to the multi-agency
regulation of eggs. Both actions are emblematic of some of the
problems in the food safety system that stem from overlapping
agency authority, increased use of guidance rather than rulemaking,
and inadequate scientific and economic foundations for regulatory
decisions.
A. Raw Oysters
In mid October of 2009, the FDA announced a plan to refor-
mulate policies concerning raw oysters." The proposal was to revise
the Seafood Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point standards
(HACCP)40 to require oysters harvested from the Gulf of Mexico
during warm summer months to undergo post-harvest processing to
reduce the presence of the bacteria Vibrio vulnificus." After substan-
tial public uproar in the Gulf coast states," the FDA scaled back its
proposal. The agency decided to conduct an "independent study to
assess how post-harvest processing or other equivalent controls can
39. See Letter from Donald W. Kraemer, Deputy Director, Office for Food
Safety, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation
Conference, Oct. 16, 2009, available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Speeches/ucml87015.htm, see also Michael Taylor, Senior Advisor to the Commis-
sioner, Food and Drug Administration, address at the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation
Conference Biennial Meeting (Oct. 17, 2009) available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Speeches/ucml87012.htm.
40. 21 C.F.R. Parts 123 and 1240.
41. See Kraemer, supra note 39; see also Taylor, supra note 39.
42. See e.g. Roger Bull, Florida Oyster Advocates Fuming Over FDA Treatment, THE
FLORIDA TIMEs UNION, Nov. 8, 2009, available at http://jacksonville.com/
business/2009-11-08/story/florida-oyster advocatesfumingover fda treatment0;
Kris Kirkham, Louisiana Blasts New FDA Requiring Oysters to be Sterilized to Prevent
Rare Bacterial Illness, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 28, 2009, available athttp://
www.nola.com/dining/index.ssf/2009/10/louisiana-blastsjfda-planto_1.html.
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be feasibly implemented in the Gulf Coast in the fastest, safest and
most economical way.
1. Background
Vibrio Vulnificus (V. Vulnificus) is a bacterium that occurs in
coastal and estuary waters, particularly in temperate zones." Al-
though it is capable of causing infection through open wounds ex-
posed to contaminated water, it is most commonly associated with
infections from consuming raw oysters." In healthy individuals it
may cause mild diarrhea and stomach cramps, known as gastroen-
teritis, and there have been no reported fatalities from the gastroen-
teritis." However, it is a bacterium of major concern to the FDA be-
cause it also causes septicemia." These infections occur primarily in
individuals with underlying diseases, such as liver disease or diabe-
tes, and almost exclusively after eating raw oysters." With a fifty to
sixty percent fatality rate, this makes V. Vulnificus the most deadly
seafood-borne pathogen, responsible for ninety-five percent of sea-
food deaths in the United States." When it is not fatal, individuals
may develop secondary lesions in which the tissue and muscles de-
velop necrosis and must be amputated.o Despite these percentages,
V. Vulnificus is responsible for relatively few illnesses and deaths
compared to other common pathogens in the foods system. The
FDA estimates that an average of fifteen people die per year from V
Vulnificus infections." Yet as a whole, food borne diseases are esti-
43. Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, Statement on Vibrio Vulnifi-
cus in Raw Oysters (Nov. 13 2009) available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnuncements/2009/ucm 190513.htm.
44. James D. Oliver, Vibrio Vulnificus, in OCEANS AND HEALTH: PATHOGENS IN THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT, 253 (Shimson Belkin and Rita R. Colwell eds., Springer, NY,
2005).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 257.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 257-258 (citing W.G. Hlady, Vibrio Infections Associated with Raw Oyster
Consumption in Florida, 1981-1994, 60J. FOOD PROT. 1176-1183 (1997)).
49. OLIVER, supra note 44, at 258.
50. Id. at 259.
51. Food and Drug Administration, Backgrounder on Measures to Eliminate
Risk Caused by Vibrio Vulnificus Infection from Consumption of Raw Mulluscan
Shellfish (Oct. 17, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Speeches/ucm 187014.htm.
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mated to cause "seventy-six million illnesses, 325,000 hospitaliza-
tions, and 5,000 deaths in the United States every year.""2
2. Initial Efforts to Control V. Vulnificus
Prior to 2009, the FDA and states made various attempts at re-
ducing infections by V. Vulnificus. Most notably, the FDA regulates
oysters, as well as all other seafood, by mandating processors im-
plement Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) pro-
cedures. The HACCP regulation requires each processor to "con-
duct, or have conducted for it, a hazard analysis to determine
whether there are food safety hazards that are reasonably likely to
occur."" Furthermore, "food safety hazards can be introduced both
within and outside the processing plant environment, including food
safety hazards that can occur before, during, and after harvest."' Poten-
tial hazards include, but are not limited to, natural toxins, microbi-
ological contamination, chemical contamination, pesticides, and
drug residues." If a hazard analysis reveals that a food safety hazard
is reasonably likely to occur, the processor must develop a written
plan that identifies the hazards that are likely to occur and the criti-
cal control points for those hazards, as well as critical limits and test-
ing procedures and frequency provisions for ensuring the critical
limits are not exceeded at the critical control points.' Processors
must take corrective action when deviations from a critical limit oc-
cur,7 and reassess and adjust the HACCP plan on an ongoing basis."
FDA guidance on the implementation of HACCP advises that
V. Vulnificus is a naturally occurring pathogen (as opposed to patho-
gens associated with raw sewage and human and animal waste)."
Currently, control of V. Vulnificus requires limiting time from har-
52. Paul S. Mead et. al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5
EMERG. INFECTIOUS DISEASE 607 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
eid/vol5no5/mead.htm.
53. 21 C.F.R. § 123.6(a) (2009).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. 21 C.F.R. § 123.6(c) (2009).
56. 21 C.F.R. § 123.6(b)-(c) (2009).
57. 21 C.F.R. § 123.7(a) (2009).
58. 21 C.F.R. § 123.8 (2009).
59. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FISH AND FISHERIES PRODUCTS HAZARDS
AND CONTROLS GUIDANCE [hereinafter FDA, FISH AND FISHERIES], Ch. 4 (3d ed.
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vest to refrigerationi6 Local Shellfish Control Authorities control
for the pathogen by monitoring waters and shutting down harvest-
ing when pathogens are present at dangerous levels."' The Shellfish
Control Authorities may also impose limits on the time between
harvest and refrigeration, depending on the average monthly maxi-
mum water temperature." Shellfish intended for raw consumption
must bear tags warning of the risk of raw and undercooked con-
sumption.' The FDA guide suggests, but does not require, cooking
or pasteurization to reduce the pathogens to non-detectable levels."
In addition to these measures, the FDA has conducted outreach
and education campaigns to try to reduce the consumption of oys-
ters by at-risk individuals. The FDA developed a Health Education
Kit for public health educators to raise awareness of the risk of con-
suming raw oysters and educate consumers about the safe ways to
eat oysters.' The FDA also publishes a National Shellfish Sanitation
Program Model Ordinance (NSSP) to act as a guide for state regula-
tors to implement safe harvesting, processing and shipping meas-
ures.' The Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference (ISSC), an or-
ganization whose members consist of state shellfish control agents
from producing and non-producing states, federal agents, industry
representatives, and academics, attempts to facilitate nationally uni-
form adoption of the NSSP.
In 2001, the ISSC adopted a V. Vulnificus risk management plan
to reduce the number of V. Vulnificus illnesses from raw oysters.
The plan required states that had "two or more confirmed shellfish-
borne V. Vulnificus illnesses since 1995 traced to the consumption of
commercially harvested raw or undercooked oysters that originated





64. FDA, FISH AND FISHERIES, supra note 59.
65. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, V. VuLNIFicus HEALTH EDUCATION KIT
(March, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/ResourcesForYou/Health
Educators/ucm085164.htm.
66. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Guide for the Control of Mulloscon
Shellfish (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-
SpecificInformation/Seafood/FederalStatePrograms/NationalShellfishSanitationPro-
gram/ucm046353.htm.
67. A non-governmental organization that was "formed in 1982 to foster and
promote shellfish sanitation through the cooperation of state and federal control
agencies, the shellfish industry, and the academic community." Their home page is
http://www.issc.org/Default.aspx.
114 [VOL. 6:103
UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE
ficus management plan."' The plan sought to reduce reported ill-
nesses (based on data from California, Florida, Louisiana, and
Texas) by forty percent by 2005 and by sixty percent by 2007 and
2008." The plan's broad strategies included improving direct com-
munication with the at-risk community, such as through develop-
ment of educational materials for public health officials, educating
the medical community that treats at-risk individuals through pres-
entations at conferences and similar activities, and developing stra-
tegic partnerships to broaden message delivery, for instance by de-
veloping stronger relationships with pharmaceutical companies that
provide medicines to at-risk populations.
Despite these varied efforts, most states have not seen a reduc-
tion in deaths or illnesses due to V. Vulnificus from consumption of
raw oysters. However, the one state that has successfully eliminated
V. Vulnificus infections is California. In 2003, the California De-
partment of Public Health banned the sale of raw Gulf coast oysters
during the summer months.' Since implementing the ban, Califor-
nia has not had a single confirmed case of V. Vulnificus."
3. FDA Proposed Regulations
The V. Vulnificus uproar started in mid-October, when FDA
proposed requiring all oysters shipped in interstate commerce to
undergo post-harvest processing (PHP) treatments to reduce the
presence of V. Vulnificus.73 The agency intended to implement the
policy changes in the Fish and Fishery Products Hazards and Controls
Guidance, Fourth Edition, which is currently under development.'
The proposed post-harvest processing treatments consisted of indi-
vidual quick freezing (IQF) with frozen storage, high hydrostatic
pressure, mild heat, and low dose gamma irradiation." These tech-
nologies are available commercially according to the FDA, 7 but im-
68. GULF & SOUTH ATLANTIC FISHERIES FOUNDATION, VIBRIO VULNIFICUS ILLNESS
REDUCTION STRATEGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR THE AT-RISK OYSTER
CONSUMER: A STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT, 4, available at http://www.issc.org/
client resources/strategic%20plan.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5-6.
71. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 13675(c)(5) (2010).
72. See Taylor, supra note 39.
73. See id;.Kraemer, supra note 39.
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plementation cost is unclear. When the FDA issued the proposal, it
did not provide data on the technologies' costs or the projected
economic impact on sales for various sized producers, or the indus-
try as a whole. Consequently, one of the most common objections to
the implementation of the new program was that the costs of the
technologies were prohibitive and the rules would put small proces-
sors out of business." Other objections focused on taste and the
rights of consumers to access foods they want (i.e., raw oysters),78
and the apparent unfairness of the action targeted against oyster-
men when other foods are associated with so many more illnesses
and deaths."
The controversy came to a head in early November when legis-
lators introduced two bills designed to prohibit FDA from spending
money to enforce the PHP standards.' Shortly thereafter, FDA re-
tracted its proposal to mandate PHP and substituted a proposal to
conduct further studies on implementing the PHP."' Congress-
woman Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) subsequently requested the Govern-
ment Accounting Office to conduct an audit of the effectiveness of
the ISSC Risk Management plan in reducing deaths from V. vulnifi-
82Cus.
4. Implications of the Revised FDA Proposal.
This action is noteworthy for several reasons, some of which
raise issues regarding FDA's policy agenda and implementation
strategy. The action is part of the overall effort by the Obama ad-
ministration to improve food safety and raise its importance at the
FDA, as described in Section I, above. Among the various food
safety actions the administration has taken includes the appointment
of long-time food safety advocate Michael Taylor as Deputy Com-
77. See, e.g., Bull, supra note 42.
78. See, e.g., Cain Burdeau, FDA Plans to Prohibit Sales of Raw Oysters from Gulf,
THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct 28, 2009, available at http://www.chron.com/
disp/story.mpl/life/food/6689876.html.
79. See, e.g., Lyndsay Layton, In Raw Oyster Trade, FDA's Proposal is Tough to Swal-
low, WASH. PosT, Nov. 10, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/11/09/AR2009110903339.htmL
80. Gulf Oyster Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4022, 111th Congress (2009); Gulf
Oyster Protection Act of 2009, S. 2735, 111th Congress (2009).
81. Press Release, FDA, supra note 43.
82. Press Release, Congresswoman Rosa L. DeLauro, DeLauro Requests GAO
Audit on Reducing Illnesses and Death Due to Contaminated Raw Oysters (Nov.
17, 2009) available at http://www.delauro.house.gov/text-release.cfm?id=2686.
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missioner for Foods." One of Taylor's most well known actions was
successfully implementing HACCP controls for meat and poultry
production while head of the Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS) at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)."
Taylor's appointment, however, has engendered some controversy
among local food advocates due to his close ties to Monsanto Co.'
Critics fear he will institute policies that indirectly harm small busi-
ness by failing to take into account the unique needs of such entities
in favor of adopting a one-size-fits-all (and that one-size is big busi-
ness) approach.'
Taylor's history, and public perceptions of the implications of
this appointment, is relevant to the FDA's oyster proposal because
the effort parallels Taylor's implementation of HACCP rules for
meat and poultry - shortly after his appointment to FSIS, Taylor
announced he was going to mandate HACCP, and then proceeded
to do so over vehement objections by the meat and poultry industry.
These HACCP regulations are accused of being a primary factor in
why slaughterhouse ownership is consolidated into a handful of
companies, and the reduction in availability of small scale, local
slaughterhouses." Similarly, when the PHP was proposed for oysters,
many advocates declared it would destroy mom and pop busi-
nesses."
83. See Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, Meet Michael R. Taylor,
J.D., Deputy Commissioner for Foods (Jan. 22, 2010) available at
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofFoods/ucml96721.h
tm. At the time of the oyster events, Michael Taylor was an advisor to the FDA
Commissioner. See Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, Noted Food
Safety Expert Michael R. Taylor Named Advisor to FDA Commissioner (July 7,
2009) available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce-
ments/2009/ucm170842.htm. See also Marion Nestle, Michael Taylor Appointed to
FDA: A Good Choice!, THE DAILY GREEN (July 8, 2009) available at
http://www.thedailygreen.com/healthy-eating/blogs/healthy-food/michael-taylor-
fda-50070809.
84. See Nestle, supra note 83.
85. See, e.g., id. See also Tom Phillpott, Monsanto's Man Taylor Returns to FDA in
Food Czar Role, GRIST, July 8, 2009, http://www.grist.org/article/2009-07-08-
monsanto-FDA-taylor/.
86. Tom Philpott, Monsanto's Man Taylor Returns to FDA in Food-Czar Role, GRIST,
July 8, 2009, available at http://www.grist.org/article/2009-07-08-monsanto-FDA-
taylor/.
87. Food and Water Watch, Where's the Local Beef: Rebuilding Small Scale Beef
Processing Infrastructure (2009), available at http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/
food/report/wheres-the-local-beef-2/.
88. See Kirkham, supra note 42.
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The notable difference between the meat and poultry HACCP
and the oyster plan is that political opposition forced FDA to retract
its oyster plan. Given the political power of the meat industry, why
was USDA able to successfully mandate HACCP, yet the FDA fell
apart trying to institute a small policy change to a portion of
HACCP rules that already apply to shellfish? Assessing and compar-
ing the variables that impacted these two actions is a research ques-
tion that needs further investigation. The answers from the study
could meaningfully contribute to developing legislation that enables
FDA to effectively implement food safety programs tailored to the
needs of various scales of production.
The proposed oyster rules provide another example of the
FDA's increasing use of guidance documents to implement policies,
rather than Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking." Pol-
icy implementation via the APA has the advantage of clearly convey-
ing to the public the agency's goals and purposes, as well as the
foundations of its decision. This process also facilitates public ac-
ceptance by creating a sense of inclusion in the political process.
In this case, however, FDA provided no data on the economic
consequences and failed to convince the public and legislators that it
had truly pursued alternative courses of action to control the public
health risk from oysters. Furthermore, there was a disconnect be-
tween FDA's characterization of the industry's capacity to imple-
ment PHP technologies and the media's, politician's, and producer's
reactions. Without strong data to support it, the FDA lost its politi-
cal capacity to move forward with its plan. A potential flaw in the
FDA's strategy may have been its decision to take action by changing
a policy guidance document, rather than by progressing through the
informal notice and comment procedure provided by the APA." A
notice of proposed rule, supported by data and the agency's reason-
ing, would have provided the public and impacted stakeholders an
opportunity to comment, and the agency a meaningful, non-political
avenue through which to respond to comments and justify its action.
The FDA, however, missed this chance and instead faced a media
debate.
Yet another issue the oyster action raises is in regards to the
FDA's jurisdiction, which is generally limited to food shipped in in-
terstate commerce.' Although some gulf oysters are shipped in in-
terstate commerce, many are consumed within the state where they
89. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2009) et seq.; See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1966).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2010).
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are harvested. Therefore, the FDA's action may not have had the
significant impact predicted. Without better public information on
where sickness and deaths are occurring, and where the oysters were
sourced, it is hard to conclude whether the FDA's action was worth
the controversy it engendered.
As congress considers new legislation for the FDA, this issue of
the FDA's authority, and the process for its exercise, is important.
Should the FDA's jurisdiction be expanded to intra-state goods, or
should states remain as "testing grounds" for policies? For instance,
the current system has allowed states to experiment with variant
regulatory regimes that provide access to unpasteurized milk, a
product in high demand by some consumers, while generally re-
stricting its availability to the general public.'
B. Egg Handling
Another food safety issue addressed in the second half of 2009
is Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) in shell eggs. On July 9, 2009 the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a final rule, effective Sep-
tember 8, 2009, requiring "shell egg producers to implement meas-
ures to prevent Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) from contaminating eggs
on the farm and from further growth during storage and transporta-
tion.""
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) first recognized SE as a
problem in eggs starting in the 1980s, when it established an epide-
miological and laboratory association between eggs and SE out-
breaks." There are two primary vectors by which eggs become con-
taminated: if a hen has Salmonella it may enter the egg during for-
mation and excretion (the transovaraian route) and through contact
with contaminated materials (trans-shell penetration).' There are
numerous programs, administered by several agencies, directed at
preventing SE infections.' However, the FDA and U.S. Department
92. For a summary of state laws on raw milk, see WESTON A. PRICE FOUNDATION,
SUMMARY OF RAW MILK STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODES, available at
http://www.realmilk.com/milk-laws-I.html.
93. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, Stor-
age, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,029, 33,030 (July 9, 2009) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. Part 118).
94. Id. at 33,031.
95. Id. at 33,032.
96. Among the programs are the continuous inspection of egg processing facili-
ties and mandatory pasteurization of processed egg products, administered by the
Food Safety and Inspection Service, 9 C.F.R. Part 590; the Agricultural Marketing
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of Agriculture's (USDA's) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
estimate that of the 47 billion eggs consumed as table eggs (as op-
posed to eggs made into egg products), 2.3 million are SE-Positive.'
This translates to a risk of about one in 20,000 eggs.
Although the risk on a per-egg basis is relatively low, SE none-
theless causes thousands of illnesses and hundreds of deaths - esti-
mated in 2001 to be 1,203,650 cases and 494 deaths, while 2004 es-
timates suggested 1,376,514 cases and 427 deaths.' People primar-
ily become ill through eating or drinking food contaminated with
the bacteria." As indicated by the above statistics, Americans con-
sume enough undercooked eggs that controlling the incidence of
infection warrants attention. The FDA characterizes the rulemaking
as "the most recent in a series of farm-to-table egg safety efforts be-
gun by FDA and FSIS in the 1990s.., [it] is the first and only Federal
rule that addresses the introduction of SE into the egg during pro-
duction."'" This "series of farm-to-table egg safety efforts" has been
characterized as the poster-child of a splintered, inconsistent and
ineffective food safety system that unevenly allocates resources.'
However, short of Congressional action to harmonize Federal and
State food safety programs and evenly allocate monies based on risk,
the somewhat ad-hoc yet coordinated attempts of various agencies
to address pressing food safety concerns is better than nothing.
The new rule will require persons with 3,000 or more laying
hens at a particular farm that do not sell all of their eggs directly to
consumers and that produce shell eggs for the table market to im-
plement shell SE prevention measures.o' The measures include de-
veloping a written SE prevention plan that requires procuring pul-
lets that are SE monitored, using a bio-security program limiting
visitors and controlling cross contamination between houses, con-
trolling rodents, files and pests, and cleaning poultry houses be-
Service's oversight and inspections to prevent cracked, dirty, and otherwise unfit
eggs from being sold on the shell egg market, 7 C.F.R. Part 57; the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service's voluntary breeding program to reduce the inci-
dence of SE in laying hens, 9 C.F.R. Part 145 and 147; and the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration's mandatory food safety labeling warning, 21 § C.F.R. 101.17(h). For a
more detailed discussion of the regulatory morass, see Sandra B. Eskin, Putting All
Your Eggs in One Basket: Egg Safety and the Case for a Single FoodSafety Agency, 59
FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 441 (2004).
97. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis, 74 Fed. Reg. at 33,032.
98. Id. at 33,031.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 33,033.
101. Eskin, supra note 96 at 451.
102. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis, 74 Fed. Reg., supra note 93, at 33,034.
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tween flocks if there was a positive SE test.'" Producers must do en-
vironmental testing for SE when laying hens are forty to forty-five
weeks old and four to six weeks after molt;" if an environmental
test is positive for SE the producer must conduct shell egg testing.'"
Producers must maintain a written SE prevention plan as well as
records to verify compliance, which they must make available within
twenty four hours of receipt of an official agency request." Shell
eggs being held or transported must be refrigerated at or below
forty-five degrees Fahrenheit ambient temperature within thirty-six
hours of laying.' This refrigeration requirement applies to shell egg
producers as well as individuals transporting or holding shell eggs.'
There were approximately 2,000 comments in response to the
proposed rulemaking.'o The comments covered a broad range of
approximately sixty issues; therefore this discussion will focus on a
few comments that are relevant to this article's over-all discussion of
food safety policies. Several comments suggested that there should
not be an exemption for producers with flocks of less than 3,000
hens because these small producers have fewer resources and thus
are less likely to have adequate SE prevention measures." The ar-
gument that smaller facilities are more likely to have inadequate
food safety due to limited resources is common, and in some in-
stances may be justified."' However, local food advocates often per-
ceive locally produced food to be safer because of the small scale of
production that allows for more careful monitoring and stronger
personal connections between the end consumer and the pro-
ducer."'2 There are likely many factors that contribute to a produc-
103. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.4).
104. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.5).
105. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.6).
106. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.10).
107. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis, 74 Fed. Reg., supra note 93, at 33,034
(codified at 21 C.F.R. §8.4(e)).
108. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.1(b)).
109. Id. at 33,034.
110. Id. at 33,036.
111. For instance, a survey of health inspections by the Salt Lake Tribune found
that large chain restaurants had fewer critical health code violations than small,
Utah based businesses. Kathy Stephenson, Chain Eateries do Better in Health Inspec-
tions, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Oct. 5, 2009 available at http://www.
sltrib.com/news/ci_13472535.
112. RICH PIROG & ANDY LARSON, CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF THE SAFETY, HEALTH
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF VARIOUS SCALES AND GEOGRAPHIc ORIGIN OF FOOD
SUPPLY CHAINS 10 ,24 (Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture, Iowa State Uni-
versity, 2007).
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ers' safety record, including scale, finances, general food safety cul-
ture and speed of production. According to commenters and the
FDA, there is a dearth of research on how scale relates to likelihood
of SE contamination."' Given this lack of information, and the very
small portion of the market occupied by producers with fewer than
3,000 hens, FDA felt that imposing the new regulation on the small-
est operations would have little measurable impact on the incidence
of SE."' Although they may be exempt from FDA's (and many Fed-
eral) rules, these small producers likely are still subject to regulation
at the state and local level.
Other comments similarly focused on appropriateness of regu-
lations due to scale and economic costs. For instance, some com-
menters objected to a manure removal requirement because com-
plete removal of all manure becomes difficult in the very large scale
houses due to the complexity of the technologies used."' FDA's re-
sponse stated "we do not understand why manure removal at a large
operation would be impractical. We acknowledge that a large opera-
tion has more manure to handle, but FDA has visited large opera-
tions that do clean out the manure, and we are unaware of any
unique problems for such operations.""'
FDA's decision to completely exempt the small producers, yet
refusal to accommodate the requests of extremely large producers,
raises issues of how to manage problems related to different scales.
Food safety policies need to be flexible enough to be capable of as-
sessing the source of risks posed by different types and sizes of pro-
duction methods in order to adequately control the risks while at
the same time allowing for competition between varying producers
and facilitating consumer access to foods with desired characteris-
tics. The decision to exempt the small producers relates to common
concerns of the local foods movement, including producer ability
and dedication to safety controls, economics and fairness, and over-
all impact on food safety versus per-unit risk. These are many of the
same issues that were raised in the raw oyster debate. Like with the
raw oysters, lack of clear information and scientific standards for
decision making may be hampering effective implementation of
food safety programs.
The oyster and egg actions raise the question of how to direct
FDA to balance competing factors. Should decisions be based on the
113. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis, 74 Fed. Reg., supra note 93, at 33,036.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 33,039.
116. Id.
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risk the food presents, or the risk of the scale of the outbreak, or
some other factor, such as the corporate culture and compliance
history, as well as the scale of the producer? And should economics
play a role in the decision making? Other regulatory regimes, such
as the Clean Air Act, require balancing economic costs against pub-
lic health benefits."7
Accommodating competing scales of production while main-
taining competitive balance goes to the heart of the new poultry
production contract rules discussed below.
III. REVISED POULTRY CONTRACTING RULES
On December 3, 2009, the Grain Inspections, Packers and
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) of the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture (USDA) amended a regulation under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act"' to improve protections for poultry producers entering
into poultry production contracts."' The changes seek to address
some longstanding abuses in the poultry industry.
In general terms, production contracts are agreements whereby
companies hire farmers for their growing services, 2 0 usually to raise
crops or animals. The company often provides the raw inputs, such
as seeds and chemicals or animals and feed, while the farmer invests
in the equipment and provides the labor. Although production con-
tracts are used throughout agriculture, they are remarkably promi-
nent in the poultry sector.'2 ' In the poultry industry, five firms con-
trol eighty percent of production'2 2 and farmers raised ninety-five
percent of poultry under a contract with a processor.'2 3 In the U.S.
117. For instance, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., bars construction of
new polluting facilities unless they make use of the "best available control technol-
ogy." 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). A "best available control technology" is "an emission
limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of [pollution]... which the
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environ-
mental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such
facility." 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).
118. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229c (2010).
119. Poultry Contracts; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg.
63271 (Dec. 3, 2009) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. § 201.100).
120. JAMES M. MACDONALD, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF U.S. BROILER PRODUCTION 3 (2008).
121. Id.
122. RENEE JOHNSON, GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
LIVESTOCK MARKETING AND COMPETITION ISSUES 6 (2009).
123. Id. at 7.
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broiler industry, processing firms called "integrators"2 1 own hatcher-
ies, processing plants, and feed mills. These integrators contract
with independent farmers to "grow out" broiler chicks to market
weight, and to produce replacement breeder hens for hatcheries.'2 1
.Under a poultry production contract, a poultry integrator will
contract with a poultry grower to raise birds of which the poultry
integrator retains ownership. The integrator typically supplies feed,
medicine and other inputs, while the poultry grower provides labor
and invests in equipment and structures to raise the birds.'2 A
30,000 square foot broiler house can cost $300,000, and most grow-
ers have multiple houses.'2 1 Payment structures generally are on a
performance basis relative to other farmers who deliver birds to the
integrator within a certain time period.'"2 Farmers receive a flat base
fee, and those who deliver more meat per chick delivered are paid
extra.'" Consequently, differences in payment are driven by differ-
ences in chick mortality and feed efficiency.'" Chick mortality de-
pends on the health of the chicks delivered, and feed efficiency de-
pends on the quality of the feed delivered. Because the integrators
provide the chicks and the feed, these are factors that are beyond
the grower's control.
Once growers have entered the poultry production industry,
they often have very limited options for selling their birds. Although
only a quarter of respondents to USDA-ERS's poultry production
survey reported only one integrator in their area, fifty-nine percent
of respondents in the 2004 Agricultural Resource Management Sur-
vey reported that they had no alternatives in the form of other con-
tractors, case markets or both, to their current contractor.'2 ' In the
final rulemaking, GIPSA recognized that it is "common knowledge"
that vertical integration and high concentration allow poultry inte-
grators to present poultry growers with "take it or leave it" con-
124. Under section 182(10) of the Packers and Stockyards Act, integrators are
defined as "live poultry dealers." Throughout the article, the authors will use the
term integrator but the reader should be aware that the term is synonymous with a
dealer as referred to in the act and regulations.
125. JoHNsoN, supra note 122, at 5.
126. Id.
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tracts. Because of the lack of alternatives, "poultry growers do not
realistically have the option of negotiating more favorable poultry
growing arrangement terms.""'
The terms of the contracts make poultry production an increas-
ingly difficult profession from which to make a living. There are sev-
eral practices that present particular hardship for poultry growers.
First, poultry growers are often asked to invest large amounts of
capital in building infrastructure for raising the birds without first
receiving a written contract.' Banks make the loans based on letters
of intent from the poultry integrator, often requiring the farmer to
put up their farmland and home as collateral.'" The consequence is
that farmers must agree to the terms of the contracts the integrator
ultimately provides; otherwise, they are at risk of losing their farm
and their home.' As farmers pay off their debts, the companies will
require them to take out further loans to make improvements on
the farm as a precondition to contract renewal, which has the effect
of keeping the farmer indebted and vulnerable.'
Because the farmer lacks leverage, integrators are able to write
onerous terms into the contracts. Payment is often on a ranking sys-
tem that compares growers within a region to each other based on
their success at putting weight on the birds during the seven to nine
week contract period.'" The quality of feed and health of the chicks
are two of the largest determinants of how quickly chickens will put
on weight. Because the companies control the inputs (birds and
feed), integrators can use the inputs as a means of retaliating against
growers who try to organize or resist the companies' control.'" If a
producer performs particularly poorly, they may be placed on a Per-
formance Improvement Plan (PIP) and ultimately have their grow-
ing arrangement terminated.'40 Other potentially abusive terms in-
clude mandatory arbitration clauses, which require costly upfront
132. Poultry Contract; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg. at
63271.
133. Id.
134. Economic Challenges and Opportunities Facing American Agricultural Producers
Today, Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 110th Cong.






139. Statement of Scott Hamilton, supra note 134.
140. 74 Fed. Reg. supra note 94, at 63272.
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fees for the grower, and clauses that prohibit the farmers from dis-
cussing the terms of the contract with anyone, including family, law-
yers, and financial advisors."'
The underlying cause of the integrators ability to abuse growers
is the vertical integration and consolidation of the industry into the
hands of a few companies. Although the Packers and Stockyards Act
prohibits unfair practices,"' GIPSA does not have anti-trust author-
ity, which limits its ability to address the problems of integration and
consolidation. GIPSA authority is limited to temporary injunc-
tions,"' civil fines,"' and referral to the Department of Justice to en-
force antitrust laws."' Furthermore, GIPSA investigations into indus-
try practices tend to be poorly executed and generally inadequate."'
This situation has allowed the poultry integrators to expand their
coercive practices with little chance of legal or financial repercus-
sions.
Congress has considered various measures to address these
abuses, but few have successfully passed."' For instance, there were
provisions in the Senate version of the 2008 Farm Bill, specifically
Senator Harkin's version, that sought to amend the P&SA to
strengthen USDA enforcement over live poultry dealers, prohibit
confidentiality clauses, and limit processor's right to terminate con-
tracts where the producer had invested more than $100,000 in capi-
tal."' The only changes included in the final bill were provisions al-
lowing producers to cancel a contract within three days; "' requiring
contracts to disclose on the first page that additional large capital
investments will be required;' and provisions intended to give pro-
141. Id. at 63271-63272. Some states have passed statutes prohibiting this and
many other practices associated with production contracts. See 505 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 17/30(2009) (prohibiting complete confidentiality in these production con-
tracts); ARK. CODE ANN. §2-32-201 (2009); IOWA CODE §202.3(2009); MINN. STAT. §
17.710 (2009).
142. 7 U.S.C. § 192 (2006).
143. 7 U.S.C. § 228a (2006).
144. 7 U.S.C. § 228b-2(b) (2006).
145. 7 U.S.C. § 224 (2006).
146. See generally, USDA, OIC AUDIT REYT. No. 30601-01-HY, GIPSA's
MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS PROGRAMS (2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/30601-01-HY.pdf.
147. See JOHNSON, supra note 122, at 15-22 (discussing recent congressional ac-
tions).
148. Id. at 18-21.
149. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 11005,
122 Stat. 1651 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197a).
150. Id.
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ducers more leeway in choice of venue,'" choice of law, ' and the
use of arbitration clauses.' The 2008 Farm Bill also requires USDA
to publish regulations within two year to establish criteria in deter-
mining:
(1) whether an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage has oc-
curred in violation of such Act;
(2) whether a live poultry dealer has provided reasonable notice to poul-
try growers of any suspension of the delivery of birds under a poultry
growing arrangement;
(3) when a requirement of additional capital investments over the life of
a poultry growing arrangement or swine production contract constitutes
a violation of such Act; and
(4) if a live poultry dealer or swine contractor has provided a reasonable
period of time for a poultry grower or a swine production contract
grower to remedy a breach of contract that could lead to termination of
the poultry growing arrangement or swine production contract.1
The notice of rulemaking states:
The failure of a live poultry dealer to deliver a written poultry growing
arrangement in a timely manner is considered by GIPSA to be an unfair
and deceptive practice because growers could not otherwise know what
the poultry growing arrangement terms will be or whether the terms ac-
curately reflect the agreement reached between the parties. This prac-
tice could also be considered discriminatory if some growers receive
written poultry growing arrangements in a timely fashion and others do
not. A live poultry dealer's failure to include written notice of termina-
tion procedures in the poultry growing arrangement and failure to pro-
vide a written notice of termination is also considered unfair, discrimi-
natory and deceptive for the same reasons.
A live poultry dealer's failure to include information about Performance
Improvement Plans (PIPs) is similarly unfair and discriminatory if some
growers receive this information and others do not, and deceptive if
growers are unaware that such a program exists until they fail to meet a
minimum performance threshold that was not specified in their poultry
growing arrangement.
GIPSA considers prohibiting growers from discussing poultry growing
arrangement terms with business advisers unfair because growers are
not typically attorneys or accountants. Depriving growers of professional
advice before they commit to a poultry growing arrangement, particu-
151. Id. (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197b).
152. Id.
153. Id. (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197c).
154. Id. at § 11006.
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larly when the live poultry dealers have access to such advice in drafting
their poultry growing arrangements, is considered unfair as well. 55
The new regulations will require integrators to provide growers
with the true written contract on the date they provide the grower
with the poultry house construction specifications and prohibit con-
fidentiality clauses that limits growers' right to discuss a poultry
growing arrangement offer with a Federal or State agency, financial
advisors or lenders, legal advisors, accounting representatives, other
growers who contract with the integrator, and members of the
growers' immediate family or business associates.5 The Farm Secu-
rity and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Farm Bill) created a
right for farmers to discuss contracts.'" GIPSA's list largely re-
enumerates the list of individuals that the 2002 Farm Bill protected,
with the addition of the right to discuss contracts with other growers
who have entered into poultry growing arrangements with the same
live poultry dealer.'"5 GIPSA added this class of individuals because
they "see no benefit for a live poultry dealer to forbid its growers
from discussing the terms of their poultry growing arrangements
with each other. To do so would impede the growers' ability to de-
termine whether they have been treated unfairly or discriminated
against in violation of the P&S Act."'"9
The contract must specify whether a PIP exists for that grower,
and if so, any PIP guidelines including the factors considered when
placing a grower on a PIP, assistance provided while on a PIP, and
factors considered when determining whether a grower will be
placed back in good standing or have their arrangement termi-
nated.'" The purpose of this provision is to prevent integrators from
adding PIP riders to an existing arrangement; rather, the integrator
will have to fully disclose the existence of the program before a
grower enters into the arrangement."' Given the large financial debt
often necessary to initiate the growing arrangements, it is important
for growers to fully understand the full range of expectations and
outcomes. This changed provision should help farmers understand
155. Poultry Contracts; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg. at
63,271.
156. Id. at 63,277 (codified at 9 C.F.R. § 201.100(a) and (b)).
157. Pub. L. No. 107-171, §10503, 116 Stat. 134 (2002) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §
229b).
158. Poultry Contracts; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg. at
63,273.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 63,277 (codified at 9 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)).
161. Id. at 63,273.
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changes to normal practices that are likely to occur when placed on
a PIP, so they can better judge how it will affect them. 2 This up-
front information should be valuable for growers considering enter-
ing into growing arrangements with large integrators and signifi-
cantly expanding their poultry operations.
Finally, parties to a growing arrangement must provide ninety
days notice of termination of their growing arrangement.'" Integra-
tors must provide reasons for the termination, effective dates, and
any right to appeal.'" It is important to note that this rule requires
written notice for all situations where one party elects to end the
poultry growing relationship, whether it be through non-renewal of
an arrangement, discontinuance of the current arrangement, offer-
ing of new contract terms, and early termination.'6 5 This broad cov-
erage is important because many arrangements exist on a flock-to-
flock basis, which, in the case of chickens, generally last only seven
to nine weeks. This prevents integrators from evading the rule by
simply only offering flock-to-flock arrangements.
Currently, most growing arrangements provide for three to
thirty days written notice of termination prior to picking up the final
flock or prior to the anticipated delivery date for the next flock.'" In
the notice of proposed rulemaking, GIPSA proposed a minimum
thirty days notice.' Many commenters suggested that thirty days was
insufficient for poultry growers to make other business arrange-
ments.'" GIPSA recognized this and the final rule requires ninety
days notice.' GIPSA suggests this additional time will allow the
grower time to "work with the live poultry dealer [integrator] to im-
prove his/her performance, obtain legal and/or financial advice or
guidance, obtain a new contract with a new live poultry dealer,
and/or sell his/her poultry growing business."'" Although ninety
days may be sufficient to allow these events to occur, the reality is
that most growers do not have access to alternative markets, the law
162. Id.
163. Poultry Contracts; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg. at
63,277 (codified at 9 C.F.R. § 201.100(h)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 63,274.
166. Id.
167. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 69
Fed. Reg. 56,824, (Sept. 22, 2004).
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provides limited recourse to demand reimplementation, and the
properties are highly specialized for poultry growing. However, the
market's vertical integration and consolidation, regardless of the
duration of notice given, imposes serious challenges on the termi-
nated farmers' ability to successfully continue their operations.
Although the changes to the new regulation should provide
farmers who have not yet entered the poultry industry with valuable
information, it provides little protection for producers who have
already acquired significant debt and are dependant on continued
contracts with the integrators to pay off those debts. For them, im-
proved information is not going to drastically impact their ability to
negotiate a favorable contract. This improves the well informed,
arms length negotiations of new contracts, but does not address the
fundamental problem of significant disparity in market power and
competitive alternatives, and thus bargaining power. The USDA and
Department of Justice have started investigations into anti-
competitive activities in the agricultural sectors.'' There may be fu-
ture actions that seek to address the larger issues of consolidation in
the marketplace. However, if government wishes to meaningfully
reform power relations in the poultry industry, fundamental
changes in the anti-competitive laws and improvement in USDA's
capacity to investigate and eliminate unfair practices is a necessary
prerequisite.
IV. GENETICALLY MODIFIED RICE LITIGATION
On December 4, 2009, a federal jury in St. Louis, Missouri
awarded two farmers approximately $2 million in compensatory
damages for their economic losses arising from the commingling of
their rice crops with an experimental (unapproved for general culti-
vation) genetically modified rice variety.'" This was the first of sev-
eral test cases brought by farmers and various entities in the interna-
tional rice supply chain seeking recovery from the economic losses
related to the contamination of rice seed stock with Bayer Crop-
Science's (Bayer) LL601 biotech rice variety. In total, over 7,000
rice farmers and others involved in the global rice supply chain have
171. See Dept. of Justice Public Workshops: Agriculture and Antitrust Enforce-
ment Issues in Our 21st Century Economy, http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/
workshops/ag2010/index.htm (last visited Aug. 03, 2010).
172. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., Case No. 06-md-01811 (E.D. Missouri).
For a website containing updated court documents from the rice litigation, see
www.bayerricelitigation.com.
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filed suit against Bayer-5,000 in federal court consolidated in the
Eastern District of Missouri and 2,000 in various state courts." This
section of the update discusses the jury verdict noted above as well
as the court's prior ruling on the consolidated summary judgment
motions of the parties seeking redress from Bayer in federal court.'
A brief summary of the facts giving rise to these disputes follows.
In June 2006, Riceland Foods, the nation's largest rice coopera-
tive, informed Bayer that it detected the presence of genetically en-
gineered rice in the 2005 Midwest rice harvest."' Bayer confirmed
this finding and reported the results to USDA. Although USDA had
approved two varieties of genetically engineered rice for commercial
release-LLRice06 and LLRice62-Bayer had not sought approval for
the LL601 variety.'" Bayer had elected not to market the approved
rice varieties nor to obtain USDA clearance for the LL601 variety
because growers had no interest in producing rice not yet approved
for consumption in the major export markets of Japan and the
European Union. USDA publically announced the rice contamina-
tion on August 19, 2006, precipitating an immediate decline in rice
futures, the pulling of U.S. rice from European grocery shelves and,
not surprisingly, the filing of multiple lawsuits.
173. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 2010 WL716190, 2 (Feb. 24, 2010, E.D.
Mo.).
174. See, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Mo.
2009). Plaintiffs' counsel estimates another 6,000 farmers will have claims in addi-
tion to the approximately 1,000 awaiting trial. In addition to the federal lawsuits, in
March 2010 an Arkansas state court jury awarded just over $1 million to a farmer,
including $500,000 in punitive damages assessed again Bayer. All Business.com,
Bayer ordered to pay farmer $1 million is tab for modified rice, http://www.
allbusiness.com/legal/torts-damages/14079681-1.html (last visited July 19, 2010).
175. There are two primary rice growing regions in the United States-the south-
ern Midwest/Gulf states and California. USDA, Economic Research Service, Rice:
Background, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rice/background.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010). Long-grain rice, the source of the contamination, is grown exclu-
sively in the South. See id.; see also Nathan Childs, USDA, Rice Outlook and Yearbook
2006, at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/ers/RCS-yearbook//2000s/2006/
RCS-yearbook-12-20-2006.pdf (last visited June 25, 2010). (noting decline in long-
grain exports due to contamination with LL Rice 601); APHIS, Biotechnology
Regulatory Services, USDA Provides Update for Farmers on Genetically Engineered
Rice (Feb. 2007) (describing USDA's investigation of the long-grain rice contamina-
tion), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/biotechnology/
content/printable-version/ia-ge-rice.pdf.
176. A. Bryan Endres & Justin G. Gardner, Genetically Engineered Rice: A Summary
of the LL Rice 601 Incident, Agric. L. & Tax Brief 06-04 (Dec. 2006); See Seedquest,
U.S. Department of Agriculture issues update for rice industry regarding Clearfield 131
long-grain rice seed, (March 9, 2007), available at http://www.seedquest.com/News/
releases/2007/march/18661.htm.
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The jury verdict, noted above, in favor of two farmer test plain-
tiffs from Missouri was the first of multiple lawsuits against Bayer.
The second bellwether trial of Arkansas and Mississippi farmer
plaintiffs commenced in January 2010, and resulted in a similar vic-
tory for the plaintiffs of approximately 1.5 million dollars.'" A third
test trial involving a non-farmer plaintiff (Riviana Foods, Inc.) will
begin on April 19, 2010. As discussed in more detail below, the
contaminated rice litigation draws heavily from the precedent estab-
lished in the Starlink genetically modified corn commingling events
in 1998-2000 growing seasons, which culminated in the landmark In
re Starlink decision.'" Although without doubt an important event
in the development of case law impacting production agriculture,
the ongoing rice litigation may have a greater impact in the devel-
opment of a common law relating to biotech commingling and
trace-back liability in the discipline of food law by providing an an-
chor point for further litigation and/or regulatory action.
As a starting point for assessing the impact of this regulation,
the following section analyzes the court's detailed October 2009 or-
der accompanying its summary judgment ruling.'"
A. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation SummaryJudgment
Defendants successfully defeated many of the plaintiffs' causes
of action on summary judgment." The court, however, allowed
claims for negligence and private nuisance from the "negligent con-
tamination of the nationwide rice supply" leading to "market losses
and damage to other property, including equipment, land, and rice"
to proceed to trial. Of particular importance to the success of plain-
tiffs' suit was the USDA's current regulatory position on the low
177. See Verdict Lands Farmers Money, STUTTGART DAILY LEADER (Feb. 8, 2010),
available at www.stuttgartdailyleader.com/features/x644563964/Verdict-lands-
farmers-money.
178. In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 841-42 (N.D. Ill.
2002). See also D. L. Uchtmann, StarLink-A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology
Regulation, 7 DRAKEJ. AGRIc. L. 159, 160 (2002) (discussing the history of Starlink
commingling and the regulatory responses).
179. See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp.2d 1004 (E.D. Mo., 2009).
180. Id. at 1004-05. Plaintiffs alleged claims of negligence, public and private nui-
sance, negligence per se and violation of the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices
Act. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Bayer for plaintiffs' claims
for negligence per se, public nuisance and violation of the North Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act. Id. at 1004.
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level presence (LLP) of regulated (unapproved for general commer-
cial release) genetic events.
The USDA acknowledges that plant breeding may result in the
mixing of genes and gene products from unintended plant sources,
whether from pollen drift or human-induced commingling."' This
mixing may result in the unauthorized introduction of genetically
modified plant material into seeds and grain.'" Recognizing this
risk, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS),"' in
2002, revised its field testing requirements to prevent the unin-
tended transfer of regulated genetically modified material.'" In the
event of an unauthorized release, APHIS will investigate and deter-
mine appropriate remedial or enforcement actions, if any, required
by the agency or product developer.'" In 2008, as part of a pro-
posed revision of the agency's biotechnology regulatory program,
APHIS announced a change to its LLP response.'" Specifically,
APHIS proposed to establish criteria under which the agency would
not take remedial action for LLP that is unlikely to result in the "in-
troduction or dissemination of a plant pest or noxious weed."' Al-
though APHIS has not yet finalized this proposed regulatory
change, the agency declined to impose remedial action or impose a
fine against Bayer in response to the LL601 commingling.'"
In its motion for summary judgment, Bayer raised the agency's
LLP response to the rice contamination (no action against Bayer), as
well as the agency's proposed LLP revisions to its regulatory pro-
gram. The court, however, rejected Bayer's argument that the
agency's proposed regulatory revisions and decision to forego regu-
181. APHIS Policy on Responding to the Low-Level Presence of Regulated Ge-
netically Engineered Plant Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,649, 14,649 (Mar. 29, 2007)(to
be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
182. Id.
183. APHIS is the USDA sub-agency responsible for regulation of genetically
engineered plant material. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 340, (2009) (implementing the Plant
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701-7772 and 7781-7786).
184. Proposed Federal Actions to Update Field Test Requirements for Biotech-
nology Derived Plants and to Establish Early Food Safety Assessments for New
Proteins Produced by Such Plants, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,578, 50,578 (proposed Aug. 2,
2002).
185. Id.
186. Importation, Interstate Movement, and Release into the Environment of
Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,008, 60,025 (proposed
Oct. 9, 2008).
187. Id.




JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
latory action served in essence as a federal permit for low-level pres-
ence in the US rice supply.'" Rather, plaintiffs were correct in stat-
ing that the current regulations would not allow LLP.'" Bayer had a
duty to ensure that the GM trait did not "escape and contaminate
other non-GM rice" and this was a "known and foreseeable risk" of
conducting field trials (because federal law required strict contain-
ment, a common law duty arose)."'
This regulatory breach (i.e., LLP), however, did not support a
claim of negligence per se, as the performance standards outlined in
the regulations did not provide a standard of care.'" Moreover, the
court held that both industry practices and the regulatory scheme
are relevant to the standard of care, but the parties cannot rely on
compliance or non-compliance with regulations as evidence for or
against liability.'
With respect to the common law tort claims for negligence and
private nuisance, the court denied Bayer's motion for summary
judgment based on the economic loss doctrine." The court distin-
guished two prior cases involving "the negligent spread of GM food"
in which farmers who had purchased contaminated seed directly
from the seed company could not proceed to trial due to application
of the economic loss doctrine. One case arose in the same court
(E.D. MO) in which the court granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on a poorly documented nuisance claim involving
unapproved-in-EU corn and soybeans.'" The other case involved
Aventis (a predecessor to Bayer) and applied Wisconsin and Illinois
law to bar claims from growers who purchased contaminated seed
(while allowing claims of those whose corn was commingled via pol-
len drift or other means to proceed).'" Although the LL601 plain-
189. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp.2d at 1121-1122.
190. Id. at 1020-21.
191. Id. at 1024.
192. Id. at 1022. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B(2) (1965) (not-
ing that where a statute fails to provide a standard of conduct, the "fact of the viola-
tion may still be accepted as relevant evidence bearing upon the conduct of a rea-
sonable man in the actor's position").
193. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp.2d at 1024.
194. Id at 1016-17. The economic loss doctrine bars recovery of monetary loses in
tort cases if there is not accompanying personal injury or physical damage to prop-
erty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21(1998).
195. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092-94 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
196. In re Starlink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 841-42. The Starlink corn variety had ap-
proval only for feed or fuel use (not food) in the United States. Id. at 834. Testing
by the environmental group Friends of the Earth revealed commingling with the US
food supply and precipitated a massive recall effort by Aventis to direct the con-
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tiffs allegedly purchased contaminated seed, they did not buy it
from Bayer. Rather their harvested crop was "injured by Bayer's
negligent contamination of the nationwide rice supply," which made
the economic loss doctrine inapplicable to their claims."'
B. Punitive Damages
While no punitive damages were awarded in this initial verdict,
Bayer cannot collaterally estop the thousands of other plaintiffs
from having their day in court to seek punitive damages.'" In con-
solidated cases, each test plaintiff seeking punitive damages requires
an "individualized hearing,"'" presumably to provide the defendant
with due process and to give each plaintiff their day in court on the
subject of defense misconduct.
Plaintiffs alleged that Bayer (the successor to Aventis Crop-
Science) and its subsidiaries were responsible for both Starlink corn
and LL601 rice crop commingling, thereby justifying an award of
punitive damages. In denying Bayer's motion for summary judg-
ment on the claim for punitive damages, the court cited disputed
issues of Bayer conduct. For example, did Bayer: 1) ascertain
whether the LL601 field trials were planted too close to foundation
seed, 2) monitor for unauthorized releases of LL601 outside areas in
which it was planted, and 3) verify whether the LSU "cooperators"
were taking necessary steps, such as cleaning their equipment and
boots, properly storing the rice, or adequately documenting compli-
taminated corn to non-food uses. Organic Consumers Association Biotech Firm
Executive Says Genetically Engineered Corn is here to Stay, (Mar. 19, 2001), available at
www.organicconsumers.org/ge/starlinkforever.cfm. Unfortunately, subsequent
testing for traces of the contaminated corn continued for at least eight years. EPA
White Paper Regarding StarLink Corn Dietary Exposure and Risk, 73 Fed. Reg.
22,715, 22,716 (Apr. 25, 2008).
197. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-17.
198. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1657 (U.S.D.C E.D. La.
Jun. 5, 2007) (awarding punitive damages in "bellwether" test trial to one of thou-
sands of plaintiffs) available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/
Barnett.o&r.pdf ; In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 448 F.Supp.2d 737
(E.D.La.,2006); In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 448 F.Supp.2d 737, 739
(E.D.La. 2006).
199. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 356-57 (2007) (constitutionally
protected defenses include individualized inquiries such as a plaintiffs knowledge);
Cf. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2007) (statistical formulas
are employed to fashion the appropriate remedy).
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ance. These, and other questions regarding punitive damages, will
be heard in future trials.
C. Trace Back Liability
The consolidated LL601 litigation also includes the claim of the
German rice importing company (Rickmers), which is suing for
breach of contract. Rickmers, by suing the grower cooperative Rice-
land, hopes to recover its losses via trace back liability through the
chain of commerce. Riceland, in turn, however, may find its reme-
dies against the originating seed company (Bayer) limited due to the
seed industry's adept use of liability disclaimers in adhesion con-
tracts signed by growers. In the LL601 litigation, the rice grower
cooperative Riceland conceivably could sue Bayer to recover
amounts paid due to the commingling caused by Bayer. This may
prove difficult, however, if the growers in the cooperative purchased
seed with disclaimers of liability from Bayer (and those disclaimers
or limitations of liability are enforced to deny recovery by Riceland
of amounts paid to claimants such as Rickmers). Seed contracts
typically have boilerplate disclaimers of liability for traces of genetic
"off-types," which might include biotech crops that were never sub-
mitted for regulatory approval in the U.S., much less the overseas
markets at issue in the LL601 rice case.
On the other hand, it its LL601 summary judgment ruling, the
court found little reason to hold the handlers such as Riceland liable
for any degree of comparative fault. Bayer asserted that it could not
have caused the harm in question "due to the intervening and/or
superseding acts or omissions of parties or non-parties to this action
for whose acts or omissions the BCS Defendants and Bayer Corpo-
ration are not liable."202
The court, however, held that "[a]lthough plaintiffs still have to
prove proximate cause, Bayer may not argue that others may have
caused the losses.. . . the negligence, if there was any, was in Bayer's
handling of the GM rice that it controlled... . [t]he risk that the GM
trait might escape and contaminate other non-GM rice or other
plants is precisely the known and foreseeable risk that Bayer under-
200. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.
201. See A. Bryan Endres, Revising Seed Purity Law to Account for the Adventitious
Presence of Genetically Modified Varieties: A First Step Toward Coexistence, I J. FOOD L.
& POL'Y 131,154-55 (2005) (discussing liability disclaimers in seed purchase con-
tracts).
202. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
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took when it field tested the rice. Bayer's duty included the duty to
assure that those it chose to field test the rice followed proper pro-
cedures."m Accordingly, trace back liability to the seed developer,
similar to the Starlink litigation, appears to have survived the first
stages of the genetically modified rice litigation.
In conclusion, although the test cases thus far have imposed sig-
nificant liability on Bayer, the case may not create a broad remedy at
common law merely for the loss of an export market in a commod-
ity crop. Although that might be a logical extension of the current
case, it is important to note that Bayer's unauthorized release of
LL601 was unlawful when it occurred, even if the subsequent regu-
latory review by USDA removed any duty to conduct a recall of rice
in domestic markets. In contrast, a seed company that is fully com-
pliant with U.S. regulations, and also undertakes disclosure of the
regulatory approval (or lack thereof) of the seed being sold via a
disclaimer in the seed purchase contract, may have less evidence of
negligence than Bayer (with its alleged lack of oversight of its LL601
field trials). Moreover, although in this case the court denied
Bayer's LLP-based defenses, eventual APHIS finalization of a revised
LLP rule that authorizes limited commingling of even regulated
genetically modified plant varieties (i.e., biotech varieties not yet
approved for commercial release) could preclude plaintiffs in the
future from seeking compensation for lost markets via trace back
liability to the seed developer. As a result, it could leave food proc-
essors or others in the food supply chain exposed to breach of con-
tract actions (e.g., breach of contract for failure to deliver food
meeting required purity standards) as they would be unable to re-
cover their losses from the biotechnology company initially respon-
sible for the product commingling.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Unintended components incorporated into the food supply,
whether unapproved GM or pathogens such as V. Vulnificus or Sal-
monella Enteritidis, present continuing challenges to a regulatory
system straining to oversee global supply chains, multiple-scale farm-
ing operations and consumer demand for wholesome, unprocessed
and inexpensive food. With so many facets, the Food Safety Work-
ing Group faces a difficult challenge as it attempts to realign the
203. Id. at 1024-25 (discussing Bayer's affirmative defense for intervening causa-
tion).
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nation's food safety system within the context of multiple non-food
policy initiatives such as health care, financial services reform, global
climate change legislation and immigration reform. As noted in the
opening paragraph, many of these relatively small initiatives dis-
cussed within this article may coalesce into a comprehensive reform
of the food regulatory system from farm to fork. On the other
hand, political realities may impose substantial roadblocks and di-
vert attention to more immediate needs. Nonetheless, the second
half of 2009 witnessed several potentially significant food law issues
with long-term impact.
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